firmly established rule in West Virginia

2013It is a firmly established rule in West Virginia that a defendant’s disregard of a statute is prima facie negligence.8 More specific to this case, it is just as firmly 8 See, e.g., Syllabus Point 1, Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 68 W.Va. 405 , 69 S.E. 857 (1910) (“A violation of the statute inhibiting the employment of boys under fourteen years of age in coal mines constitutes actionable negligence whenever that violation is the natural and proximate cause of an injury.”); Syllabus Point 5, Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Const. Co., 106 W.Va. 99 , 144 S.E. 881 (1928) (“Disregard of a statut

2013It is a firmly established rule in West Virginia that a defendant’s disregard of a statute is prima facie negligence.8 More specific to this case, it is just as firmly 8 See, e.g., Syllabus Point 1, Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 68 W.Va. 405 , 69 S.E. 857 (1910) (“A violation of the statute inhibiting the employment of boys under fourteen years of age in coal mines constitutes actionable negligence whenever that violation is the natural and proximate cause of an injury.”); Syllabus Point 5, Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Const. Co., 106 W.Va. 99 , 144 S.E. 881 (1928) (“Disregard of a statut

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962HaymoND, Judge, dissenting: Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, 146 W.

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Va. 156 , 118 S. E. 2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, 145 W.

1953Further, "The law favors the vesting of estates, and is adverse to their destruction after they have been vested; and hence, the firmly established rule is that courts will always construe a stipulation in a deed so as *113 to prevent either the nonvesting or defeasance of an estate conveyed thereby, if possible." Sands v. Holbert, 93 W.Va. 574 , 117 S.E. 896 .

1953Further, "The law favors the vesting of estates, and is adverse to their destruction after they have been vested; and hence, the firmly established rule is that courts will always construe a stipulation in a deed so as *113 to prevent either the nonvesting or defeasance of an estate conveyed thereby, if possible." Sands v. Holbert, 93 W.Va. 574 , 117 S.E. 896 .

2016Pt. 2, French v. Sinkford, 132 W.Va. 66 , 54 S.E.2d 38 (1948).

2016Pt. 2, French v. Sinkford, 132 W.Va. 66 , 54 S.E.2d 38 (1948).

2013In Syllabus Point 7 of Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc., 206 W.Va. 333 , 524 S.E.2d 688 (1999), Justice Davis established the following guideline for weighing whether the violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation is prima facie negligence: When a statute imposes a duty on a person for the protection of others, it is a public safety statute and a violation of such a statute is prima facie evidence of negligence unless the statute says otherwise.

2013In Syllabus Point 7 of Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc., 206 W.Va. 333 , 524 S.E.2d 688 (1999), Justice Davis established the following guideline for weighing whether the violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation is prima facie negligence: When a statute imposes a duty on a person for the protection of others, it is a public safety statute and a violation of such a statute is prima facie evidence of negligence unless the statute says otherwise.

1999See e.g., Felzcerek v. I.N.S., 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1996); U.S. v. Wilkinson, 804 F.Supp. 263 , 268 n. 6 (D.Utah 1992); State v. Powdrill, 684 So.2d 350, 358 (La.1996); People v. Stacy, 193 Mich.App. 19 , 484 N.W.2d 675, 683 (1992).

1970State Road Commission v. Bowling, 152 W.Va. 688 , pt. 2 syl., 166 S.E.2d 119 .

1970State Road Commission v. Bowling, 152 W.Va. 688 , pt. 2 syl., 166 S.E.2d 119 .

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1962Though I concur in the holding of the majority that under the evidence in this case bearing upon the question of contributory *466 negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, that question was for the jury and that the trial court correctly applied the firmly established principle that questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, Graham v. Crist, W.Va., 118 S.E.2d 640 ; Overton v. Fields, W.Va., 117 S.E.2d 598 ; Lawrence v. Nelson

1958Va. 314 , 84 S. E. 2d 156 ; Cremeans v. Myers, 136 W.

1958The firmly established rule is that a new trial is rarely granted on the ground of after discovered evidence and that a new trial on that ground will be granted only “under very special circumstances.” State v. Spradley, 140 W.

1958Va. 314 , 84 S. E. 2d 156 ; Cremeans v. Myers, 136 W.

1934“Two things must concur to establish domicile, the fact of residence at a place and the intention to remain an indefinite time.” White v. Tenant, 31 W.

1913Poling v. Williams, 55 W.