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10 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1877–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Butala v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Butala, 664 N.W.2d at 340 n.4 (noting that “the plea agreement in this case was not part of a package deal; and the postconviction court found the coercion inherent in contingent plea agreements absent, a finding amply supported by the record”). | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Reingreen1 sentence2024Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 4 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004). 1 Res judicata, also called claim preclusion, applies generally to a set of circumstances that gave rise to an entire lawsuit. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Johnson v. State, 673 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn.2004) (addressing whether the state waived an argument). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences1991State v. Simmons, 258 N.W.2d 908, 910 (Minn.1977). 1991State v. Simmons, 258 N.W.2d 908, 910 (Minn.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Polivka Logan Designers, Inc. v. Endegreen2 sentences1982Counterpoised to this principle is the principle that Minn. Stat. § 514.011 should be strictly construed as to prelien notice because this statute was adopted “to remedy the unfairness arising from the foreclosure of mechanics liens on property of unsuspecting owners.” Polivka Logan Designers, Inc. v. Ende, 312 Minn. 171, 176 , 251 N.W.2d 851, 854 (1977). 1982Counterpoised to this principle is the principle that Minn. Stat. § 514.011 should be strictly construed as to prelien notice because this statute was adopted “to remedy the unfairness arising from the foreclosure of mechanics liens on property of unsuspecting owners.” Polivka Logan Designers, Inc. v. Ende, 312 Minn. 171, 176 , 251 N.W.2d 851, 854 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Nasseff v. Schoeneckergreen2 sentences1982See Nasseff v. Schoenecker, 312 Minn. 485 , 253 N.W.2d 374 (1977); Blankholm v. Fearing, 222 Minn. 51 , 22 N.W.2d 853 (1946). 1982See Nasseff v. Schoenecker, 312 Minn. 485 , 253 N.W.2d 374 (1977); Blankholm v. Fearing, 222 Minn. 51 , 22 N.W.2d 853 (1946). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Ibarra
green
1 sentence2026Danh, 516 N.W.2d at 543 (citing Ibarra, 666 P.2d at 986–87).6 We observed that under this 5 Although we affirmed the principle that a standard Rule 15.01 inquiry is inadequate to detect potential coercion associated with contingent pleas in Butala v. State, we did not view Butala’s guilty plea as a contingent plea and therefore did not consider the factors from State v. Danh when assessing the voluntariness of Butala’s plea. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Danh
green
1 sentence2026Danh, 516 N.W.2d at 543 (citing Ibarra, 666 P.2d at 986–87).6 We observed that under this 5 Although we affirmed the principle that a standard Rule 15.01 inquiry is inadequate to detect potential coercion associated with contingent pleas in Butala v. State, we did not view Butala’s guilty plea as a contingent plea and therefore did not consider the factors from State v. Danh when assessing the voluntariness of Butala’s plea. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Trog
green
1 sentence2013But as stated in Trog “[t]he only issue ... is whether the dispositional departure was justified.” 323 N.W.2d at 31 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Blankholm v. Fearing
green
2 sentences1982See Nasseff v. Schoenecker, 312 Minn. 485 , 253 N.W.2d 374 (1977); Blankholm v. Fearing, 222 Minn. 51 , 22 N.W.2d 853 (1946). 1982See Nasseff v. Schoenecker, 312 Minn. 485 , 253 N.W.2d 374 (1977); Blankholm v. Fearing, 222 Minn. 51 , 22 N.W.2d 853 (1946). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Bangs v. Midland Loan & Finance Co.
neutral
2 sentences1974Bangs v. Midland Loan & Finance Co. 200 Minn. 310 , 274 N. W. 184 . 1974Bangs v. Midland Loan & Finance Co. 200 Minn. 310 , 274 N. W. 184 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co.
green
2 sentences1967In Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co. 250 Minn. 167, 184 , 84 N. W. (2d) 593, 604 , we noted that the principle of waiver is applicable to both procedural and substantive law. 9 Rule 1. 1967In Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co. 250 Minn. 167, 184 , 84 N. W. (2d) 593, 604 , we noted that the principle of waiver is applicable to both procedural and substantive law. 9 Rule 1. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Byram v. City of Detroit
neutral
1 sentence1912The cases above cited [Bryan v. City of Detroit, 50 Mich. 56 ; Lundbom v. City of Manistee, 93 Mich. 170 ; Goodwillie v. City of Detroit, 103 Mich. 283 ] do not turn on the principle of waiver, but hold that, where a party stands by and sees, work of this kind go on, with full knowledge that he is to be assessed therefor, and knowing that those who do the work can be compensated in no other way than by an assessment for benefits, and when, as in the present case, the complaining party actually receives a benefit from such work, equity will not interpose to relieve him.” Kellogg v. Ely, 15 Oh. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Lundbom v. City of Manistee
neutral
1 sentence1912The cases above cited [Bryan v. City of Detroit, 50 Mich. 56 ; Lundbom v. City of Manistee, 93 Mich. 170 ; Goodwillie v. City of Detroit, 103 Mich. 283 ] do not turn on the principle of waiver, but hold that, where a party stands by and sees, work of this kind go on, with full knowledge that he is to be assessed therefor, and knowing that those who do the work can be compensated in no other way than by an assessment for benefits, and when, as in the present case, the complaining party actually receives a benefit from such work, equity will not interpose to relieve him.” Kellogg v. Ely, 15 Oh. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Goodwillie v. City of Detroit
neutral
1 sentence1912The cases above cited [Bryan v. City of Detroit, 50 Mich. 56 ; Lundbom v. City of Manistee, 93 Mich. 170 ; Goodwillie v. City of Detroit, 103 Mich. 283 ] do not turn on the principle of waiver, but hold that, where a party stands by and sees, work of this kind go on, with full knowledge that he is to be assessed therefor, and knowing that those who do the work can be compensated in no other way than by an assessment for benefits, and when, as in the present case, the complaining party actually receives a benefit from such work, equity will not interpose to relieve him.” Kellogg v. Ely, 15 Oh. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Schwerin v. De Graff
neutral
1 sentence1877In these circumstances the testimony was admissible, within the principle of the rule laid down in Schwerin v. De Graff, 21 Minn. 354 , and followed in Miller v. Lamb, 22 Minn. 43 , as follows: That when the price of work is in issue, and there is no written contract, any evidence tending to show that the testimony of one party is more reasonable than that of the other is admissible. 5. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Miller v. Lamb
green
1 sentence1877In these circumstances the testimony was admissible, within the principle of the rule laid down in Schwerin v. De Graff, 21 Minn. 354 , and followed in Miller v. Lamb, 22 Minn. 43 , as follows: That when the price of work is in issue, and there is no written contract, any evidence tending to show that the testimony of one party is more reasonable than that of the other is admissible. 5. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.