principle rule in Missouri

2021The principle is not a rule of convenience, but it is a principle of justice, so recognized, like the statute of limitations.’” Id. (quoting Denny, 57 S.W.2d at 418 ).

2021The principle is not a rule of convenience, but it is a principle of justice, so recognized, like the statute of limitations.’” Id. (quoting Denny, 57 S.W.2d at 418 ).

1885Upon the principle of waiver as applicable to the acts of the landlord, it may well be held that he has surrendered his right to proceed under the act.” The more general principle laid down by the supreme court in Garnhardt v. Finney ( 40 Mo. 449 ,. 460), seems equally to apply.

1877Garnhart v. Finney, 40 Mo. 449 : Taylor’s L. & T., sec. 497.

2013“Appellate courts review evi-dentiary errors to ascertain whether they were prejudicial, that is, whether the errors are more likely than not to have affected the outcome.” Id. at 757 .

2012Craig, 287 S.W.3d at 679 .

2004E.g., Drake, supra; Long, supra. “Equitable adoption is a principle and rule of equity only.” Rich v. Baer, 361 Mo. 1048 , 238 S.W.2d 408, 411 (1951).

2001The court cited Hendricks for the principle that the presumption that a wife signs a land contract solely to release her inchoate right of dower is a rebuttable one, and that evidence sufficient to rebut it would have to be either special language in the contract tending to establish an agreement between the husband and wife that the wife was to share in the ownership of the payments made by the vendee thereunder, or evidence “dehors the contract tending to prove such an agreement.” In re Fischer’s Estate, 126 N.W.2d at 600 .

2000General Electric v. Gaertner, 666 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. banc 1984), which they cite for the principle that a claim for contribution is separate and apart from the underlying tort action.

1979Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss, supra, was cited as authority for the principle that under the rule of ejusdem generis the authority to regulate and restrict the location and use of buildings and lands for “trade, industry, residence or other purposes” related to private property and the phrase “other purposes” was not to be broadened to include a public use of property by the state in carrying out its constitutional mandate to establish and maintain free public schools.

1978In truth, personal jurisdiction over an absent spouse is not necessary to confer jurisdiction for the purpose of dividing marital property. ' That legal proposition has been recently decided by this court in In re Marriage of Breen, 560 S.W.2d 358 (Mo.App.1977).

1964Costello v. Kansas City, 280 Mo. 576 , 219 *101 S.W. 386; Spalding v. Robertson, 357 Mo. 37 , 206 S.W.2d 517 ; Bittner v. Crown Shoe Mfg.

1964Costello v. Kansas City, 280 Mo. 576 , 219 *101 S.W. 386; Spalding v. Robertson, 357 Mo. 37 , 206 S.W.2d 517 ; Bittner v. Crown Shoe Mfg.

1964Costello v. Kansas City, 280 Mo. 576 , 219 *101 S.W. 386; Spalding v. Robertson, 357 Mo. 37 , 206 S.W.2d 517 ; Bittner v. Crown Shoe Mfg.

1964Costello v. Kansas City, 280 Mo. 576 , 219 *101 S.W. 386; Spalding v. Robertson, 357 Mo. 37 , 206 S.W.2d 517 ; Bittner v. Crown Shoe Mfg.

1963In State ex rel. and to the use of Reeves v. Shain et al., Mo. en Banc., 343 Mo. 550 , 122 S.W.2d 885, 887 , the principle of waiver of objections to instructions is applied.

1963In State ex rel. and to the use of Reeves v. Shain et al., Mo. en Banc., 343 Mo. 550 , 122 S.W.2d 885, 887 , the principle of waiver of objections to instructions is applied.

1957Wilson v. Wilson, supra, 260 S.W.2d 770 , loc. cit. 776.

1957Wilson v. Wilson, supra, 260 S.W.2d 770 , loc. cit. 776.

1946In State v. Shipley, 174 Mo. 512 , l.c. 516, relied on by us in State v. Byrnes, 177 S.W.2d 909 , l.c. 912, it was held "Error is presumptively harmful, and it devolves upon the party who commits it to show that it could not possibly have resulted in injury." Both of the last cited decisions were handed down in criminal cases where courts are inclined to jealously guard the rights of an accused; but the principle that error is presumed to be harmful is equally applicable in a suit for damages.

1946In State v. Shipley, 174 Mo. 512 , l.c. 516, relied on by us in State v. Byrnes, 177 S.W.2d 909 , l.c. 912, it was held "Error is presumptively harmful, and it devolves upon the party who commits it to show that it could not possibly have resulted in injury." Both of the last cited decisions were handed down in criminal cases where courts are inclined to jealously guard the rights of an accused; but the principle that error is presumed to be harmful is equally applicable in a suit for damages.

1938In the ease at bar, the principle of waiver and estoppel is evidently urged, as creative of a cause of action. ■ Waiver and estoppel is for the purpose of preserving rights already acquired and not to create new rights. [State v. Mo. Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 337 , 53 S. W. (2d) 394 , l. c. 401.] Appellant cites in support of the first point Van Cleave v. Union Casualty Co., 82 Mo. App. 668 .

1938In the ease at bar, the principle of waiver and estoppel is evidently urged, as creative of a cause of action. ■ Waiver and estoppel is for the purpose of preserving rights already acquired and not to create new rights. [State v. Mo. Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 337 , 53 S. W. (2d) 394 , l. c. 401.] Appellant cites in support of the first point Van Cleave v. Union Casualty Co., 82 Mo. App. 668 .

1938In the ease at bar, the principle of waiver and estoppel is evidently urged, as creative of a cause of action. ■ Waiver and estoppel is for the purpose of preserving rights already acquired and not to create new rights. [State v. Mo. Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 337 , 53 S. W. (2d) 394 , l. c. 401.] Appellant cites in support of the first point Van Cleave v. Union Casualty Co., 82 Mo. App. 668 .

1924Co., 186 Mo. App. 310 ; Lafont v. Ins.