firmly established rule in Indiana

1999“This is consistent with the firmly established principle that the right to speak out at election time is one of the most zealously protected under the Constitution.” Central Long Island Tax Reform, 616 F.2d at 53 (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 , 91 S.Ct. 621 , 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971)).

1999“This is consistent with the firmly established principle that the right to speak out at election time is one of the most zealously protected under the Constitution.” Central Long Island Tax Reform, 616 F.2d at 53 (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 , 91 S.Ct. 621 , 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971)).

1993This firmly established principle of statutory construction is based upon the notion that an exemption from taxation shifts the tax burden to taxpayers who fall outside the exempted class. *934 Orr v. Baker (1853), 4 Ind. 86 .

1988Co. (1941), 111 Ind.App. 550 , 38 N.E.2d 263 ; see also City of Mobile v. Largay (1977), Ala., 346 So.2d 398 ; 7795 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 901 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 528 ; Graham v. M & J Corp. (1980), D.C.App., 424 A.2d 103 ; De Foe v. W. & J.

1988Co. (1941), 111 Ind.App. 550 , 38 N.E.2d 263 ; see also City of Mobile v. Largay (1977), Ala., 346 So.2d 398 ; 7795 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 901 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 528 ; Graham v. M & J Corp. (1980), D.C.App., 424 A.2d 103 ; De Foe v. W. & J.

1988A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that: "when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken." Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind. App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785 ); Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind. App. 217 , 279 N.E.2d 266 , trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray

1988A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that: "when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken." Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785 ) Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind.App. 217 , 279 N.E.2d 266 , trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray (1

1988Co. (1941), 111 Ind. App. 550 , 38 N.E.2d 263 ; see also City of Mobile v. Largay (1977), Ala., 346 So.2d 393 ; 7735 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court (1981), 116 Cal. App.3d 901 , 172 Cal. Rptr. 528 ; Graham v. M & J Corp. (1980), D.C.App., 424 A.2d 103 ; De Foe v. W. & J.

1988Co. (1941), 111 Ind.App. 550 , 38 N.E.2d 263 ; see also City of Mobile v. Largay (1977), Ala., 346 So.2d 398 ; 7795 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 901 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 528 ; Graham v. M & J Corp. (1980), D.C.App., 424 A.2d 103 ; De Foe v. W. & J.

1988Co. (1941), 111 Ind.App. 550 , 38 N.E.2d 263 ; see also City of Mobile v. Largay (1977), Ala., 346 So.2d 398 ; 7795 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 901 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 528 ; Graham v. M & J Corp. (1980), D.C.App., 424 A.2d 103 ; De Foe v. W. & J.

1988Co. (1941), 111 Ind.App. 550 , 38 N.E.2d 263 ; see also City of Mobile v. Largay (1977), Ala., 346 So.2d 398 ; 7795 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 901 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 528 ; Graham v. M & J Corp. (1980), D.C.App., 424 A.2d 103 ; De Foe v. W. & J.

1988A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that: "when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken." Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind. App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785 ); Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind. App. 217 , 279 N.E.2d 266 , trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray

1988A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that: "when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken." Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785 ) Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind.App. 217 , 279 N.E.2d 266 , trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray (1

1988A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that: "when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken." Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind. App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785 ); Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind. App. 217 , 279 N.E.2d 266 , trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray

1988A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that: "when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken." Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785 ) Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind.App. 217 , 279 N.E.2d 266 , trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray (1

1988A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that: "when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken." Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785 ) Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind.App. 217 , 279 N.E.2d 266 , trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray (1

1988A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that: "when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken." Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785 ) Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind.App. 217 , 279 N.E.2d 266 , trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray (1

1984Silver, Burdett & Co. v. Indiana State Board of Education, (1904) 35 Ind.App. 438 , 72 N.E. 829 .

1984Silver, Burdett & Co. v. Indiana State Board of Education, (1904) 35 Ind.App. 438 , 72 N.E. 829 .

1980The “public policy exception” has been created in recent years by a few courts to afford some means of protection to an at will employee whose discharge seriously undermines some compelling public policy. 1 The method of protection has been to grant a cause of action for damages to the wronged employee. 2 The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized the “public policy exception” in the landmark case of Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., (1973) 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 .

1980The “public policy exception” has been created in recent years by a few courts to afford some means of protection to an at will employee whose discharge seriously undermines some compelling public policy. 1 The method of protection has been to grant a cause of action for damages to the wronged employee. 2 The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized the “public policy exception” in the landmark case of Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., (1973) 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 .

1980In a series of cases arising out of a variety of factual settings in which a discharge clearly violated an express statutory objective or undermined a firmly established principle of public policy, courts have recognized that an employer's traditional broad authority to discharge an at-will employee `may be limited by statute ... or by considerations of public policy.' [Citations omitted.]" (Our insertion.) 610 P.2d at 1332-33 .

1980In a series of cases arising out of a variety of factual settings in which a discharge clearly violated an express statutory objective or undermined a firmly established principle of public policy, courts have recognized that an employer’s traditional broad authority to discharge an at-will employee ‘may be limited by statute ... or by considerations of public policy.’ [Citations omitted.]” (Our insertion.) 610 P.2d at 1332-33 .

1976Turner v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 267 , 280 N.E.2d 621 .

1976Turner v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 267 , 280 N.E.2d 621 .

1972This decision must rest upon the firmly established principle reiterated in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971), 402 U.S. 415 , that an “injunction, so far as it imposes prior restraint on speech and publication, constitutes an impermissible restraint on First Amendment rights. . . . [And it is impermissible where it] operates, not to redress alleged private wrongs, but to suppress, on the basis of previous publications, ditribution of literature of ‘any kind’ . . .” The requested injunction would be an impermissible prior restraint and the trial court’s denial thereof was proper.

1969The Constitution of the State of Indiana provides in Article 4, Sec. 24, in part as follows: “Provision may be made, by general law, for bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities orginating after the adoption of this Constitution; but no special act authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person' claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed.” This Court, in the case of Bracht v. Conservation Commission (1947), 118 Ind. App. 77, at p. 83 , 76 N. E. 2d, 848 , stated: “It is a firmly established rule, universally recognized and enforced, that ne

1969The Constitution of the State of Indiana provides in Article 4, Sec. 24, in part as follows: “Provision may be made, by general law, for bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities orginating after the adoption of this Constitution; but no special act authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person' claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed.” This Court, in the case of Bracht v. Conservation Commission (1947), 118 Ind. App. 77, at p. 83 , 76 N. E. 2d, 848 , stated: “It is a firmly established rule, universally recognized and enforced, that ne

1969Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, supra; Busby v. Indiana Board of Agriculture, supra; City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Water Co. (1916), 185 Ind. 277, 291 , 113 N.E. 369 ; State v. Mutual Life Ins.

1969Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, supra; Busby v. Indiana Board of Agriculture, supra; City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Water Co. (1916), 185 Ind. 277, 291 , 113 N.E. 369 ; State v. Mutual Life Ins.

1968Joseph Superior Court, etc. (1964), 246 Ind. 74 , 4 Ind. Dec. 102 , 104, 201 N. E. 2d 778, 779 , our Supreme Court stated: “We may reason in this case from the firmly established principle of common law that a trial court retains full and complete control of its records in an action during the term at which it enters a final judgment.

1968Joseph Superior Court, etc. (1964), 246 Ind. 74 , 4 Ind. Dec. 102 , 104, 201 N. E. 2d 778, 779 , our Supreme Court stated: “We may reason in this case from the firmly established principle of common law that a trial court retains full and complete control of its records in an action during the term at which it enters a final judgment.

1962Co. (1939), 102 Ind. App. 175 , 199 N. E. 453 . *226 We do not construe the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Glad case, supra, as intending to alter the firmly established rule Indiana that in deciding the question of contributory negligence the jury may consider the railroad’s prior negligence, if any.

1962Co. (1939), 102 Ind. App. 175 , 199 N. E. 453 . *226 We do not construe the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Glad case, supra, as intending to alter the firmly established rule Indiana that in deciding the question of contributory negligence the jury may consider the railroad’s prior negligence, if any.

1935Courts will not permit their process to be employed for improper and unauthorized purposes.” To the same effect is Wanzer v. Bright (1869), 52 Ill. 35 , 40: “It is a firmly established rule of practice that courts will never permit the fraudulent use of their process.

1926(Hanlon v. Ehrich, 178 N. Y. 474 , 71 N. E. 12 ), and it is a firmly established rule of this state that it cannot be read to the jury, or, provided it can be produced, used as basis for a cross-examination as to its contents until it is in evidence.” In Hanlon v. Ehrich (1904), supra, the court, after stating the rule relative to contradictory oral statements, said: “The rule as to documentary evi *486 dence, which is to be used to contradict the oral testimony of a witness, is necessarily somewhat different, and has given rise to much discussion.

1926(Hanlon v. Ehrich, 178 N. Y. 474 , 71 N. E. 12 ), and it is a firmly established rule of this state that it cannot be read to the jury, or, provided it can be produced, used as basis for a cross-examination as to its contents until it is in evidence.” In Hanlon v. Ehrich (1904), supra, the court, after stating the rule relative to contradictory oral statements, said: “The rule as to documentary evi *486 dence, which is to be used to contradict the oral testimony of a witness, is necessarily somewhat different, and has given rise to much discussion.

1910Ferre v. American Board, etc. (1880), 53 Vt. 162 ; Holt v. Hogan (1859), 5 Jones Eq. 82 ; Bostick v. Winton (1853), 1 Sneed *524; Shank v. DeWitt (1886), 44 Ohio St. 237 , 6 N. E. 255 ; 31 Cyc. 1137. 7.

1909Miller v. State (1889), 121 Ind. 294 ; Nichols v. State (1891), 127 Ind. 406 ; State v. Sopher (1901), 157 Ind. 360 ; State, ex rel., v. Board, etc. (1904), 162 Ind. 183 ; Laporte Carriage Co. v. Sullender (1905), 165 Ind. 290 ; State, ex rel., v. Jackson (1907), 168 Ind. 384 . 2.

1909Miller v. State (1889), 121 Ind. 294 ; Nichols v. State (1891), 127 Ind. 406 ; State v. Sopher (1901), 157 Ind. 360 ; State, ex rel., v. Board, etc. (1904), 162 Ind. 183 ; Laporte Carriage Co. v. Sullender (1905), 165 Ind. 290 ; State, ex rel., v. Jackson (1907), 168 Ind. 384 . 2.

1909Miller v. State (1889), 121 Ind. 294 ; Nichols v. State (1891), 127 Ind. 406 ; State v. Sopher (1901), 157 Ind. 360 ; State, ex rel., v. Board, etc. (1904), 162 Ind. 183 ; Laporte Carriage Co. v. Sullender (1905), 165 Ind. 290 ; State, ex rel., v. Jackson (1907), 168 Ind. 384 . 2.

1909Miller v. State (1889), 121 Ind. 294 ; Nichols v. State (1891), 127 Ind. 406 ; State v. Sopher (1901), 157 Ind. 360 ; State, ex rel., v. Board, etc. (1904), 162 Ind. 183 ; Laporte Carriage Co. v. Sullender (1905), 165 Ind. 290 ; State, ex rel., v. Jackson (1907), 168 Ind. 384 . 2.

1909Miller v. State (1889), 121 Ind. 294 ; Nichols v. State (1891), 127 Ind. 406 ; State v. Sopher (1901), 157 Ind. 360 ; State, ex rel., v. Board, etc. (1904), 162 Ind. 183 ; Laporte Carriage Co. v. Sullender (1905), 165 Ind. 290 ; State, ex rel., v. Jackson (1907), 168 Ind. 384 . 2.

1909Miller v. State (1889), 121 Ind. 294 ; Nichols v. State (1891), 127 Ind. 406 ; State v. Sopher (1901), 157 Ind. 360 ; State, ex rel., v. Board, etc. (1904), 162 Ind. 183 ; Laporte Carriage Co. v. Sullender (1905), 165 Ind. 290 ; State, ex rel., v. Jackson (1907), 168 Ind. 384 . 2.