21 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 1889–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lien v. Couchgreen2 sentences2008"The principle of claim preclusion prevents parties from splitting their cause of action and requires parties to raise in a single lawsuit all the grounds for recovery arising from a single transaction or series of transactions that can be brought together.” Lien v. Couch, 993 S.W.2d 53, 56 . 2008"The principle of claim preclusion prevents parties from splitting their cause of action and requires parties to raise in a single lawsuit all the grounds for recovery arising from a single transaction or series of transactions that can be brought together." Lien v. Couch, 993 S.W.2d 53, 56 . | 1 | 6 |
Anderson v. Westfield Groupgreen1 sentence2024In addition, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a new injury resulting from medical treatment is compensable under the theory that “the initial injury is the cause of all that follows.” Anderson v. Westfield Grp., 259 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tenn. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dinitzgreen1 sentence2015We likewise note the Supreme Court’s admonition in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976), that “traditional waiver concepts have little relevance where the defendant must determine whether or not to request or consent to a mistrial in response to judicial or prosecutorial error.” In this case, however, we are not called upon to determine whether the principle of waiver is operative due to the Defendant’s failure to make a contemporaneous motion for a mistrial. | 1 | 1 |
Brehm v. Eisnergreen1 sentence2011Brehm, 746 A.2d at 257 (citations omitted). 12 The certificate was introduced into this record as an exhibit to Defendants’ motion to dismiss which was grounded in Tenn. R. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Cihlar v. Crawfordgreen1 sentence2009Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Varley v. Varleygreen1 sentence1997See Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Crain v. Crain, 925 S.W.2d at 234 ; Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Kincaid v. Kincaidgreen1 sentence1997See Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Crain v. Crain, 925 S.W.2d at 234 ; Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. MacKeygreen1 sentence1983State v. Mackey, Tenn., 553 S.W.2d 337, 340 (1977); Dallas Glass of Hendersonville, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hammond v. Danielson
green
2 sentences1921They rest upon the principle or presumption of implied agency in the company to contract such liabilities, and discharge them out of the earnings of the mortgaged property, as contemplated by the mortgagee, and necessary to the operation and preservation of the property- “We do not mean to say that an implied agency might not arise out of the terms upon which the mortgagor was left in possession which would authorize the mortgagor to contract with the stable keeper a lien that would in the particular case, be superior to the claim of the mortgagee, which seems to have been the case in Hammonds 1889We do not mean to say that an implied agency -might not arise out of the terms upon which the mortgagor was left in possession, which would authorize the mortgagor to contract with the stable keeper a lien that would, in the particular case, be superior to the claim of the mortgagee, which seems to have been the casé in Hammonds v. Danielson, 126 Mass., 294 . | 2 | 1889–1921 |
Crain v. Crain
green
1 sentence1997See Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Crain v. Crain, 925 S.W.2d at 234 ; Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Felts v. Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System
green
1 sentence1995The Supreme Court in Felts v. Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System, 650 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn.1983) defined waiver thus: The principle of waiver as recognized in this State is defined as the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or a privilege. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Scates
green
1 sentence1977In another opinion released on the same day, State v. Scates, 524 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn.1975), the Court expressly adhered to the principle that the test is not whether the offenses involve the “same transaction”, but rather whether the same evidence was required to prove both of them. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Briggs
green
1 sentence1977In the case of State v. Briggs, 533 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn.1976), our Supreme Court overruled a prior holding and ruled that one who committed murder while perpetrating a robbery could be convicted of both armed robbery and first degree murder. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Gilson v. Gillia
green
2 sentences1976For example, in the case of Gilson v. Gillia, 45 Tenn.App. 193 , 321 S.W.2d 855 (1958), suit was brought against two landlords by three different complainants, consisting of two separate corporations and the principal stockholder therein. 1976For example, in the case of Gilson v. Gillia, 45 Tenn.App. 193 , 321 S.W.2d 855 (1958), suit was brought against two landlords by three different complainants, consisting of two separate corporations and the principal stockholder therein. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Meinhardt v. Vaughn
green
2 sentences1950Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 276 , 17 S. W. (2d) 5 ; 5 Amer. 1950Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 276 , 17 S. W. (2d) 5 ; 5 Amer. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence1949Cf. Coca-Cola Bottling Works *524 v. Sullivan, supra, 178 Tenn. 405 , page 413, 158 S. W. 721 , 171 A. L. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Leming v. Stephens
neutral
2 sentences1921“But we see nothing in the agreed statement of'facts in the case at bar that creates such an agency, and in the absence of such an agency, or some other authorization or recognition by the mortgagee, we hold his claim superior to that of the stable keeper, contracted with the mortgagor subsequent to the registration of the mortgagee.” Leming v. Stephens, 95 Tenn., 444 , 32 S. W., 961 . 1921“But we see nothing in the agreed statement of'facts in the case at bar that creates such an agency, and in the absence of such an agency, or some other authorization or recognition by the mortgagee, we hold his claim superior to that of the stable keeper, contracted with the mortgagor subsequent to the registration of the mortgagee.” Leming v. Stephens, 95 Tenn., 444 , 32 S. W., 961 . | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Scott v. Wilson
neutral
1 sentence1916Swanson v. Swanson, 2 Swan (32 Tenn.), 446; Williams v. Williams, 11 Lea (79 Tenn.), 652, 657; McKamie v. Baskerville, 86 Tenn. (2 Pickle), 459, 7 S. W., 194 ; Scott v. Wilson, 110 Tenn., 175 , 75 S. W., 1091 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Locke
green
1 sentence1897Defendant asked and was refused instruction No. 10: “Where an event takes place, the real cause of which cannot be traced, or is at least not apparent, it ordinarily belongs to that class of occurrences designated as purely accidental, and, there being no presumption of negligence in such cases, the party who asserts negligence cannot recover without showing-enough to exclude the case from that class of accidental occurrences.” In Railway Co. v. Locke, 112 Ind. 412 , ( 14 N. E. 391 ), cited to support the instruction, it is admitted, I think, that in cases where a presumption of negligence ari | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.