principle rule in Mississippi

1952In the case of Staton v. Bryant, 55 Miss. 261 , this Court expressly recognized the doctrine of estoppel by conduct, and stated that, “The principle on which the doctrine of estoppel by conduct rests is that it would be a fraud in a party to assert what his previous conduct had denied, when on the faith of that denial, others have acted.” In the case of Young v. Adams, 122 Miss. 1 , 84 So. 1 , the Court held that a vendor of standing timber, who participates in, agrees to, and acquiesces in the assignment of a timber contract by the vendee to a third party, is estopped to assert its nonassigna

1934Estoppel by conduct ‘ arises from an act or declaration of a person intended or calculated to mislead another, on which that other has relied, and has so acted, or refrained from action, as that injury will befall him if the truth of the act or declaration be denied.’ ” Staton v. Bryant, 55 Miss. 261 ; Strauss Bros. v. Denton, 140 Miss. 745 , 106 So. 257 , 45 A. L.

1987This section states "It [is] unlawful ... to sell ... beer to... any person under the age of eighteen (18) years." It does not say "it is unlawful ... unless the seller used reasonable care to ascertain the age of the minor." In Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So.2d 213 (Miss. 1979), we addressed this exact question and held that plaintiffs are entitled to an instruction that defendants who violated the statute, were negligent per se, and that if the negligence proximately caused or contributed to the injury, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. *1097 The principle that violation of a statu

1985West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048 (Miss. 1985); Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); and precedent for more than a hundred years.

1985West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048 (Miss. 1985); Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); and precedent for more than a hundred years.

1985This writer readily agrees that we have held that when a chancery court takes jurisdiction of a claim that is principally equitable and that "legal claims" have been asserted therein arising out of or closely related to the equitable claim, that the chancery court, as a court of equity, has the power to do "complete justice to all of the parties involved." But, the majority opinion goes further and makes the broad and bold statement that "There is no reason or principle why the converse should not also be true: where a circuit court has jurisdiction of an action at law, it may hear and adjudic

1985This writer readily agrees that we have held that when a chancery court takes jurisdiction of a claim that is principally equitable and that "legal claims" have been asserted therein arising out of or closely related to the equitable claim, that the chancery court, as a court of equity, has the power to do "complete justice to all of the parties involved." But, the majority opinion goes further and makes the broad and bold statement that "There is no reason or principle why the converse should not also be true: where a circuit court has jurisdiction of an action at law, it may hear and adjudic

1985This writer readily agrees that we have held that when a chancery court takes jurisdiction of a claim that is principally equitable and that "legal claims" have been asserted therein arising out of or closely related to the equitable claim, that the chancery court, as a court of equity, has the power to do "complete justice to all of the parties involved." But, the majority opinion goes further and makes the broad and bold statement that "There is no reason or principle why the converse should not also be true: where a circuit court has jurisdiction of an action at law, it may hear and adjudic

1985The principle of immunity from suit for governmental bodies vested with discretionary authority was carried forward in the legislative response to Pruett v. City of Rosedale, supra , the 1984 Immunity Act.

1983Cf. Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 245 So.2d 845 (Miss. 1971).

1980Reagan v. State, 318 So.2d 879 (Miss. 1975).

1957“In the absence of express words, it seems that only one recovery can be had for acts or omissions, in violation of a statute, occurring prior to the commencement of suit.” Only one case has been brought to our attention in which this Court has had occasion to consider questions relating to the recovery of cumulative penalties, and that is the case of the Town of Flora v. American Express Company, 92 Miss. 66 , 45 So. 149 .

1957“In the absence of express words, it seems that only one recovery can be had for acts or omissions, in violation of a statute, occurring prior to the commencement of suit.” Only one case has been brought to our attention in which this Court has had occasion to consider questions relating to the recovery of cumulative penalties, and that is the case of the Town of Flora v. American Express Company, 92 Miss. 66 , 45 So. 149 .

1952In the case of Staton v. Bryant, 55 Miss. 261 , this Court expressly recognized the doctrine of estoppel by conduct, and stated that, “The principle on which the doctrine of estoppel by conduct rests is that it would be a fraud in a party to assert what his previous conduct had denied, when on the faith of that denial, others have acted.” In the case of Young v. Adams, 122 Miss. 1 , 84 So. 1 , the Court held that a vendor of standing timber, who participates in, agrees to, and acquiesces in the assignment of a timber contract by the vendee to a third party, is estopped to assert its nonassigna

1952The principle applied in the above mentioned cases was also applied in the cases of Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 ; Peeler v. Hutson, 202 Miss. 837 , 32 So. (2d) 785 ; In re Stoball’s Estate, 211 Miss. 15 , 50 So. (2d) 635 .

1952The principle applied in the above mentioned cases was also applied in the cases of Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 ; Peeler v. Hutson, 202 Miss. 837 , 32 So. (2d) 785 ; In re Stoball’s Estate, 211 Miss. 15 , 50 So. (2d) 635 .

1952The principle applied in the above mentioned cases was also applied in the cases of Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 ; Peeler v. Hutson, 202 Miss. 837 , 32 So. (2d) 785 ; In re Stoball’s Estate, 211 Miss. 15 , 50 So. (2d) 635 .

1952The principle applied in the above mentioned cases was also applied in the cases of Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 ; Peeler v. Hutson, 202 Miss. 837 , 32 So. (2d) 785 ; In re Stoball’s Estate, 211 Miss. 15 , 50 So. (2d) 635 .

1952The principle applied in the above mentioned cases was also applied in the cases of Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 ; Peeler v. Hutson, 202 Miss. 837 , 32 So. (2d) 785 ; In re Stoball’s Estate, 211 Miss. 15 , 50 So. (2d) 635 .

1952The principle applied in the above mentioned cases was also applied in the cases of Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 ; Peeler v. Hutson, 202 Miss. 837 , 32 So. (2d) 785 ; In re Stoball’s Estate, 211 Miss. 15 , 50 So. (2d) 635 .

1934Estoppel by conduct ‘ arises from an act or declaration of a person intended or calculated to mislead another, on which that other has relied, and has so acted, or refrained from action, as that injury will befall him if the truth of the act or declaration be denied.’ ” Staton v. Bryant, 55 Miss. 261 ; Strauss Bros. v. Denton, 140 Miss. 745 , 106 So. 257 , 45 A. L.

1934Estoppel by conduct ‘ arises from an act or declaration of a person intended or calculated to mislead another, on which that other has relied, and has so acted, or refrained from action, as that injury will befall him if the truth of the act or declaration be denied.’ ” Staton v. Bryant, 55 Miss. 261 ; Strauss Bros. v. Denton, 140 Miss. 745 , 106 So. 257 , 45 A. L.

1930See, also, Farad Co. v. Buckalew (Miss.), 124 So. 333 ; Continental Co. v. Braddock, 103 Miss. 248 , 60 So. 212 , The contentions of appellant are that, when the merchandise was returned to appellee, it had three remedies: First, to promptly ship the goods back to appellant and stand on the contract price; or, second, to retain the goods as its own and sue for the difference between the contract price and the market value at the place of business of appellant; or, third, to" sell the property after notice to appellant at the best market price at or near the place of business of appellant and s

1930See, also, Farad Co. v. Buckalew (Miss.), 124 So. 333 ; Continental Co. v. Braddock, 103 Miss. 248 , 60 So. 212 , The contentions of appellant are that, when the merchandise was returned to appellee, it had three remedies: First, to promptly ship the goods back to appellant and stand on the contract price; or, second, to retain the goods as its own and sue for the difference between the contract price and the market value at the place of business of appellant; or, third, to" sell the property after notice to appellant at the best market price at or near the place of business of appellant and s

1873But the correctness of the ruling of the court below may: be sustained and illustrated, as.in Owings v. Wyant, 1 Har. >& McHur., 393, where parol evidence was held admissable to prove the defendant to be an inn-keeper, in an action against him as such, although his license as such was a matter of record, or, in Widdifield v. Widdifield, 2 Bin., 245 , where parol proof of the existence of a partnership was allowed, though there were written articles of partnership, See also, 9 Mass., 312 ; 5 ib., 427; 11 ib., 477 ; 5 Pay, 175 ; 1 ib., 100; and Gratz v. Wilson, 1 Halsted’s R., 419, wherein parol

1873It is the doctrine of the text writers, and of adjudicated cases, that the principle of the rule which requires that a party shall have previous notice to produce a written instrument in his possession, before the contents can be proved as evidence in the case, will not apply to cases where, from the nature of the proceeding, the defendant has notice, that the plaintiff means to charge him with the possession of the instrument. 2 Phil, on Ev., with C. & H.’s & E.’s notes, c. 7, p. 539, And this rule is applied in both civil and criminal proceedings. 14 East, 274; 4 Launt, 865; 5 Barn. & Cress.

1873But the correctness of the ruling of the court below may: be sustained and illustrated, as.in Owings v. Wyant, 1 Har. >& McHur., 393, where parol evidence was held admissable to prove the defendant to be an inn-keeper, in an action against him as such, although his license as such was a matter of record, or, in Widdifield v. Widdifield, 2 Bin., 245 , where parol proof of the existence of a partnership was allowed, though there were written articles of partnership, See also, 9 Mass., 312 ; 5 ib., 427; 11 ib., 477 ; 5 Pay, 175 ; 1 ib., 100; and Gratz v. Wilson, 1 Halsted’s R., 419, wherein parol

1873It is the doctrine of the text writers, and of adjudicated cases, that the principle of the rule which requires that a party shall have previous notice to produce a written instrument in his possession, before the contents can be proved as evidence in the case, will not apply to cases where, from the nature of the proceeding, the defendant has notice, that the plaintiff means to charge him with the possession of the instrument. 2 Phil, on Ev., with C. & H.’s & E.’s notes, c. 7, p. 539, And this rule is applied in both civil and criminal proceedings. 14 East, 274; 4 Launt, 865; 5 Barn. & Cress.

1873It is the doctrine of the text writers, and of adjudicated cases, that the principle of the rule which requires that a party shall have previous notice to produce a written instrument in his possession, before the contents can be proved as evidence in the case, will not apply to cases where, from the nature of the proceeding, the defendant has notice, that the plaintiff means to charge him with the possession of the instrument. 2 Phil, on Ev., with C. & H.’s & E.’s notes, c. 7, p. 539, And this rule is applied in both civil and criminal proceedings. 14 East, 274; 4 Launt, 865; 5 Barn. & Cress.