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33 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1898–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fiscus v. Beartooth Electric Cooperative, Inc.green2 sentences2017Coop., 180 Mont. 434, 437 , 591 P.2d 196, 197 (1979) (concluding that when we state in an opinion “a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). ¶41 Because the District Court conducted a complete review of the administrative record and properly applied the applicable standard of review to the Hearing Officer’s decision, there is nothingfurther for the Commission to review. 2017Coop., 180 Mont. 434, 437 , 591 P.2d 196, 197 (1979) (concluding that when we state in an opinion “a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). ¶41 Because the District Court conducted a complete review of the administrative record and properly applied the applicable standard of review to the Hearing Officer’s decision, there is nothingfurther for the Commission to review. | 5 | 9 |
Carlson v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.green2 sentences2013As our Carlson decision stated: The rule is well established and long adhered to in this state that where, upon an appeal, the supreme court in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal[.] Carlson, 86 Mont at 81 , 281 P. at 914 . ¶17 Our decision in McCormick III articulated another application of the doctrine. 2013As our Carlson decision stated: The rule is well established and long adhered to in this state that where, upon an appeal, the supreme court in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal[.] Carlson, 86 Mont at 81 , 281 P. at 914 . ¶17 Our decision in McCormick III articulated another application of the doctrine. | 2 | 6 |
Haines Pipeline Construction, Inc. v. Montana Power Co.green2 sentences1999“Collateral estoppel also prevents relitigation of determinative facts which were actually or necessarily decided in a prior action.” Haines, 265 Mont. at 288 , 876 P.2d at 636 . *50 ¶60 The law of the case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.” In re Marriage of Scott (1997), 283 Mont. 169, 175 , 939 P.2d 998, 1001-02 . [W]here upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to 1999“Collateral estoppel also prevents relitigation of determinative facts which were actually or necessarily decided in a prior action.” Haines, 265 Mont. at 288 , 876 P.2d at 636 . *50 ¶60 The law of the case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.” In re Marriage of Scott (1997), 283 Mont. 169, 175 , 939 P.2d 998, 1001-02 . [W]here upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to | 2 | 3 |
Scott v. Scottgreen2 sentences1999“Collateral estoppel also prevents relitigation of determinative facts which were actually or necessarily decided in a prior action.” Haines, 265 Mont. at 288 , 876 P.2d at 636 . *50 ¶60 The law of the case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.” In re Marriage of Scott (1997), 283 Mont. 169, 175 , 939 P.2d 998, 1001-02 . [W]here upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to 1999“Collateral estoppel also prevents relitigation of determinative facts which were actually or necessarily decided in a prior action.” Haines, 265 Mont. at 288 , 876 P.2d at 636 . *50 ¶60 The law of the case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.” In re Marriage of Scott (1997), 283 Mont. 169, 175 , 939 P.2d 998, 1001-02 . [W]here upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to | 1 | 5 |
Zavarelli v. Mightgreen2 sentences2008The law of the case doctrine holds that: “[W]here, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal.. . .” Zavarelli v. Might, 239 Mont. 120, 124 , 779 P.2d 489, 492 (1989) (quoting Carlson v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 86 Mont. 78 , 281 P. 913, 914 (1929)). 2008The law of the case doctrine holds that: “[W]here, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal.. . .” Zavarelli v. Might, 239 Mont. 120, 124 , 779 P.2d 489, 492 (1989) (quoting Carlson v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 86 Mont. 78 , 281 P. 913, 914 (1929)). | 1 | 3 |
State v. De Leagreen2 sentences2026The principle of the presumption of innocence “is so foundational that we have recognized ‘it cannot be evidence, nor can it be introduced in the case, for it is in the case from its inception.’” Lawrence, ¶ 15 (quoting State v. De Lea, 36 Mont. 531, 539 , 93 P. 814, 817 (1908)). 2026The principle of the presumption of innocence “is so foundational that we have recognized ‘it cannot be evidence, nor can it be introduced in the case, for it is in the case from its inception.’” Lawrence, ¶ 15 (quoting State v. De Lea, 36 Mont. 531, 539 , 93 P. 814, 817 (1908)). | 1 | 1 |
O'BRIEN v. Great Northern Railroad Companygreen2 sentences2014Co., 148 Mont. 429, 440 , 421 P.2d 710, 716 (1966). ¶18 In our rehearing order, we did not pronounce a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision; rather, we simply observed that we had not expressly awarded attorney fees in our Wohl I opinion, and “decline[d] to do so now.” We “made no expression of opinion on the merits” of the Landowners’ request for appellate fees. 2014Co., 148 Mont. 429, 440 , 421 P.2d 710, 716 (1966). ¶18 In our rehearing order, we did not pronounce a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision; rather, we simply observed that we had not expressly awarded attorney fees in our Wohl I opinion, and “decline[d] to do so now.” We “made no expression of opinion on the merits” of the Landowners’ request for appellate fees. | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2008According to Clark, his original sentence was also reviewable on remand, without ever formally appealing it, simply because it was “illegal.” I would adopt the State’s arguments and re-impose the District Court’s original sentence, as I do not believe a waiver occurred here. ¶52 The law of the case doctrine provides that “in deciding a case on appeal, when the Supreme Court states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent proceedings, both in the trial court and upon subs 2008According to Clark, his original sentence was also reviewable on remand, without ever formally appealing it, simply because it was “illegal.” I would adopt the State’s arguments and re-impose the District Court’s original sentence, as I do not believe a waiver occurred here. ¶52 The law of the case doctrine provides that “in deciding a case on appeal, when the Supreme Court states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent proceedings, both in the trial court and upon subs | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Winslow v. Montana Rail Link, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025Rail Link, Inc., 2005 MT 217, ¶ 30 , 328 Mont. 260 , 121 P.3d 506 ); see also Carlson v. N. Pac. 2025Rail Link, Inc., 2005 MT 217, ¶ 30 , 328 Mont. 260 , 121 P.3d 506 ); see also Carlson v. N. Pac. | 3 | 2013–2025 |
Diaz v. State
neutral
2 sentences2025He is bound by the law of the case. ¶33 “‘When this Court, in deciding a case presented, states a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case and must be 21 adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal.’” Diaz v. State, 2013 MT 219, ¶ 32 , 371 Mont. 214 , 308 P.3d 38 (quoting Winslow v. Mont. 2025He is bound by the law of the case. ¶33 “‘When this Court, in deciding a case presented, states a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case and must be 21 adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal.’” Diaz v. State, 2013 MT 219, ¶ 32 , 371 Mont. 214 , 308 P.3d 38 (quoting Winslow v. Mont. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re the Estate of Snyder
neutral
2 sentences2014Rather, “[t]he law of the case binds the parties only on those issues that the court previously has decided.” In re Estate of Snyder, 2007 MT 146, ¶ 27 , 337 Mont. 449 , 162 P.3d 87 ; see Gilder, ¶ 12 (“where . . . the supreme court... states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case” (emphasis added)). 2014Rather, “[t]he law of the case binds the parties only on those issues that the court previously has decided.” In re Estate of Snyder, 2007 MT 146, ¶ 27 , 337 Mont. 449 , 162 P.3d 87 ; see Gilder, ¶ 12 (“where . . . the supreme court... states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Apple v. Edwards
neutral
2 sentences1997Fiscus, 591 P.2d at 197 (quoting Apple v. Edwards (1949), 123 Mont. 135, 139-40 , 211 P.2d 138, 140 ). 1997Fiscus, 591 P.2d at 197 (quoting Apple v. Edwards (1949), 123 Mont. 135, 139-40 , 211 P.2d 138, 140 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Batten v. Watts Cycle and Marine, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995The District Court refused H-8 because it concluded that Batten v. Watts Cycle & Marine, Inc. (1989), 240 Mont. 113 , 783 P.2d 378 , which was cited by defendants as authority for that instruction, did not stand for the principle stated in the instruction. 1995The District Court refused H-8 because it concluded that Batten v. Watts Cycle & Marine, Inc. (1989), 240 Mont. 113 , 783 P.2d 378 , which was cited by defendants as authority for that instruction, did not stand for the principle stated in the instruction. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Englund v. Englund
neutral
1 sentence1982We have previously set down the rule to be followed when dealing with law of the case in Englund v. Englund (1979), Mont., 603 P.2d 1048 , 36 St.Rep. 2211 , and cases cited therein where we stated: “ ‘The rule is well established and long adhered to in this State that where, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal;. . .’ Carlson v. Northern | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Gallagher
green
2 sentences1979Montana has applied this principle and stated the rule in this language: "The rule is: Where there is prior justification for the police to search an area, and in searching the area, they inadvertently find incriminating evidence which they had no reason to anticipate, they may lawfully seize that incriminating evidence." State v. Gallagher (1973), 162 Mont. 155, 167 , 509 P.2d 852, 858 . 1979Montana has applied this principle and stated the rule in this language: "The rule is: Where there is prior justification for the police to search an area, and in searching the area, they inadvertently find incriminating evidence which they had no reason to anticipate, they may lawfully seize that incriminating evidence." State v. Gallagher (1973), 162 Mont. 155, 167 , 509 P.2d 852, 858 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Conway v. Monidah Trust
neutral
2 sentences1929While it is true that the volume of testimony introduced by the defendants on the second trial appears to be somewhat augmented, its legal effect is still the same, viz., such as to create a direct conflict usually presenting a problem for the jury to solve, (Conway v. Monidah Trust, 51 Mont. 113 , 149 Pac. 711 .) The rule is well established and long adhered to in this state that where, upon 'an appeal, the supreme court in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the ease, and must be adhered t 1929While it is true that the volume of testimony introduced by the defendants on the second trial appears to be somewhat augmented, its legal effect is still the same, viz., such as to create a direct conflict usually presenting a problem for the jury to solve, (Conway v. Monidah Trust, 51 Mont. 113 , 149 Pac. 711 .) The rule is well established and long adhered to in this state that where, upon 'an appeal, the supreme court in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the ease, and must be adhered t | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Finlen v. Heinze
green
2 sentences1911The principle of the rule was involved and applied in Finlen v. Heinze, 32 Mont. 354 , 80 Pac. 918 . 1911The principle of the rule was involved and applied in Finlen v. Heinze, 32 Mont. 354 , 80 Pac. 918 . | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Dempsey v. . Kipp
neutral
1 sentence1911The rule itself is well illustrated by the case of Dempsey v. Kipp, 61 N. Y. 462 . | 1 | 1911–1911 |
People v. Finley
green
1 sentence1899We believe, however, that the definition of a reasonable doubt was good (Thompson on Trials, Sec. 2183; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482 ; People v. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329 , 28 N. W. 883 ; People v. Cox, 70 Mich. 247 , 38 N. W. 235 ), and that the whole instruction was correct on both points covered by its language. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
People v. Cox
green
2 sentences1899We believe, however, that the definition of a reasonable doubt was good (Thompson on Trials, Sec. 2183; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482 ; People v. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329 , 28 N. W. 883 ; People v. Cox, 70 Mich. 247 , 38 N. W. 235 ), and that the whole instruction was correct on both points covered by its language. 1899We believe, however, that the definition of a reasonable doubt was good (Thompson on Trials, Sec. 2183; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482 ; People v. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329 , 28 N. W. 883 ; People v. Cox, 70 Mich. 247 , 38 N. W. 235 ), and that the whole instruction was correct on both points covered by its language. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
People v. Stubenvoll
green
2 sentences1899We believe, however, that the definition of a reasonable doubt was good (Thompson on Trials, Sec. 2183; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482 ; People v. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329 , 28 N. W. 883 ; People v. Cox, 70 Mich. 247 , 38 N. W. 235 ), and that the whole instruction was correct on both points covered by its language. 1899We believe, however, that the definition of a reasonable doubt was good (Thompson on Trials, Sec. 2183; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482 ; People v. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329 , 28 N. W. 883 ; People v. Cox, 70 Mich. 247 , 38 N. W. 235 ), and that the whole instruction was correct on both points covered by its language. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Mayor of San Jose v. Fulton
neutral
1 sentence1898The principle of this exception to the rule was recognized in Mayor, etc., of the City of San Jose v. Fulton, 45 Cal. 316 , and is approved in Hayne, New Trial and Appeal, § 19, subdivision 4. | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.