principle error in Michigan

2018Co. of Mich. , 492 Mich. 503 , 536, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012) : " 'The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.' " This principle does have an exception: When a ''statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such contracts may not be invalidated, nor vested rights acquired under them impaire

2018Co. of Mich. , 492 Mich. 503 , 536, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012) : " 'The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.' " This principle does have an exception: When a ''statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such contracts may not be invalidated, nor vested rights acquired under them impaire

2018Co. of Mich. , 492 Mich. 503 , 536, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012) : " 'The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.' " This principle does have an exception: When a ''statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such contracts may not be invalidated, nor vested rights acquired under them impaire

2018Co. of Mich. , 492 Mich. 503 , 536, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012) : " 'The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.' " This principle does have an exception: When a ''statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such contracts may not be invalidated, nor vested rights acquired under them impaire

2018Co. of Mich. , 492 Mich. 503 , 536, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012) : " 'The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.' " This principle does have an exception: When a ''statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such contracts may not be invalidated, nor vested rights acquired under them impaire

2018Co. of Mich. , 492 Mich. 503 , 536, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012) : " 'The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.' " This principle does have an exception: When a ''statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such contracts may not be invalidated, nor vested rights acquired under them impaire

2017Instead, its stated rationale was as follows: “ ‘The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.’ ” This principle does have an exception: When a 11 We are similarly unpersuaded by defendants’ citation to Hall v Novik, 256 Mich App 387, 392 ; 663 NW2d 522 (2003), which defendants contend implicitly found that where a judicial decision specifies the order to be entered by the trial court on remand (as occurred in Co

2017Instead, its stated rationale was as follows: “ ‘The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.’ ” This principle does have an exception: When a 11 We are similarly unpersuaded by defendants’ citation to Hall v Novik, 256 Mich App 387, 392 ; 663 NW2d 522 (2003), which defendants contend implicitly found that where a judicial decision specifies the order to be entered by the trial court on remand (as occurred in Co

1917In the Bernard Case Justice McAlvay used the following quotations: “ ‘The statements of an agent, when made in the course of his employment, and while engaged in the business of his principal, are binding upon the principal, because they are part of the res gestse; but no agent is employed to make admissions outside of his employment. * * * In the case of Vicksburg & Meridian Railroad v. O’Brien, 119 U. S. 106 [7 Sup. Ct. 118], the court, quoting Mr. Justice Strong {Northwestern Packet Co. v. ClougK], 20 Wall 541, states the principle of the rule to be that, “The agent to do the act is not aut

1912The following excerpts from opinions of this court are in point: “ The statements of an agent, when made in the course of his employment, and while engaged in the business of his principal, are binding upon the principal, because they are part of the res gesteej but no agent is employed to make admissions outside of his employment. * * * In the case of Vicksburg & Meridian Railroad v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 106 [7 Sup. Ct. 121], the court, quoting Mr. Justice Strong [Northwestern Packet Co. v. Clough], 20 Wall. 541 , states the principle of the rule to be that, ‘ the agent to do the act is not aut

2025Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 520 .

2021Johnson v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich 751, 761 ; 918 NW2d 785 (2018). -4- MCL 750.411h addresses the crime of stalking.4 “Stalking” is defined as a “willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” MCL 750.411h(1)(d).

2021Johnson v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich 751, 761 ; 918 NW2d 785 (2018). -4- MCL 750.411h addresses the crime of stalking.4 “Stalking” is defined as a “willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” MCL 750.411h(1)(d).

2018So, under the principle of the rule against retroactive ratemaking, when estimates of future costs on which rates are based prove inaccurate by being either higher or lower than predicted, “the previously set rates cannot be changed to correct for the error; the only step that the MPSC can take is to prospectively revise rates in an effort to set more appropriate ones.” Detroit Edison Co v Pub Serv Comm, 416 Mich 510, 523 ; 331 NW2d 159 (1982).

2018So, under the principle of the rule against retroactive ratemaking, when estimates of future costs on which rates are based prove inaccurate by being either higher or lower than predicted, “the previously set rates cannot be changed to correct for the error; the only step that the MPSC can take is to prospectively revise rates in an effort to set more appropriate ones.” Detroit Edison Co v Pub Serv Comm, 416 Mich 510, 523 ; 331 NW2d 159 (1982).

2018Simply stated, to the extent that the public policy of this state is derived from its Constitution and statutes, such policy seemingly stands in disfavor of allowing those with serious criminal records to serve in public office. 13 *748 I further believe that the bar-to-office obligation is consistent with the principle that the rule of law fundamentally "ensures equality of treatment under the law." LSEA , 487 Mich. at 435 , 792 N.W.2d 686 ( CORRIGAN , J., dissenting).

2018Simply stated, to the extent that the public policy of this state is derived from its Constitution and statutes, such policy seemingly stands in disfavor of allowing those with serious criminal records to serve in public office. 13 *748 I further believe that the bar-to-office obligation is consistent with the principle that the rule of law fundamentally "ensures equality of treatment under the law." LSEA , 487 Mich. at 435 , 792 N.W.2d 686 ( CORRIGAN , J., dissenting).

2015Therefore, consistent with the principle that defense “[c]ounsel may not harbor error as an appellate parachute,” Dresselhouse v Chrysler Corp, 177 Mich App 470, 477 ; 442 NW2d 705 (1989), defendant has waived review of any claim that the trial court erred by failing to provide findings concerning the value of the parties’ home and personal property.

2015Therefore, consistent with the principle that defense “[c]ounsel may not harbor error as an appellate parachute,” Dresselhouse v Chrysler Corp, 177 Mich App 470, 477 ; 442 NW2d 705 (1989), defendant has waived review of any claim that the trial court erred by failing to provide findings concerning the value of the parties’ home and personal property.

2015Therefore, consistent with the principle that defense “[c]ounsel may not harbor error as an appellate parachute,” Carter, 462 Mich at 214 , defendant arguably waived review of the issue of whether the trial court properly admitted Richardson’s expert testimony, Kowalski, 489 Mich at 503 .

2012Likewise, Butterworth, Mester, Allen, and Roberts are Court of Appeals decisions, and, as such, are not binding precedent in this Court. “‘The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.’”100 This principle does have an exception: When a “statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such co

2012Likewise, Butterworth, Mester, Allen, and Roberts are Court of Appeals decisions, and, as such, are not binding precedent in this Court. “‘The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.’”100 This principle does have an exception: When a “statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such co

2012Likewise, Butterworth, Mester, Allen, and Roberts are Court of Appeals decisions, and, as such, are not binding precedent in this Court. “‘The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.’”100 This principle does have an exception: When a “statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such co

2012Likewise, Butterworth, Mester, Allen, and Roberts are Court of Appeals decisions, and, as such, are not binding precedent in this Court. “‘The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.’”100 This principle does have an exception: When a “statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such co

2012Likewise, Butterworth, Mester, Allen, and Roberts are Court of Appeals decisions, and, as such, are not binding precedent in this Court. “‘The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.’”100 This principle does have an exception: When a “statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such co

2004While this Court has subsequently questioned the Miller Court’s conclusion that the dilution of the right of peremptory challenge is error per se, see People v Green (On Remand), 241 Mich App 40, 46 ; 613 NW2d 744 (2000) (Griffin J., noting that in the years following Miller our Supreme Court has “distanced itself from the principle of error per se and embraced the notion that ‘rules of automatic reversal are disfavored.’ ” [citation omitted].), we are unaware of any Michigan Supreme Court case that has overruled or otherwise expressly modified the conclusion in Miller. 11 In fact, as observed

2004While this Court has subsequently questioned the Miller Court’s conclusion that the dilution of the right of peremptory challenge is error per se, see People v Green (On Remand), 241 Mich App 40, 46 ; 613 NW2d 744 (2000) (Griffin J., noting that in the years following Miller our Supreme Court has “distanced itself from the principle of error per se and embraced the notion that ‘rules of automatic reversal are disfavored.’ ” [citation omitted].), we are unaware of any Michigan Supreme Court case that has overruled or otherwise expressly modified the conclusion in Miller. 11 In fact, as observed

2004While this Court has subsequently questioned the Miller Court’s conclusion that the dilution of the right of peremptory challenge is error per se, see People v Green (On Remand), 241 Mich App 40, 46 ; 613 NW2d 744 (2000) (Griffin J., noting that in the years following Miller our Supreme Court has “distanced itself from the principle of error per se and embraced the notion that ‘rules of automatic reversal are disfavored.’ ” [citation omitted].), we are unaware of any Michigan Supreme Court case that has overruled or otherwise expressly modified the conclusion in Miller. 11 In fact, as observed

2004While this Court has subsequently questioned the Miller Court's conclusion that the dilution of the right of peremptory challenge is error per se, see People v. Green (On Remand), 241 Mich.App. 40, 46 , 613 N.W.2d 744 (2000) (Griffin J., noting that in the years following Miller our Supreme Court has "distanced itself from the principle of error per se and embraced the notion that `rules of automatic reversal are disfavored'" [citation omitted]), we are unaware of any Michigan Supreme Court case that has overruled or otherwise expressly modified the conclusion in Miller . [11] *901 In fact, as

2004See, e.g., United States v Gibbs, 182 F3d 408, 435 (CA 6, 1999) (denial of right to peremptoiy challenge “amounts to reversible error, there is no requirement of a showing of prejudice” [citation omitted]); United States v Hall, 152 F3d 381, 408 (CA 5, 1998), abrogated on other grounds by United States v Martinez-Salazar, 528 US 304 ; 120 S Ct 774 ; 145 L Ed 2d 792 (2000) 13 (noting circuits that hold that harmless error does not apply to denial or impairment of right to exercise peremptoiy challenges); Tankleff v Senkowski, 135 F3d 235, 248 (CA 2, 1998) (holding that harmless error analysis i

2004See, e.g., United States v Gibbs, 182 F3d 408, 435 (CA 6, 1999) (denial of right to peremptoiy challenge “amounts to reversible error, there is no requirement of a showing of prejudice” [citation omitted]); United States v Hall, 152 F3d 381, 408 (CA 5, 1998), abrogated on other grounds by United States v Martinez-Salazar, 528 US 304 ; 120 S Ct 774 ; 145 L Ed 2d 792 (2000) 13 (noting circuits that hold that harmless error does not apply to denial or impairment of right to exercise peremptoiy challenges); Tankleff v Senkowski, 135 F3d 235, 248 (CA 2, 1998) (holding that harmless error analysis i

2004While this Court has subsequently questioned the Miller Court’s conclusion that the dilution of the right of peremptory challenge is error per se, see People v Green (On Remand), 241 Mich App 40, 46 ; 613 NW2d 744 (2000) (Griffin J., noting that in the years following Miller our Supreme Court has “distanced itself from the principle of error per se and embraced the notion that ‘rules of automatic reversal are disfavored.’ ” [citation omitted].), we are unaware of any Michigan Supreme Court case that has overruled or otherwise expressly modified the conclusion in Miller. 11 In fact, as observed

2004While this Court has subsequently questioned the Miller Court’s conclusion that the dilution of the right of peremptory challenge is error per se, see People v Green (On Remand), 241 Mich App 40, 46 ; 613 NW2d 744 (2000) (Griffin J., noting that in the years following Miller our Supreme Court has “distanced itself from the principle of error per se and embraced the notion that ‘rules of automatic reversal are disfavored.’ ” [citation omitted].), we are unaware of any Michigan Supreme Court case that has overruled or otherwise expressly modified the conclusion in Miller. 11 In fact, as observed

2003The Supreme Court relied on Scheurman v Dep’t of Trans, 434 Mich 619, 629-630 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), for the principle that the immunity conferred on governmental agencies is broad and the exceptions to that immunity are narrowly drawn.

2003The Supreme Court relied on Scheurman v Dep’t of Trans, 434 Mich 619, 629-630 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), for the principle that the immunity conferred on governmental agencies is broad and the exceptions to that immunity are narrowly drawn.

2003The Supreme Court relied on Scheurman v Dep’t of Trans, 434 Mich 619, 629-630 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), for the principle that the immunity conferred on governmental agencies is broad and the exceptions to that immunity are narrowly drawn.

2003The Supreme Court relied on Scheurman v Dep’t of Trans, 434 Mich 619, 629-630 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), for the principle that the immunity conferred on governmental agencies is broad and the exceptions to that immunity are narrowly drawn.

2003Nawrocki, supra at 158-159 .

2003Nawrocki, supra at 158-159 , 615 N.W.2d 702 .