principle hearing in Hawaii

1984In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. 625, 630 , 594 P.2d 612, 617 (1979); In re Kauai Electric Division of Citizens Utilities Co., 60 Haw. 166, 187 , 590 P.2d 524, 538 (1978); In re Kaanapali Water Corp., 5 Haw.

1953(State v. Kent, 67 N. W. 1052 , 5 N. D. 516 .) In State v. McKay, 54 N. D. 801 , 211 N. W. 435 , which has been cited to the effect that a paternity action is not *77 a criminal one, this same question of privilege arose and the court stated as follows: “* * * the privilege is personal and must be claimed by the defendant in person under the sanctity of his oath.

1953(State v. Kent, 67 N. W. 1052 , 5 N. D. 516 .) In State v. McKay, 54 N. D. 801 , 211 N. W. 435 , which has been cited to the effect that a paternity action is not *77 a criminal one, this same question of privilege arose and the court stated as follows: “* * * the privilege is personal and must be claimed by the defendant in person under the sanctity of his oath.

1953(State v. Kent, 67 N. W. 1052 , 5 N. D. 516 .) In State v. McKay, 54 N. D. 801 , 211 N. W. 435 , which has been cited to the effect that a paternity action is not *77 a criminal one, this same question of privilege arose and the court stated as follows: “* * * the privilege is personal and must be claimed by the defendant in person under the sanctity of his oath.

1953(State v. Kent, 67 N. W. 1052 , 5 N. D. 516 .) In State v. McKay, 54 N. D. 801 , 211 N. W. 435 , which has been cited to the effect that a paternity action is not *77 a criminal one, this same question of privilege arose and the court stated as follows: “* * * the privilege is personal and must be claimed by the defendant in person under the sanctity of his oath.

1950(See Mfgrs Co. v. von Hamm-Young Co., 34 Haw. 288 .) This court, however, takes cognizance of the principle that the rule against perpetuities is not a rule of construction but a rule of property and does not invoke it to ascertain the Queen’s intention.

1950(See Milliken National Bank v. Wilson, 343 Ill. 55 , 174 N. E. 857 ; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 629.) Nevertheless, where as here the ambiguous clause of paragraph thirteen is fairly open to two possible constructions of opposite import, the one of discretionary power, turning as it does the provision of gift to the issue of Albert into an illegal perpetuity, will not be preferred over the other of mandatory power if such other upholds the validity of that provision consistently with the rule.

1950(See Milliken National Bank v. Wilson, 343 Ill. 55 , 174 N. E. 857 ; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 629.) Nevertheless, where as here the ambiguous clause of paragraph thirteen is fairly open to two possible constructions of opposite import, the one of discretionary power, turning as it does the provision of gift to the issue of Albert into an illegal perpetuity, will not be preferred over the other of mandatory power if such other upholds the validity of that provision consistently with the rule.

1896The principle is that the presumption exists that a person exercising an official function has the requisite authority to exercise it. 1 Greenleaf, Sec. 92, expresses the principle as follows: “All who are proved to have acted as such are presumed to have been duly appointed to the office, until the contrary appears.” Doe v. Young, 8 Ad. & Ellis, N. S. 62; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585 ; State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 .

1896The principle is that the presumption exists that a person exercising an official function has the requisite authority to exercise it. 1 Greenleaf, Sec. 92, expresses the principle as follows: “All who are proved to have acted as such are presumed to have been duly appointed to the office, until the contrary appears.” Doe v. Young, 8 Ad. & Ellis, N. S. 62; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585 ; State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 .