principle claim in Connecticut

2000The court cited 3A Corbin, Contracts , § 755 (19960), "Waiver by Continuing to Perform or to Receive Performance." There are no Massachusetts cases the court is aware of that apply the waiver principle to non-compete agreements but that state certainly accepts the principle of waiver, see White v. Burger , 368 N.E.2d 824 , 825 (1977); Craig v. Lane , 98 N.E. 685 (Mass., 1912).

2000The court cited 3A Corbin, Contracts , § 755 (19960), "Waiver by Continuing to Perform or to Receive Performance." There are no Massachusetts cases the court is aware of that apply the waiver principle to non-compete agreements but that state certainly accepts the principle of waiver, see White v. Burger , 368 N.E.2d 824 , 825 (1977); Craig v. Lane , 98 N.E. 685 (Mass., 1912).

2000The court cited 3A Corbin, Contracts , § 755 (19960), "Waiver by Continuing to Perform or to Receive Performance." There are no Massachusetts cases the court is aware of that apply the waiver principle to non-compete agreements but that state certainly accepts the principle of waiver, see White v. Burger , 368 N.E.2d 824 , 825 (1977); Craig v. Lane , 98 N.E. 685 (Mass., 1912).

2000The court cited 3A Corbin, Contracts , § 755 (19960), "Waiver by Continuing to Perform or to Receive Performance." There are no Massachusetts cases the court is aware of that apply the waiver principle to non-compete agreements but that state certainly accepts the principle of waiver, see White v. Burger , 368 N.E.2d 824 , 825 (1977); Craig v. Lane , 98 N.E. 685 (Mass., 1912).

2000Also Steranko v. Infurex, Inc. , 362 N.E.2d 222 (Mass., 1976), made clear that if the employee breached its agreement by reducing the plaintiff in rank this would be a breach of the employment agreement, but also concluded there was no waiver of his right to rely on the breach because of his delay in seeking relief by way of declaratory judgment for one month.

2000Also Steranko v. Infurex, Inc. , 362 N.E.2d 222 (Mass., 1976), made clear that if the employee breached its agreement by reducing the plaintiff in rank this would be a breach of the employment agreement, but also concluded there was no waiver of his right to rely on the breach because of his delay in seeking relief by way of declaratory judgment for one month.

2022The plaintiff’s original claim is said to be ‘‘merged’’ in the judgment.’ Our recent case law has uniformly approved and applied the principle of claim preclusion or merger.’’ (Emphasis added.) 18 We also note that, to the extent that ‘‘our rationale is slightly different than that of the trial court,’’ it is ‘‘axiomatic that [an appellate court] may affirm a proper result of the trial court for a different reason.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silano v. Cooney, 189 Conn. App. 235, 241 , 207 A.3d 84 (2019); see also Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 , 58 S. Ct. 154 , 82 L.

2022The plaintiff’s original claim is said to be ‘‘merged’’ in the judgment.’ Our recent case law has uniformly approved and applied the principle of claim preclusion or merger.’’ (Emphasis added.) 18 We also note that, to the extent that ‘‘our rationale is slightly different than that of the trial court,’’ it is ‘‘axiomatic that [an appellate court] may affirm a proper result of the trial court for a different reason.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silano v. Cooney, 189 Conn. App. 235, 241 , 207 A.3d 84 (2019); see also Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 , 58 S. Ct. 154 , 82 L.

2018This court has held that "the principle of claim preclusion applie[s] when identical claims [are] argued on direct appeal and habeas review." (Emphasis omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 125 Conn. App. at 66 , 6 A.3d 213 .

2018This court has held that "the principle of claim preclusion applie[s] when identical claims [are] argued on direct appeal and habeas review." (Emphasis omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 125 Conn. App. at 66 , 6 A.3d 213 .

2016We consider the policies underlying res judicata in our determination of whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case. ‘‘These [underlying] purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to pre- vent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integ- rity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Isaac v. Truck Service, Inc., 253 Conn. 416, 422 , 752 A.2d 509 (2000). ‘‘[W]e have recognized that the applicatio

2016We consider the policies underlying res judicata in our determination of whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case. ‘‘These [underlying] purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to pre- vent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integ- rity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Isaac v. Truck Service, Inc., 253 Conn. 416, 422 , 752 A.2d 509 (2000). ‘‘[W]e have recognized that the applicatio

2016Such a require- ment would be inconsistent with the principle that the privilege does not extend to consequences of a noncrim- inal nature, such as threats of liability in civil suits, disgrace in the community, or the loss of employment.’’ United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 125 , 100 S. Ct. 948 , 63 L.

2016Such a require- ment would be inconsistent with the principle that the privilege does not extend to consequences of a noncrim- inal nature, such as threats of liability in civil suits, disgrace in the community, or the loss of employment.’’ United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 125 , 100 S. Ct. 948 , 63 L.

2003Cf. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681, 699-700 , 590 A.2d 957 (1991) (no detrimental reliance when party asserting doctrine of equitable estoppel failed to prove that action would have been different if promisor’s statement were different).

2003Cf. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681, 699-700 , 590 A.2d 957 (1991) (no detrimental reliance when party asserting doctrine of equitable estoppel failed to prove that action would have been different if promisor’s statement were different).

2001Lynn v. Haybuster Mfg, Inc., 226 Conn. 282 , 287 (1993); Hopson v. St.

1995Thus the Utah Supreme Court has said: "We therefore adopt the principle that waiver of a right of arbitration must be based on both a finding of participation in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice. . . . both prongs of this test turn on the facts of the individual case," Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield , 833 P.2d 356 , 360 (Utah 1992).

1992Moreover, Diamond Fertiliser, supra notes that the principle of waiver had previously been applied to a failure to claim untimeliness prior to the issuance of a labor arbitration award under 31-98 in A.F.S.C.M.E. v. New Britain, 206 Conn. 465 , 468-69 (1988).

1992Moreover, Diamond Fertiliser, supra notes that the principle of waiver had previously been applied to a failure to claim untimeliness prior to the issuance of a labor arbitration award under 31-98 in A.F.S.C.M.E. v. New Britain, 206 Conn. 465 , 468-69 (1988).

1992See Gagne v. Norton, 189 Conn. 29, 32 , 453 A.2d 1162 (1983); Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, [ 163 Conn. 309, 317 , 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 , 93 S. Ct. 903 , 34 L.

1992See Gagne v. Norton, 189 Conn. 29, 32 , 453 A.2d 1162 (1983); Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, [ 163 Conn. 309, 317 , 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 , 93 S. Ct. 903 , 34 L.

1992See Gagne v. Norton, 189 Conn. 29, 32 , 453 A.2d 1162 (1983); Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, [ 163 Conn. 309, 317 , 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 , 93 S. Ct. 903 , 34 L.

1992See Gagne v. Norton, 189 Conn. 29, 32 , 453 A.2d 1162 (1983); Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, [ 163 Conn. 309, 317 , 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 , 93 S. Ct. 903 , 34 L.

1992See Gagne v. Norton, 189 Conn. 29, 32 , 453 A.2d 1162 (1983); Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, [ 163 Conn. 309, 317 , 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 , 93 S. Ct. 903 , 34 L.

1986Hoffman v. Colorado State Board of Assessment, 683 P.2d 783 , 785 (Colo. 1984); Stout Industries, Inc. v. Leachman, 699 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Mo. App. 1985); Jaroff v. Board of Assessment Review, 89 App. Div. 2d 617, 452 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1982); Sullivan v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 283 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Okla. 1954); Columbia Developers, Inc. v. Elliott, 269 S.C. 486, 490 , 238 S.E.2d 169 (1977).

1986Hoffman v. Colorado State Board of Assessment, 683 P.2d 783 , 785 (Colo. 1984); Stout Industries, Inc. v. Leachman, 699 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Mo. App. 1985); Jaroff v. Board of Assessment Review, 89 App. Div. 2d 617, 452 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1982); Sullivan v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 283 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Okla. 1954); Columbia Developers, Inc. v. Elliott, 269 S.C. 486, 490 , 238 S.E.2d 169 (1977).

1986Hoffman v. Colorado State Board of Assessment, 683 P.2d 783 , 785 (Colo. 1984); Stout Industries, Inc. v. Leachman, 699 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Mo. App. 1985); Jaroff v. Board of Assessment Review, 89 App. Div. 2d 617, 452 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1982); Sullivan v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 283 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Okla. 1954); Columbia Developers, Inc. v. Elliott, 269 S.C. 486, 490 , 238 S.E.2d 169 (1977).

1986Hoffman v. Colorado State Board of Assessment, 683 P.2d 783 , 785 (Colo. 1984); Stout Industries, Inc. v. Leachman, 699 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Mo. App. 1985); Jaroff v. Board of Assessment Review, 89 App. Div. 2d 617, 452 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1982); Sullivan v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 283 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Okla. 1954); Columbia Developers, Inc. v. Elliott, 269 S.C. 486, 490 , 238 S.E.2d 169 (1977).

1983If a change should be made, it is for the Legislature, and not the courts, to make.” Id., 634 .

1971Barney v. Thompson, 159 Conn. 416, 419 .

1971II Under § 11 of Public Acts 1971, No. 608 (General Statutes § 35-34), proceedings for an injunction under that act are governed by “the rules and principles governing the granting of injunctive relief.” One of these principles is that no temporary injunction should issue if “it is very clear that the plaintiff is without legal right.” Olcott v. Pendleton, 128 Conn. 292, 295 . *478 This principle requires an inquiry into the legal right which the plaintiffs are seeking to enforce in this proceeding.

1939Buckley v. Hickey Family Laundry Co., 261 Mass. 348, 350 , 158 N. E. 769 ; Coxv.

1939Buckley v. Hickey Family Laundry Co., 261 Mass. 348, 350 , 158 N. E. 769 ; Coxv.