principle rule in Pennsylvania

2020Putting the proverbial cart before the horse, the Court found harmlessness without finding error.5 Absent any advocacy from the parties on the question, and instead forging ahead sua sponte, this Court then disregarded that the “overwhelming evidence” variety of harmless error necessitates that the evidence be uncontradicted—a requirement that prevents the reviewing court from making questionable assessments of the credibility of competing evidence from its inherently limited appellate perspective.6 As Story stated: The requirement that the “overwhelming” evidence relied upon be uncontradicted

2018As explained by this Court in Story , "The requirement that the 'overwhelming' evidence relied upon be uncontradicted follows from the principle that an error cannot be harmless if 'honest, fair minded jurors might very well have brought in not guilty verdicts.' " Story , 383 A.2d at 167 (quoting Davis , 305 A.2d at 721 ; Chapman , 386 U.S. at 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ).

1965For confirmation of that assertion it is only necessary to refer to such cases as Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 , 15 A. 553 ; Gable v. Sisters of St.

1965For confirmation of that assertion it is only necessary to refer to such cases as Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 , 15 A. 553 ; Gable v. Sisters of St.

2020Finally, “the principle inquiry in determining content neutrality … is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 .

2018"The principle inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781 , 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 , 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989).

1938As was said by this court in Garman v. Glass, 197 Pa. 101 , in discussing the question of amendments under the statute, ‘Bights of action in different capacities, even though in the same individual, cannot be mixed and interchanged in this way.’ ” And in Slakoff v. Foulke, Trustee, supra, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Maxey, (p. 361), said: “The court below also correctly held that the defendant was not sued in his individual capacity and that the words ‘Surviving Trustee, under the Will of Charles M.

1912As was said by this court in Garman v. Glass, 197 Pa. 101 , in discussing the question of amendments under the statute, “Rights of action in “different capacities, even though in the same individual, cannot be mixed and interchanged in this way.” In the present case the right of action against the appellee was lost by expiry when this amendment was made, and a new action against the appellee would have been unavailing in face of the statute of limitations.

2025In BM&N’s view, the decision in Delaware, Lackawanna & Western, supra, reinforced the principle that the doctrine of laches was not applicable in a claim involving a railroad’s property that is actively used by a railroad company for railroad purposes.

2025Id.

2024That is, like the vast majority of cases, the Court in McCusker v. WCAB, 639 A.2d 776 , 779 (Pa. 1994) addressed the two challenges together because there was no argument for interpreting Article I, Section 26 differently than its federal counterpart.

2018As explained by this Court in Story , "The requirement that the 'overwhelming' evidence relied upon be uncontradicted follows from the principle that an error cannot be harmless if 'honest, fair minded jurors might very well have brought in not guilty verdicts.' " Story , 383 A.2d at 167 (quoting Davis , 305 A.2d at 721 ; Chapman , 386 U.S. at 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ).

2015He presents no meaningful argument to distinguish the principle that defense counsel’s assent is akin to a request -9- J.A25037/15 for a continuance that constitutes “excludable time.” See Hunt, 858 A.2d at 1241 .

2009The rule, therefore, fulfills the laudatory purposes of “pro-mot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contributing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539 , 599 n. 31, 905 A.2d 918 , 954 n. 31(2006) (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 , 126 S.Ct. 2479 , 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court)); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 , 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2621 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (Marshall, J. d

2009The rule, therefore, fulfills the laudatory purposes of “pro-mot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contributing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539 , 599 n. 31, 905 A.2d 918 , 954 n. 31(2006) (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 , 126 S.Ct. 2479 , 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court)); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 , 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2621 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (Marshall, J. d

2009The rule, therefore, fulfills the laudatory purposes of “pro-mot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contributing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539 , 599 n. 31, 905 A.2d 918 , 954 n. 31(2006) (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 , 126 S.Ct. 2479 , 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court)); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 , 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2621 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (Marshall, J. d

2009The rule, therefore, fulfills the laudatory purposes of “pro-mot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contributing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539 , 599 n. 31, 905 A.2d 918 , 954 n. 31(2006) (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 , 126 S.Ct. 2479 , 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court)); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 , 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2621 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (Marshall, J. d

2000In denying Thomas’ petition for rehearing, the Board stated that Crucible, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Vinovich), 713 A.2d 749 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), upon which Thomas relied, had reaffirmed the principle that a violation of the Act does not mandate the imposition of penalties under Section 435, added by Section 3 of the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, 77 P.S. § 991.

1999Expressly rejecting the Felton distinction between absence before trial and absence during trial, the Supreme Court held “that when a defendant is absent without cause at the time his trial is scheduled to begin, he may be tried in absentia, as Pa.R.Crim.P. 1117(a) contemplates.” Id. at 104, 619 A.2d at 1350 .

1997Moreover, Grieff reaffirmed the principle that under the immunity statute, the government is not liable for harm where its negligence “only facilitated injuries caused by third parties.” Id. at -, 693 A.2d at 197 .

1997Moreover, Grieff reaffirmed the principle that under the immunity statute, the government is not liable for harm where its negligence “only facilitated injuries caused by third parties.” Id. at -, 693 A.2d at 197 .

1995We have stated that stare decisis is a “wise course of action.” Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 282 , 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976). “[SJtare decisis is essential if case-by-case judicial decision making is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 , 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2192 , 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled i

1995We have stated that stare decisis is a “wise course of action.” Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 282 , 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976). “[SJtare decisis is essential if case-by-case judicial decision making is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 , 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2192 , 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled i

1995"Over and over again Stare Decisis has been recognized as the established rule and Law of Pennsylvania." Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 442 Pa. 70, 86 , 274 A.2d 182, 191 (Bell, C.J., opinion in support of affirmance), cert. denied., 404 U.S. 846 , 92 S.Ct. 148 , 30 L.Ed.2d 83 (1971), overruled in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210 , 360 A.2d 914 (1976). *291 We have stated that stare decisis is a "wise course of action." Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 282 , 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976). " [S]tare decisis is essential if case-by-case judicial decision making is to be reconc

1995"Over and over again Stare Decisis has been recognized as the established rule and Law of Pennsylvania." Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 442 Pa. 70, 86 , 274 A.2d 182, 191 (Bell, C.J., opinion in support of affirmance), cert. denied., 404 U.S. 846 , 92 S.Ct. 148 , 30 L.Ed.2d 83 (1971), overruled in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210 , 360 A.2d 914 (1976). *291 We have stated that stare decisis is a "wise course of action." Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 282 , 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976). " [S]tare decisis is essential if case-by-case judicial decision making is to be reconc

1995We have stated that stare decisis is a “wise course of action.” Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 282 , 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976). “[SJtare decisis is essential if case-by-case judicial decision making is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 , 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2192 , 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled i

1995We have stated that stare decisis is a “wise course of action.” Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 282 , 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976). “[SJtare decisis is essential if case-by-case judicial decision making is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 , 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2192 , 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled i