firmly established rule in Florida

2005"It is a firmly established rule that `Courts must apply a statute as they find it, leaving to the legislature the correction of assorted inconsistencies and inequalities in its operation.'" State v. Aiuppa, 298 So.2d 391, 404 (Fla.1974) (citing McClain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 527 , 61 S.Ct. 373 , 85 L.Ed. 319 (1940)).

2005"It is a firmly established rule that `Courts must apply a statute as they find it, leaving to the legislature the correction of assorted inconsistencies and inequalities in its operation.'" State v. Aiuppa, 298 So.2d 391, 404 (Fla.1974) (citing McClain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 527 , 61 S.Ct. 373 , 85 L.Ed. 319 (1940)).

1989Parise v. State, 320 So.2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); see also Raulerson v. State, 102 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1958); Seward v. State, 59 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1952); Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447 , 147 So. 897 (1933).

1989Parise v. State, 320 So.2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); see also Raulerson v. State, 102 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1958); Seward v. State, 59 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1952); Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447 , 147 So. 897 (1933).

1989Parise v. State, 320 So.2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); see also Raulerson v. State, 102 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1958); Seward v. State, 59 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1952); Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447 , 147 So. 897 (1933).

1975Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447 , 147 So. 897 (1933); Seward v. State, Fla. 1952, 59 So.2d 529 ; Raulerson v. State, Fla. 1958, 102 So.2d 281 .

2004Id. (citations omitted).

2001If negligently created or permitted to exist, this decidedly non— "purely natural" defect, see, 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363 Comment b (1965), would give rise to liability under the firmly established principle embodied in 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 364 (1965): Creation or Maintenance of Dangerous Artificial Conditions A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for physical harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land, which the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such harm, if (a) the

1994In Fischer v. State, 429 So.2d 1309 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 438 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1983), this court invoked the firmly established rule that a defendant is entitled to a mistrial upon timely motion when an alternate juror is present during deliberations.

1989Del Sol, 537 So.2d at 694 .

1989Parise v. State, 320 So.2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); see also Raulerson v. State, 102 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1958); Seward v. State, 59 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1952); Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447 , 147 So. 897 (1933).

1988Azalea Park Utilities, Inc. v. Knox-Florida Development Corp., 127 So.2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).

1986This theory is inconsistent with the firmly established principle that "just value" for tax assessment purposes is synonymous with "fair market value." E.g., Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. County of Dade, supra ; Walter v. Schuler, supra .

1986This theory is inconsistent with the firmly established principle that "just value" for tax assessment purposes is synonymous with "fair market value." E.g., Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. County of Dade, supra ; Walter v. Schuler, supra .

1976In Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973), this Court recognized the traumatic effect that the judicial substitution of the comparative negligence doctrine, in place of the firmly established doctrine of contributory negligence, would have in the field of tort litigation in the trial and appellate courts of this State.

1971Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 5 Cir.1964, 335 F.2d 317 ; Battisti v. Continental Casualty Company, 5 Cir.1969, 406 F.2d 1318 ; Bennett v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 788 ; Consolidated Mutual Ins.

1971Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 5 Cir.1964, 335 F.2d 317 ; Battisti v. Continental Casualty Company, 5 Cir.1969, 406 F.2d 1318 ; Bennett v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 788 ; Consolidated Mutual Ins.

1971Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 5 Cir.1964, 335 F.2d 317 ; Battisti v. Continental Casualty Company, 5 Cir.1969, 406 F.2d 1318 ; Bennett v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 788 ; Consolidated Mutual Ins.

1971Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. v. Sommer, 111 So.2d 743 (Fla.App. 1959).

1967(Certain Lands, etc. v. City of Coronado Beach, 128 Fla. 884 , 175 So. 774 ; Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679 , 79 So. 163 , 16 RCL 95) He is, in reality, in substantially the same position as the mortgagor who is foreclosed after constructive service and is then made a defendant in a suit at law to recover the balance due on the promissory note involved.

1967(Certain Lands, etc. v. City of Coronado Beach, 128 Fla. 884 , 175 So. 774 ; Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679 , 79 So. 163 , 16 RCL 95) He is, in reality, in substantially the same position as the mortgagor who is foreclosed after constructive service and is then made a defendant in a suit at law to recover the balance due on the promissory note involved.

1967(Certain Lands, etc. v. City of Coronado Beach, 128 Fla. 884 , 175 So. 774 ; Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679 , 79 So. 163 , 16 RCL 95) He is, in reality, in substantially the same position as the mortgagor who is foreclosed after constructive service and is then made a defendant in a suit at law to recover the balance due on the promissory note involved.

1967(Certain Lands, etc. v. City of Coronado Beach, 128 Fla. 884 , 175 So. 774 ; Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679 , 79 So. 163 , 16 RCL 95) He is, in reality, in substantially the same position as the mortgagor who is foreclosed after constructive service and is then made a defendant in a suit at law to recover the balance due on the promissory note involved.

1964Typical of the cases applying this rule of estoppel is our decision in Carter v. Carter, 141 So.2d 591 (1962), a divorce suit in which we held that the appellant wife, who accepted the benefits under a settlement agreement incorporated into the husband’s divorce decree, was estopped from appealing from the said decree, so we dismissed her appeal.