firmly established rule in Illinois

2020People v. Lewis, 269 Ill.

2002People v. Lewis , 269 Ill.

2002Ed. 2d 1 , 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982), for the firmly established rule that “while a capital sentencer ‘may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence,’ the sentencer ‘may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence’ from its consideration.” Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 346 , quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15 , 71 L.

2002We cited Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), for the firmly established rule that "while a capital sentencer `may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence,' the sentencer `may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence' from its consideration." Davis, 185 Ill.2d at 346 , 235 Ill.

2002Ed. 2d 1 , 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982), for the firmly established rule that “while a capital sentencer ‘may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence,’ the sentencer ‘may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence’ from its consideration.” Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 346 , quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15 , 71 L.

2002Ed. 2d 1 , 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982), for the firmly established rule that “while a capital sentencer ‘may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence,’ the sentencer ‘may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence’ from its consideration.” Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 346 , quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15 , 71 L.

1994Additionally, we note that during the oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, defendants' attorney conceded that "[t]he city's contracts specifically required the subcontractor or, any subcontractor that may be hired to carry the insurance." It is a firmly established principle of contract interpretation that courts should give great weight to the parties' interpretation *596 of the contract because the parties are in the best position to know what was intended by the language employed. ( Schneider v. Neubert (1923), 308 Ill. 40, 43 , 139 N.E. 84, 85 ; Chicago & Northwestern R.R.

1994Additionally, we note that during the oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, defendants' attorney conceded that "[t]he city's contracts specifically required the subcontractor or, any subcontractor that may be hired to carry the insurance." It is a firmly established principle of contract interpretation that courts should give great weight to the parties' interpretation *596 of the contract because the parties are in the best position to know what was intended by the language employed. ( Schneider v. Neubert (1923), 308 Ill. 40, 43 , 139 N.E. 84, 85 ; Chicago & Northwestern R.R.

1976It is designed to prevent not only the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent *354 conduct, but to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself where he must choose between reconciling conflicting interests and protecting rights which he should represent." 1 Ill.

1976It is designed to prevent not only the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself where he must choose between reconciling conflicting interests and protecting rights which he should represent.” 1 Ill.

1973Consequently, this court must rely on the firmly established rule that, unless there is evidence of fraud, mistake, or violation of duty by the officer conducting the sale, mere inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient cause for setting aside a judicial sale (Horney v. Hayes (1957), 11 Ill.2d 178 , 142 N.E.2d 94 ; People v. Anderson (1942), 380 Ill. 158 , 43 N.E.2d 997 ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Robin (1935), 361 Ill. 261 , 198 N.E. 4 ).

1973Consequently, this court must rely on the firmly established rule that, unless there is evidence of fraud, mistake, or violation of duty by the officer conducting the sale, mere inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient cause for setting aside a judicial sale (Horney v. Hayes (1957), 11 Ill.2d 178 , 142 N.E.2d 94 ; People v. Anderson (1942), 380 Ill. 158 , 43 N.E.2d 997 ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Robin (1935), 361 Ill. 261 , 198 N.E. 4 ).

1973Consequently, this court must rely on the firmly established rule that, unless there is evidence of fraud, mistake, or violation of duty by the officer conducting the sale, mere inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient cause for setting aside a judicial sale (Horney v. Hayes (1957), 11 Ill.2d 178 , 142 N.E.2d 94 ; People v. Anderson (1942), 380 Ill. 158 , 43 N.E.2d 997 ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Robin (1935), 361 Ill. 261 , 198 N.E. 4 ).

1973Consequently, this court must rely on the firmly established rule that, unless there is evidence of fraud, mistake, or violation of duty by the officer conducting the sale, mere inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient cause for setting aside a judicial sale (Horney v. Hayes (1957), 11 Ill.2d 178 , 142 N.E.2d 94 ; People v. Anderson (1942), 380 Ill. 158 , 43 N.E.2d 997 ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Robin (1935), 361 Ill. 261 , 198 N.E. 4 ).

1973Consequently, this court must rely on the firmly established rule that, unless there is evidence of fraud, mistake, or violation of duty by the officer conducting the sale, mere inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient cause for setting aside a judicial sale (Horney v. Hayes (1957), 11 Ill.2d 178 , 142 N.E.2d 94 ; People v. Anderson (1942), 380 Ill. 158 , 43 N.E.2d 997 ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Robin (1935), 361 Ill. 261 , 198 N.E. 4 ).

1973Consequently, this court must rely on the firmly established rule that, unless there is evidence of fraud, mistake, or violation of duty by the officer conducting the sale, mere inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient cause for setting aside a judicial sale (Horney v. Hayes (1957), 11 Ill.2d 178 , 142 N.E.2d 94 ; People v. Anderson (1942), 380 Ill. 158 , 43 N.E.2d 997 ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Robin (1935), 361 Ill. 261 , 198 N.E. 4 ).

1960(People v. Holmstrom, 8 Ill.2d 401 ; Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380 ; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356 .) Equally familiar is the rule that even if a judgment has been entered and a cause is pending on appeal, the reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.

1960It is a firmly established principle that where there is no constitutional prohibition, and none has been brought to our attention here, the legislature may, by curative act, validate any proceeding which it might have authorized in advance. ( People v. Holmstrom, 8 Ill.2d 401 ; Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380 ; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356 .) Equally familiar is the rule that even if a judgment has been entered and a cause is pending on appeal, the reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.

1960(People v. Holmstrom, 8 Ill.2d 401 ; Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380 ; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356 .) Equally familiar is the rule that even if a judgment has been entered and a cause is pending on appeal, the reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.

1960It is a firmly established principle that where there is no constitutional prohibition, and none has been brought to our attention here, the legislature may, by curative act, validate any proceeding which it might have authorized in advance. ( People v. Holmstrom, 8 Ill.2d 401 ; Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380 ; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356 .) Equally familiar is the rule that even if a judgment has been entered and a cause is pending on appeal, the reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.

1960(People v. Holmstrom, 8 Ill.2d 401 ; Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380 ; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356 .) Equally familiar is the rule that even if a judgment has been entered and a cause is pending on appeal, the reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.

1960It is a firmly established principle that where there is no constitutional prohibition, and none has been brought to our attention here, the legislature may, by curative act, validate any proceeding which it might have authorized in advance. ( People v. Holmstrom, 8 Ill.2d 401 ; Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380 ; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356 .) Equally familiar is the rule that even if a judgment has been entered and a cause is pending on appeal, the reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.

2026Therefore, when calculating respondent’s statutory share upon renunciation of the decedent’s will in Illinois, we find that the trial court did not err when it excluded the Florida and Georgia properties from the decedent’s entire estate.” Id. at 1101 . ¶ 11 Applying the same reasoning here, Arizona law controls the administration of real property in that state and Kevin’s real property there is not part of his “entire estate” for purposes of calculating Deborah’s share under section 2-8.

2012App. 3d at 689 (quoting Illini Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 162 Ill.

2012Loeb v. Stern, 198 Ill. 371, 383 (1902). “ ‘[I]t is a firmly established rule that unless there is evidence of mistake, fraud, or violation of duty by the officer conducting the sale, mere inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient cause for setting aside a judicial sale.’ ” Lyons Savings & Loan Ass’n, 189 Ill.

1995This court has repeatedly rejected this argument. ( People v. Burrows (1992), 148 Ill.2d 196, 259-60 , 170 Ill.Dec. 317 , 592 N.E.2d 997 .) We continue to adhere to the firmly established principle that the Illinois death penalty is constitutional.

1995(People v. Burrows (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 196, 259-60 .) We continue to adhere to the firmly established principle that the Illinois death penalty is constitutional.

1994App. 3d 589 , 606 N.E.2d 258 .) With regard to property, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that " 'it is a firmly established principle that questions involving interests in immovables are governed by the law of the situs.’ ” (Lake County Trust Co. v. Two Bar B, Inc., 238 Ill.

1994App. 3d 589 , 606 N.E.2d 258 .) With regard to property, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that " 'it is a firmly established principle that questions involving interests in immovables are governed by the law of the situs.’ ” (Lake County Trust Co. v. Two Bar B, Inc., 238 Ill.

1989(Presbyterian Distribution Service v. Chicago National Bank (1962), 36 Ill.

1988(People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153 , 368 N.E.2d 882, 883 .) It is apparent that defendant does not respond to the chastisements of his insurance company, the Secretary of State, or the court.

1988(People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153 , 368 N.E.2d 882, 883 .) It is apparent that defendant does not respond to the chastisements of his insurance company, the Secretary of State, or the court.

1986(People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 4 , 237 N.E.2d 697 ; People v. Harris (1975), 33 Ill.

1986(People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 4 , 237 N.E.2d 697 ; People v. Harris (1975), 33 Ill.

1986(Monier v. Chamberlain (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 351 , 221 N.E.2d 410 .) Moreover, great latitude is allowed in the scope of discovery, and the trial court has broad discretion on ruling on discovery matters, which discretion will not be interfered with on appeal in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion affirmatively, and clearly shown by the appellant.

1986(Monier v. Chamberlain (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 351 , 221 N.E.2d 410 .) Moreover, great latitude is allowed in the scope of discovery, and the trial court has broad discretion on ruling on discovery matters, which discretion will not be interfered with on appeal in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion affirmatively, and clearly shown by the appellant.