principle rule in Massachusetts

1939It is pointed out in McCafferty v. Leioando’s French Dyeing & Cleansing Co., 194 Mass. 412 , that the principle on which this rule is founded is the principle on which the rule of caveat emptor is founded in a sale of property, and on which the, rule is founded that a landlord is not liable for the ruinous condition of leased premises.” See also McLeod v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, 191 Mass. 389, 391 .

1909It is pointed out in Mc Cafferty v. Lewando’s French Dyeing & Cleansing Co. 194 Mass. 412 , that the principle on which this rule is founded is the principle on which the rule of caveat emptor is founded in a sale of property, and on which the rule is founded that a landlord is not liable for the ruinous condition of leased premises.

2009In Mugnano-Bornstein v. Crowell, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 347 (1997) (Mugnano- Bornstein), the Appeals Court addressed the question whether the arbitration clause in the plaintiffs employment agreement covered her claims of sexual harassment and gender discrimination in violation of G.

2002Id. at 752-753 .

1993None of the cases mentioned in Commonwealth v. Leslie, supra, or Commonwealth v. Walter, 396 Mass. 549, 554-555 (1986), also relied on by the defendant, expressly establishes or supports the principle that defense counsel’s friendship with a prosecution witness amounts to a “genuine” conflict or creates prejudice per se.

1990Rather, the decision whether to exclude such evidence should properly turn on: (1) the degree to which the violation undermined the principles underlying the governing rule of law, see Rutkowski, supra at 677 , and (2) the extent to which exclusion will tend to deter such violations from being repeated in the future, see Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 114-115 (1989).

1939It is pointed out in McCafferty v. Leioando’s French Dyeing & Cleansing Co., 194 Mass. 412 , that the principle on which this rule is founded is the principle on which the rule of caveat emptor is founded in a sale of property, and on which the, rule is founded that a landlord is not liable for the ruinous condition of leased premises.” See also McLeod v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, 191 Mass. 389, 391 .

1939Sylvian v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 280 Mass. 503, 505 .

1937See Leonard v. Conquest, 274 Mass. 347, 351 ; Emeneau v. Hillery, 282 Mass. 280, 284 .

1925The trustee ought not to be placed in a worse situation than he would be in, if the principal had sued him for the debt.” On the facts the case at bar is governed by, and not distinguishable from, Lannan v. Walter, 149 Mass. 14 , wherein, at page 15, it is said by Field, J.: “ ‘if before final answer the debtor becomes indebted to the’ trustee ‘on any contract entered into before the service of the writ, the latter shall have a right of set-off, and be chargeable only with the final balance, if one should be due’”; citing Boston Type & Stereotype Foundry Co. v. Mortimer, 7 Pick. 166 , Smith v.

1925The trustee ought not to be placed in a worse situation than he would be in, if the principal had sued him for the debt.” On the facts the case at bar is governed by, and not distinguishable from, Lannan v. Walter, 149 Mass. 14 , wherein, at page 15, it is said by Field, J.: “ ‘if before final answer the debtor becomes indebted to the’ trustee ‘on any contract entered into before the service of the writ, the latter shall have a right of set-off, and be chargeable only with the final balance, if one should be due’”; citing Boston Type & Stereotype Foundry Co. v. Mortimer, 7 Pick. 166 , Smith v.

1925The trustee ought not to be placed in a worse situation than he would be in, if the principal had sued him for the debt.” On the facts the case at bar is governed by, and not distinguishable from, Lannan v. Walter, 149 Mass. 14 , wherein, at page 15, it is said by Field, J.: “ ‘if before final answer the debtor becomes indebted to the’ trustee ‘on any contract entered into before the service of the writ, the latter shall have a right of set-off, and be chargeable only with the final balance, if one should be due’”; citing Boston Type & Stereotype Foundry Co. v. Mortimer, 7 Pick. 166 , Smith v.

1920The principle of immunity there stated was that a charitable corporation of that nature “has no funds which can be charged with any judgment which he [the plaintiff]] might recover, except those which are held subject to the trust of maintaining the hospital.” That decision was affirmed in Benton v. Boston City Hospital, 140 Mass. 13, 17 , which, however, went on the ground that the defendant, although a corporation, was in truth but an agency of the city of Boston and that, as a municipality, it could not be held liable for negligence of its servants in the performance of a function undertake

1920The principle of immunity there stated was that a charitable corporation of that nature “has no funds which can be charged with any judgment which he [the plaintiff]] might recover, except those which are held subject to the trust of maintaining the hospital.” That decision was affirmed in Benton v. Boston City Hospital, 140 Mass. 13, 17 , which, however, went on the ground that the defendant, although a corporation, was in truth but an agency of the city of Boston and that, as a municipality, it could not be held liable for negligence of its servants in the performance of a function undertake

1920In Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147 , an action of tort for negligence of servants of a private charity, it was said, after relying upon McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, ubi supra, as an authority exonerating the defendant, "Among the reasons given for this exemption it has been said, that being a charitable institution rendering services to the public without pecuniary profit, if the property of the charity was depleted by the payment of damages its usefulness might be either impaired or wholly destroyed, the object of the founder or donors defeated, and charitable gifts discourag

1920In Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147 , an action of tort for negligence of servants of a private charity, it was said, after relying upon McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, ubi supra, as an authority exonerating the defendant, "Among the reasons given for this exemption it has been said, that being a charitable institution rendering services to the public without pecuniary profit, if the property of the charity was depleted by the payment of damages its usefulness might be either impaired or wholly destroyed, the object of the founder or donors defeated, and charitable gifts discourag

1920In Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147 , an action of tort for negligence of servants of a private charity, it was said, after relying upon McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, ubi supra, as an authority exonerating the defendant, "Among the reasons given for this exemption it has been said, that being a charitable institution rendering services to the public without pecuniary profit, if the property of the charity was depleted by the payment of damages its usefulness might be either impaired or wholly destroyed, the object of the founder or donors defeated, and charitable gifts discourag

1909Commonwealth v. Wallace, 123 Mass. 400 .