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11 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carney v. Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences2018We review the Attorney General's decision regarding *770 whether to certify a ballot petition de novo, bearing in mind "the firmly established principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support the people's prerogative to initiate and adopt laws." Abdow v. Attorney Gen ., 468 Mass. 478 , 487, 11 N.E.3d 574 (2014), quoting Carney v. Attorney Gen ., 451 Mass. 803 , 814, 890 N.E.2d 121 (2008). 2016We review the Attorney General’s certification decision de novo, bearing in mind “the firmly established principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support the people’s prerogative to initiate and adopt laws.” Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 487 (2014), quoting Carney v. Attorney Gen., 451 Mass. 803, 814 (2008) (Carney II). 7 1. | 4 | 5 |
Abdow v. Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences2018We review the Attorney General's decision regarding *770 whether to certify a ballot petition de novo, bearing in mind "the firmly established principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support the people's prerogative to initiate and adopt laws." Abdow v. Attorney Gen ., 468 Mass. 478 , 487, 11 N.E.3d 574 (2014), quoting Carney v. Attorney Gen ., 451 Mass. 803 , 814, 890 N.E.2d 121 (2008). 2016We review the Attorney General’s certification decision de novo, bearing in mind “the firmly established principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support the people’s prerogative to initiate and adopt laws.” Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 487 (2014), quoting Carney v. Attorney Gen., 451 Mass. 803, 814 (2008) (Carney II). 7 1. | 2 | 5 |
Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 403 Mass. 203, 211 (1988). b. 2014Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 403 Mass. 203, 211 (1988). 1. | 2 | 2 |
Buckley v. Secretary of the Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1988See Buckley v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 195, 199, 202-203 (1976); 2 Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1917-1918, at 728 (191.8) (when certifying petitions as to proper form, Attorney General is not to be a censor; people should be allowed to speak and act freely through the initiative process). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
green
2 sentences2008Because “undetermined factual issues . . . [led] to reasonable, not frivolous, contentions that the petition [did] not necessarily effect a regulatory taking,” id. at 210 , and in light of “the firmly established principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support the people’s prerogative to initiate and adopt laws,” id. at 211 , the court held that “it was reasonable and proper for the Attorney General to [certify the petition].” Id. 2008Because “undetermined factual issues . . . [led] to reasonable, not frivolous, contentions that the petition [did] not necessarily effect a regulatory taking,” id. at 210 , and in light of “the firmly established principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support the people’s prerogative to initiate and adopt laws,” id. at 211 , the court held that “it was reasonable and proper for the Attorney General to [certify the petition].” Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Foster v. Shubert Holding Co.
green
1 sentence1966See: Wyatt v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 319 Mass. 251 , 252 and Foster v. Shubert Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470, 477 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Wyatt v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co.
green
1 sentence1966See: Wyatt v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 319 Mass. 251 , 252 and Foster v. Shubert Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470, 477 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Magee v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation
green
1 sentence1944This statement, however, is hardly consistent with the firmly established principle that a taxable succession “includes not only the privilege exer cised by the former owner to dispose of his property by will or grant, or to allow it to descend under the laws of intestate succession, but also the privilege enjoyed by the legatee, devisee, donee or heir to succeed to the title, possession and enjoyment of the property according to established laws,” Magee v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 256 Mass. 512, 515 , for the taxable successions other than succession by survivorship in joint o | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.