Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foster v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc.green2 sentences2014See Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 1986-NMSC-086 , ¶¶ 8-9, 105 N.M. 57 , 728 P.2d 467 (holding that claim preclusion may be raised in a motion to dismiss as an affirmative defense barring a claim). {17} However, “}w]here matters outside the pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the motion becomes one for summary judgment}.]” Foster v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 2012-NMCA-072, ¶ 6 , 284 P.3d 389 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-006 , 294 P.3d 1243 . 2013See Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 1986-NMSC-086 , ¶¶ 8-9, 105 N.M. 57 , 728 P.2d 467 (holding that claim preclusion may be raised in a motion to dismiss as an affirmative defense barring a claim). {17} However, “[w]here matters outside the pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the motion becomes one for summary judgment[.]” Foster v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 2012-NMCA-072, ¶ 6 , 284 P.3d 389 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2012- NMCERT-006, 294 P.3d 1243 . | 3 | 3 |
Universal Life Church v. Coxongreen2 sentences2014See Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 1986-NMSC-086 , ¶¶ 8-9, 105 N.M. 57 , 728 P.2d 467 (holding that claim preclusion may be raised in a motion to dismiss as an affirmative defense barring a claim). {17} However, “}w]here matters outside the pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the motion becomes one for summary judgment}.]” Foster v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 2012-NMCA-072, ¶ 6 , 284 P.3d 389 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-006 , 294 P.3d 1243 . 2014See Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 1986-NMSC-086 , ¶¶ 8-9, 105 N.M. 57 , 728 P.2d 467 (holding that claim preclusion may be raised in a motion to dismiss as an affirmative defense barring a claim). {17} However, “}w]here matters outside the pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the motion becomes one for summary judgment}.]” Foster v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 2012-NMCA-072, ¶ 6 , 284 P.3d 389 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-006 , 294 P.3d 1243 . | 3 | 3 |
Lytle v. Jordangreen2 sentences2021See Lytle v. Jordan, 2001-NMSC-016, ¶ 50 , 130 N.M. 198 , 22 P.3d 666 . 2021See Lytle v. Jordan, 2001-NMSC-016, ¶ 50 , 130 N.M. 198 , 22 P.3d 666 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munozgreen1 sentence2019See Munoz, 2004-NMCA-103, ¶¶ 16-17 (applying the second and third factors); see also Smith, 1976-NMSC-085 , ¶ 16 (evidence of provocation is required for a voluntary manslaughter conviction). {11} In Meadors, after both parties had rested, the State requested a jury instruction on aggravated battery as a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree murder. 1995-NMSC-073 , ¶ 4. | 1 | 1 |
Di Russo v. Di Russogreen2 sentences1996See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 98 Ill.App.3d 928 , 54 Ill.Dec. 207, 210-11 , 424 N.E.2d 957, 960-61 (1981); DiRusso v. DiRusso, 55 Misc.2d 839 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 171, 178-81 (Sup.Ct.1968); Ginsburg, supra, at 812; Reynolds, supra, at 417. 19. 1996See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 98 Ill.App.3d 928 , 54 Ill.Dec. 207, 210-11 , 424 N.E.2d 957, 960-61 (1981); DiRusso v. DiRusso, 55 Misc.2d 839 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 171, 178-81 (Sup.Ct.1968); Ginsburg, supra, at 812; Reynolds, supra, at 417. 19. | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. Sullivangreen2 sentences1996See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 98 Ill.App.3d 928 , 54 Ill.Dec. 207, 210-11 , 424 N.E.2d 957, 960-61 (1981); DiRusso v. DiRusso, 55 Misc.2d 839 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 171, 178-81 (Sup.Ct.1968); Ginsburg, supra, at 812; Reynolds, supra, at 417. 19. 1996See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 98 Ill.App.3d 928 , 54 Ill.Dec. 207, 210-11 , 424 N.E.2d 957, 960-61 (1981); DiRusso v. DiRusso, 55 Misc.2d 839 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 171, 178-81 (Sup.Ct.1968); Ginsburg, supra, at 812; Reynolds, supra, at 417. 19. | 1 | 1 |
Tally v. Ganahlgreen2 sentences1987Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 418, 421 , 90 P. 1049, 1050 (1907). 1987Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 418, 421 , 90 P. 1049, 1050 (1907). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tunis v. Country Club Estates Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015“The principle of claim preclusion precludes a claim when there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate issues arising out of that claim.” Tunis v. Country Club Estates Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2014-NMCA-025 , ¶ 19, 318 P.3d 713 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-001 , 321 P.3d 936 . 2014“The principle of claim 3 preclusion precludes a claim when there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate 4 issues arising out of that claim.” Tunis v. Country Club Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 5 Inc., 2014-NMCA-025, ¶ 19 , 318 P.3d 713 (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted), cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-001 , 321 P.3d 936 . | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Sommerville v. Southwest Firebird
green
2 sentences2017Worker asserts that the WCJ 3 1 erred by: (1) failing to mutually apply the principle of waiver to all provisions in the 2 SCO; (2) converting the MSCO into a strictly legal argument and granting summary 3 judgment in favor of Employer; (3) failing to apply the holding in Benny to effectuate 4 a modification of the SCO based upon the parties’ actions since 2004; and (4) failing 5 to determine that the SCO was invalid and unenforceable under Sommerville v. 6 Southwest Firebird, 2008-NMSC-034 , 144 N.M. 396 , 188 P.3d 1147 . 2017Worker asserts that the WCJ 3 1 erred by: (1) failing to mutually apply the principle of waiver to all provisions in the 2 SCO; (2) converting the MSCO into a strictly legal argument and granting summary 3 judgment in favor of Employer; (3) failing to apply the holding in Benny to effectuate 4 a modification of the SCO based upon the parties’ actions since 2004; and (4) failing 5 to determine that the SCO was invalid and unenforceable under Sommerville v. 6 Southwest Firebird, 2008-NMSC-034 , 144 N.M. 396 , 188 P.3d 1147 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Warren v. New York Life Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1982Co., 40 N.M. 253 , 58 P.2d 1175 (1936) and Miller v. Montgomery, 77 N.M. 766 , 427 P.2d 275 (1967), for the principle that under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction retention of a tendered check for an unreasonable period of time amounts to an acceptance of those conditions because the creditor has a duty either to notify the debtor of his rejection of the tender or to return the check. 1982Co., 40 N.M. 253 , 58 P.2d 1175 (1936) and Miller v. Montgomery, 77 N.M. 766 , 427 P.2d 275 (1967), for the principle that under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction retention of a tendered check for an unreasonable period of time amounts to an acceptance of those conditions because the creditor has a duty either to notify the debtor of his rejection of the tender or to return the check. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Miller v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences1982Co., 40 N.M. 253 , 58 P.2d 1175 (1936) and Miller v. Montgomery, 77 N.M. 766 , 427 P.2d 275 (1967), for the principle that under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction retention of a tendered check for an unreasonable period of time amounts to an acceptance of those conditions because the creditor has a duty either to notify the debtor of his rejection of the tender or to return the check. 1982Co., 40 N.M. 253 , 58 P.2d 1175 (1936) and Miller v. Montgomery, 77 N.M. 766 , 427 P.2d 275 (1967), for the principle that under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction retention of a tendered check for an unreasonable period of time amounts to an acceptance of those conditions because the creditor has a duty either to notify the debtor of his rejection of the tender or to return the check. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Barger v. Ford Sales Company, Inc.
green
2 sentences1981Barger v. Ford Sales Co., Inc., 89 N.M. 25 , 546 P.2d 873 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206 , 549 P.2d 284 (1976). 1981Barger v. Ford Sales Co., Inc., 89 N.M. 25 , 546 P.2d 873 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206 , 549 P.2d 284 (1976). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
City of Albuquerque v. Chapman
green
2 sentences1967Plaintiff particularly relies upon the opinion of this court in the case of City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 76 N.M. 162 , 413 P.2d 204 (1966), wherein we stated: “In this jurisdiction, the measure of damages in eminent domain is determined by the application of the ‘before and after’ rule, by which the owner of property is entitled to recover as compensation the amount by which the fair market value of his property has been depreciated by the taking of a portion thereof. * * * ” Defendants contend that the trial court in effect gave damages based on the before and after values by giving damage 1967Plaintiff particularly relies upon the opinion of this court in the case of City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 76 N.M. 162 , 413 P.2d 204 (1966), wherein we stated: “In this jurisdiction, the measure of damages in eminent domain is determined by the application of the ‘before and after’ rule, by which the owner of property is entitled to recover as compensation the amount by which the fair market value of his property has been depreciated by the taking of a portion thereof. * * * ” Defendants contend that the trial court in effect gave damages based on the before and after values by giving damage | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Board of Com'rs of Dona Ana County v. Gardner
red
2 sentences1967Plaintiff particularly relies upon the opinion of this court in the case of City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 76 N.M. 162 , 413 P.2d 204 (1966), wherein we stated: “In this jurisdiction, the measure of damages in eminent domain is determined by the application of the ‘before and after’ rule, by which the owner of property is entitled to recover as compensation the amount by which the fair market value of his property has been depreciated by the taking of a portion thereof. * * * ” Defendants contend that the trial court in effect gave damages based on the before and after values by giving damage 1967Plaintiff particularly relies upon the opinion of this court in the case of City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 76 N.M. 162 , 413 P.2d 204 (1966), wherein we stated: “In this jurisdiction, the measure of damages in eminent domain is determined by the application of the ‘before and after’ rule, by which the owner of property is entitled to recover as compensation the amount by which the fair market value of his property has been depreciated by the taking of a portion thereof. * * * ” Defendants contend that the trial court in effect gave damages based on the before and after values by giving damage | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Fisher v. Shropshire
green
2 sentences1944Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133 , 13 S.Ct. 201 , 37 L.Ed. 109 ; Lavin v. Lynch, 203 Mich. 143 , 168 N.W. 1024 , 2 A.L.R. 804 ; Martin v. Becker, 169 Cal. 301 , 146 P. 665 , Ann.Cas.1916D, 171. 1944Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133 , 13 S.Ct. 201 , 37 L.Ed. 109 ; Lavin v. Lynch, 203 Mich. 143 , 168 N.W. 1024 , 2 A.L.R. 804 ; Martin v. Becker, 169 Cal. 301 , 146 P. 665 , Ann.Cas.1916D, 171. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Martin v. Becker
green
2 sentences1944Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133 , 13 S.Ct. 201 , 37 L.Ed. 109 ; Lavin v. Lynch, 203 Mich. 143 , 168 N.W. 1024 , 2 A.L.R. 804 ; Martin v. Becker, 169 Cal. 301 , 146 P. 665 , Ann.Cas.1916D, 171. 1944Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133 , 13 S.Ct. 201 , 37 L.Ed. 109 ; Lavin v. Lynch, 203 Mich. 143 , 168 N.W. 1024 , 2 A.L.R. 804 ; Martin v. Becker, 169 Cal. 301 , 146 P. 665 , Ann.Cas.1916D, 171. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Lavin v. Lynch
neutral
2 sentences1944Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133 , 13 S.Ct. 201 , 37 L.Ed. 109 ; Lavin v. Lynch, 203 Mich. 143 , 168 N.W. 1024 , 2 A.L.R. 804 ; Martin v. Becker, 169 Cal. 301 , 146 P. 665 , Ann.Cas.1916D, 171. 1944Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133 , 13 S.Ct. 201 , 37 L.Ed. 109 ; Lavin v. Lynch, 203 Mich. 143 , 168 N.W. 1024 , 2 A.L.R. 804 ; Martin v. Becker, 169 Cal. 301 , 146 P. 665 , Ann.Cas.1916D, 171. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.