firmly established rule in Maryland

2007Applying the so-called ‘constitutional exception’ under circumstances like these is inconsistent with the firmly established principle of Maryland law ‘that we will not reach a constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground,’ Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552, 561 , 750 A.2d 35, 40 (2000), quoting State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385 , 404 n. 13, 631 A.2d 453 , 463 n. 13 (1993).

2007Applying the so-called ‘constitutional exception’ under circumstances like these is inconsistent with the firmly established principle of Maryland law ‘that we will not reach a constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground,’ Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552, 561 , 750 A.2d 35, 40 (2000), quoting State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385 , 404 n. 13, 631 A.2d 453 , 463 n. 13 (1993).

2007See, e.g., Harryman v. State, 359 Md. 492 , 503 n. 6, 754 A.2d 1018 , 1024 n. 6 (2000); Thrower v. State ex rel.

2007See, e.g., Harryman v. State, 359 Md. 492 , 503 n. 6, 754 A.2d 1018 , 1024 n. 6 (2000); Thrower v. State ex rel.

2005See Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 214 Md. 80, 84 , 133 A.2d 423, 425 (1957) (stating succinctly and conclusively in regard to the best interests standard, that “[i]t seems unnecessary to cite additional authority in support of this firmly established rule”).

2005See Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 214 Md. 80, 84 , 133 A.2d 423, 425 (1957) (stating succinctly and conclusively in regard to the best interests standard, that “[i]t seems unnecessary to cite additional authority in support of this firmly established rule”).

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 223 , 935 A.2d 731, 738 (2007) (“We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed,” and cases there cited); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534-535 , 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995) (Right to appellate review “may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below....” In addition, “[acquiescence implies consent....” A “litigant who acquiesces in a ruling is completely deprived of the right to complain about that ruling”); Globe American v. Chung,

2007At the outset, we pointed out that § 11-109 envisioned the supremacy of the intention of the testator or testatrix, as reflected in the *651 language of the will, stating that its “application of the rule of apportionment set out in subsection (b) is mandatory, ‘unless the will evinces an expression of intent to the contrary,'’ ” Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. at 648 , 392 A.2d at 1106 (emphasis in original), and noted its consistency with, thus reiterating and emphasizing, “the firmly established rule[ 7 ] that, unless prohibited by statute or public policy, the intent of the testator as ascertaine

2007At the outset, we pointed out that § 11-109 envisioned the supremacy of the intention of the testator or testatrix, as reflected in the *651 language of the will, stating that its “application of the rule of apportionment set out in subsection (b) is mandatory, ‘unless the will evinces an expression of intent to the contrary,'’ ” Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. at 648 , 392 A.2d at 1106 (emphasis in original), and noted its consistency with, thus reiterating and emphasizing, “the firmly established rule[ 7 ] that, unless prohibited by statute or public policy, the intent of the testator as ascertaine

2005So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).

2005So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).

2005So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).

2005So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).

2005So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).

2005So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).

2000We noted a firmly-established principle in Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 302 , 396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979), overruled in part by James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980), and Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162 , 460 A.2d 1038 (1983), when we said: “It is presumed that the legislative body did not intend to make any alteration of the common law other than what is plainly stated.” See also Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 131 , 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15 , 172 A. 354, 355-56 (1934).

2000We noted a firmly-established principle in Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 302 , 396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979), overruled in part by James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980), and Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162 , 460 A.2d 1038 (1983), when we said: “It is presumed that the legislative body did not intend to make any alteration of the common law other than what is plainly stated.” See also Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 131 , 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15 , 172 A. 354, 355-56 (1934).

2000We noted a firmly-established principle in Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 302 , 396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979), overruled in part by James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980), and Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162 , 460 A.2d 1038 (1983), when we said: “It is presumed that the legislative body did not intend to make any alteration of the common law other than what is plainly stated.” See also Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 131 , 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15 , 172 A. 354, 355-56 (1934).

2000We noted a firmly-established principle in Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 302 , 396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979), overruled in part by James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980), and Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162 , 460 A.2d 1038 (1983), when we said: “It is presumed that the legislative body did not intend to make any alteration of the common law other than what is plainly stated.” See also Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 131 , 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15 , 172 A. 354, 355-56 (1934).