principle waiver in Kentucky

1995Van Wey further cites with approval the holding of Rose v. Ledford, 306 Ky. 662 , 208 S.W.2d 957 (1948), that “a parent may not take (children) away from those to whom he surrendered them without first showing that it would be for the best interest of the child to do so.” Further, the principle of waiver was recognized in Van Wey when the Court stated on p. 735: A long line of Kentucky cases beginning with Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944), where the mother signed her consent for adoption in the hospital and then attempted to revoke her consent and resist the adoption procedur

1995Van Wey further cites with approval the holding of Rose v. Ledford, 306 Ky. 662 , 208 S.W.2d 957 (1948), that “a parent may not take (children) away from those to whom he surrendered them without first showing that it would be for the best interest of the child to do so.” Further, the principle of waiver was recognized in Van Wey when the Court stated on p. 735: A long line of Kentucky cases beginning with Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944), where the mother signed her consent for adoption in the hospital and then attempted to revoke her consent and resist the adoption procedur

1995Van Wey further cites with approval the holding of Rose v. Ledford, 306 Ky. 662 , 208 S.W.2d 957 (1948), that “a parent may not take (children) away from those to whom he surrendered them without first showing that it would be for the best interest of the child to do so.” Further, the principle of waiver was recognized in Van Wey when the Court stated on p. 735: A long line of Kentucky cases beginning with Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944), where the mother signed her consent for adoption in the hospital and then attempted to revoke her consent and resist the adoption procedur

1995Van Wey further cites with approval the holding of Rose v. Ledford, 306 Ky. 662 , 208 S.W.2d 957 (1948), that “a parent may not take (children) away from those to whom he surrendered them without first showing that it would be for the best interest of the child to do so.” Further, the principle of waiver was recognized in Van Wey when the Court stated on p. 735: A long line of Kentucky cases beginning with Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944), where the mother signed her consent for adoption in the hospital and then attempted to revoke her consent and resist the adoption procedur

1995The right of the parent to reclaim the child is not extinguished, but the parent’s superior statutory right to custody has been waived so that thereafter the court will look primarily to the child’s welfare in awarding custody. [Citing cases.] Among the cases cited in support of the waiver principle was Shaw v. Graham, Ky., 310 S.W.2d 522 (1958), which held at p. 523: With respect to the custody of the children, we have held in numerous cases that whei'e a parent has consigned then' care to their grandparents, who are suitable for discharging the trust, and has acquiesced in that commitment, h

1995The right of the parent to reclaim the child is not extinguished, but the parent's superior statutory right to custody has been waived so that thereafter the court will look primarily to the child's welfare in awarding custody. [Citing cases.] Among the cases cited in support of the waiver principle was Shaw v. Graham, Ky., 310 S.W.2d 522 (1958), which held at p. 523: With respect to the custody of the children, we have held in numerous cases that where a parent has consigned their care to their grandparents, who are suitable for discharging the trust, and has acquiesced in that commitment, he

1967He cites Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , in support of his argument. *869 The Commonwealth counters by contending that Miranda stands for the principle that the warnings are required in connection with the use by the prosecution of statements or confessions.

1967He cites Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , in support of his argument. *869 The Commonwealth counters by contending that Miranda stands for the principle that the warnings are required in connection with the use by the prosecution of statements or confessions.

1949In Howard v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 467 , 86 S.W.2d 126, 127 , we said: “This court seems well committed to the principle that when the defense of accidental killing is relied upon, it is the duty of the court to give the accused the benefit of an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.” Appellant, however, cannot complain of the instrue *354 tion on involuntary manslaughter since he was convicted of a higher degree of the crime.

1949In Howard v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 467 , 86 S.W.2d 126, 127 , we said: “This court seems well committed to the principle that when the defense of accidental killing is relied upon, it is the duty of the court to give the accused the benefit of an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.” Appellant, however, cannot complain of the instrue *354 tion on involuntary manslaughter since he was convicted of a higher degree of the crime.

1945In the celebrated and pioneer case of Turner v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 619 , 2 Metc. 619 , at page 630, the court held that where objection is timely made and “ample cause” has been shown why it was improper for the circuit judge to preside in a case or make any order therein, he may not do so other than such as may be necessary to the selection of a special judge.

1945In the celebrated and pioneer case of Turner v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 619 , 2 Metc. 619 , at page 630, the court held that where objection is timely made and “ample cause” has been shown why it was improper for the circuit judge to preside in a case or make any order therein, he may not do so other than such as may be necessary to the selection of a special judge.

1944Barker v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 291 Ky. 184 , 163 S. W. 2d 466 .

1944Barker v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 291 Ky. 184 , 163 S. W. 2d 466 .

1942This principle or rule of interpretation was approved by us in the case of Lepps v. Lee, 92 Ky. 16 , 17 S. W. 146 .

1942This principle or rule of interpretation was approved by us in the case of Lepps v. Lee, 92 Ky. 16 , 17 S. W. 146 .

1939Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.” A like statement of the general principle of this res gestae exception was given in State v. Wag

1939Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.” A like statement of the general principle of this res gestae exception was given in State v. Wag

1939Maddox v. Maddox, 135 Ky. 403 , 122 S. W. 201 ; Elswick v. Elswick, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S. W. 1070 ; Watson v. Gilliam, 252 Ky. 762 , 68 S. W. (2d) 399 .

1939Maddox v. Maddox, 135 Ky. 403 , 122 S. W. 201 ; Elswick v. Elswick, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S. W. 1070 ; Watson v. Gilliam, 252 Ky. 762 , 68 S. W. (2d) 399 .

1939Maddox v. Maddox, 135 Ky. 403 , 122 S. W. 201 ; Elswick v. Elswick, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S. W. 1070 ; Watson v. Gilliam, 252 Ky. 762 , 68 S. W. (2d) 399 .

1939Maddox v. Maddox, 135 Ky. 403 , 122 S. W. 201 ; Elswick v. Elswick, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S. W. 1070 ; Watson v. Gilliam, 252 Ky. 762 , 68 S. W. (2d) 399 .

1939Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.” A like statement of the general principle of this res gestae exception was given in State v. Wag

1939Maddox v. Maddox, 135 Ky. 403 , 122 S. W. 201 ; Elswick v. Elswick, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S. W. 1070 ; Watson v. Gilliam, 252 Ky. 762 , 68 S. W. (2d) 399 .

1939Maddox v. Maddox, 135 Ky. 403 , 122 S. W. 201 ; Elswick v. Elswick, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S. W. 1070 ; Watson v. Gilliam, 252 Ky. 762 , 68 S. W. (2d) 399 .

1935Brewer’s Adm’r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400 , 205 S. W. 393 ; Thompson v. Latimer, 209 Ky. 491 , 273 S. W. 65 ; Erdman’s Adm’r v. Erdman’s Ex’r and Trustee, 229 Ky. 162 , 16 S. W. (2d) 756 ; 18 C.

1935Brewer’s Adm’r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400 , 205 S. W. 393 ; Thompson v. Latimer, 209 Ky. 491 , 273 S. W. 65 ; Erdman’s Adm’r v. Erdman’s Ex’r and Trustee, 229 Ky. 162 , 16 S. W. (2d) 756 ; 18 C.

1935Brewer’s Adm’r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400 , 205 S. W. 393 ; Thompson v. Latimer, 209 Ky. 491 , 273 S. W. 65 ; Erdman’s Adm’r v. Erdman’s Ex’r and Trustee, 229 Ky. 162 , 16 S. W. (2d) 756 ; 18 C.

1935Brewer’s Adm’r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400 , 205 S. W. 393 ; Thompson v. Latimer, 209 Ky. 491 , 273 S. W. 65 ; Erdman’s Adm’r v. Erdman’s Ex’r and Trustee, 229 Ky. 162 , 16 S. W. (2d) 756 ; 18 C.

1935Pelfrey v. Com., 247 Ky. 484 , 57 S. W. (2d) 474 , in which case the facts differ somewhat from the facts presented here.

1935Pelfrey v. Com., 247 Ky. 484 , 57 S. W. (2d) 474 , in which case the facts differ somewhat from the facts presented here.

1935Brewer’s Adm’r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400 , 205 S. W. 393 ; Thompson v. Latimer, 209 Ky. 491 , 273 S. W. 65 ; Erdman’s Adm’r v. Erdman’s Ex’r and Trustee, 229 Ky. 162 , 16 S. W. (2d) 756 ; 18 C.

1935Brewer’s Adm’r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400 , 205 S. W. 393 ; Thompson v. Latimer, 209 Ky. 491 , 273 S. W. 65 ; Erdman’s Adm’r v. Erdman’s Ex’r and Trustee, 229 Ky. 162 , 16 S. W. (2d) 756 ; 18 C.

1932This does not, of course, mean that, when the circuit court takes jurisdiction to hear and determine a case against a juvenile offender, and it develops for the first time during the. trial that the defendant is within the statutory age, he cannot, upon his dismissal in the circuit court, be immediately apprehended and taken before the county court; nor does it mean that on the return of this case the defendant should not be, upon his discharge by the circuit court, at once arrested, and taken before the county court; nor will the proceedings had in this case in the circuit court be a bar to o

1932This does not, of course, mean that, when the circuit court takes jurisdiction to hear and determine a case against a juvenile offender, and it develops for the first time during the. trial that the defendant is within the statutory age, he cannot, upon his dismissal in the circuit court, be immediately apprehended and taken before the county court; nor does it mean that on the return of this case the defendant should not be, upon his discharge by the circuit court, at once arrested, and taken before the county court; nor will the proceedings had in this case in the circuit court be a bar to o

1932As he failed so to do, the case must be reversed.” Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441 , 267 S. W. 231 ; Alexander’s Adin’r v. Kentucky Bankers Associa *741 tion, 237 Ky. 232 , 35 S. W. (2d) 287 ; Ashley v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 543 , 33 S. W. (2d) 614 .

1932As he failed so to do, the case must be reversed.” Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441 , 267 S. W. 231 ; Alexander’s Adin’r v. Kentucky Bankers Associa *741 tion, 237 Ky. 232 , 35 S. W. (2d) 287 ; Ashley v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 543 , 33 S. W. (2d) 614 .

1932As he failed so to do, the case must be reversed.” Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441 , 267 S. W. 231 ; Alexander’s Adin’r v. Kentucky Bankers Associa *741 tion, 237 Ky. 232 , 35 S. W. (2d) 287 ; Ashley v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 543 , 33 S. W. (2d) 614 .

1932As he failed so to do, the case must be reversed.” Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441 , 267 S. W. 231 ; Alexander’s Adin’r v. Kentucky Bankers Associa *741 tion, 237 Ky. 232 , 35 S. W. (2d) 287 ; Ashley v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 543 , 33 S. W. (2d) 614 .

1932As he failed so to do, the case must be reversed.” Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441 , 267 S. W. 231 ; Alexander’s Adin’r v. Kentucky Bankers Associa *741 tion, 237 Ky. 232 , 35 S. W. (2d) 287 ; Ashley v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 543 , 33 S. W. (2d) 614 .

1932As he failed so to do, the case must be reversed.” Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441 , 267 S. W. 231 ; Alexander’s Adin’r v. Kentucky Bankers Associa *741 tion, 237 Ky. 232 , 35 S. W. (2d) 287 ; Ashley v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 543 , 33 S. W. (2d) 614 .

1922The principle of this instruction has been approved by this court in Abbott v Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 624 ; Banks v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 800 ; Miracle v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 453 .

1922The principle of this instruction has been approved by this court in Abbott v Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 624 ; Banks v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 800 ; Miracle v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 453 .

1922The principle of this instruction has been approved by this court in Abbott v Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 624 ; Banks v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 800 ; Miracle v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 453 .

1920Hence, he who steals a stolen article of property from a thief may himself be convieted, notwithstanding the criminality of the possession of his immediate predecessor in crime.” To the same effect is Com. v. Smith, 129 Mass. 104 ; Bales v. State, 3 W.

1920Hence, he who steals a stolen article of property from a thief may himself be convieted, notwithstanding the criminality of the possession of his immediate predecessor in crime.” To the same effect is Com. v. Smith, 129 Mass. 104 ; Bales v. State, 3 W.

1869In Owens v. Snod grass and wife, 6 Dana, 229 , it is said that “though, a feme covert may be guilty of a tort either separately or conjointly with her husband, yet she can not, in our opinion, be precluded from relying on her coverture as a bar to legal liability for a fraud committed by her in a contract which her disability made void.” And this is true generally where the fraud is directly connected with a contract of the wife, and is the means of effecting it, and part of the same transaction. (2 Hilliard on Torts, 590.) But it is equally well settled that the husband is liable for the simp