firmly established rule in Montana

1996Peggy contends that the court improperly modified the custody arrangement as contained in the original decree by removing her "primary custodian" status. pew alleges that she requested that the court merely "clarify" matters, noting that her motion before the court was entitled "Motion for Final Determination of Visitation Rights," and that the court recognized the purpose of this document when it stated "The central issue before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for Final Determination of Visitation Rights." While we are well aware of the firmly established rule that a district court may not r

1996Peggy alleges that she requested that the court merely "clarify" matters, noting that her motion before the court was entitled "Motion for Final Determination of Visitation Rights," and that the court recognized the purpose of this document when it stated "The central issue before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for Final Determination of Visitation Rights." While we are well aware of the firmly established rule that a district court may not rule on matters other than those presented by the pleadings, In re Custody of C.S.F. (1988), 232 Mont. 2 0 4 , 209, 755 P.2d 578, 581 , we cannot glean f

2005State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58, ¶ 39 , 320 Mont. 211, ¶ 39 , 89 P.3d 947, ¶ 39 . ¶13 While we generally do not consider arguments first raised on appeal, our precedent clearly establishes that review of such arguments is proper in certain circumstances.

2005State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58, ¶ 39 , 320 Mont. 211, ¶ 39 , 89 P.3d 947, ¶ 39 . ¶13 While we generally do not consider arguments first raised on appeal, our precedent clearly establishes that review of such arguments is proper in certain circumstances.

2000Corp. (1997), 282 Mont. 376 , 938 P.2d 631 , where this Court firmly established the rule that a vehicle owner’s policy cannot deviate from the mandatory automatic omnibus coverage under §§ 61-6-103(2)(b) and 61-6-301(l)(a), MCA.

2000Corp. (1997), 282 Mont. 376 , 938 P.2d 631 , where this Court firmly established the rule that a vehicle owner’s policy cannot deviate from the mandatory automatic omnibus coverage under §§ 61-6-103(2)(b) and 61-6-301(l)(a), MCA.

1953A., N. S., p. 926, is as follows: “Based upon the principle above indicated, the firmly established rule is that, for injuries resulting from the unskilful, or otherwise negligent, performance of a thing agreed to be done, an action ex delicto will lie, notwithstanding the act complained of would also be ground for an action ex contractu.” In Dixon v. Texas Co., S. C., 72 S. E. (2d) 897, 899 , the court stated the rule as follows: “ ‘Although there is a broad distinction between causes of action arising ex contractu and those arising ex delicto, the dividing line between breaches of contract a

1953There is no certain test by which the Court can be guided in determining whether a particular action is ex delicto or ex contractu.’ Shaw v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 189 S. C. 437, 1 S. E. (2d) 499, 500 .