firmly established rule in Texas

2012See Akers v. Simpson, 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 1969) (“It is the firmly established rule in Texas that a defendant who is not served and who does not appear may not … attack the verity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding; the jurisdictional recitals import absolute verity.”); Dispensa v. Univ.

2011“It is the firmly established rule in Texas that a defendant who is not served and who does not appear may not, as a matter of public policy, attack the verity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding; the jurisdictional recitals import absolute verity.” Id.

2026However, “it is a firmly established principle in this state that testimony elicited from a witness called by the accused and offered by the accused is not accomplice-witness testimony which must be corroborated as contemplated under Article 38.14.” Selman v. State, 807 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).“Accomplice-witness testimony must be corroborated and the jury so instructed only when the State calls the witness and seeks to rely on such witness’s testimony.” Id.; see -7- Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527 , 530-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding instruction under Article 38.14 does no

2002However, "it is a firmly established principle in this State that testimony elicited from a witness called by the accused and offered by the accused is not accomplice-witness testimony which must be corroborated . . . ." Selman v. State, 807 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991). "[A]ccomplice-witness testimony must be corroborated and the jury so instructed only when the State calls the witness and seeks to rely on such witness's testimony." Id.

2015See Potts v. • State, 26 Tex. App. 664, 14 S.W. 456 (1883), amJOther English and American ras^ ritPH in Annotation: "Use in a criminal case of testimony given on former trial, or preliminary examination, by witnesses not available at present trial," 15 A.L.R. 495 (1921).

1995See Potts v. State, 26 Tex.App. 663 , 14 S.W. 456 (1883), and other English and American cases cited in Annotation: “Use in a criminal case of testimony given on former trial, or preliminary examination, by witnesses not available at present trial,” 15 A.L.R. 495 (1921).

2015Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 331-32 (sovereign immunity in the absence of a clear legislative waiver is the firmly established principle); see also Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc., 381 S.W.3d at 604 (sovereign immunity is “default rule” after Tooke).

2012Id. at 331-32 (sovereign immunity in the absence of a clear legislative waiver is the firmly established principle); see also Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 694 n. 3 (Tex.2003) (general rule is immunity).

2006Id. at 4; see also Wilson v. Work , 122 Tex. 545 , 62 S.W.2d 490 , 490 B 91 (1933); Mellinger , 3 S.W. at 254 B 55.

2006Id. at 4; see also Wilson v. Work, 122 Tex. 545 , 62 S.W.2d 490, 490-91 (1933); Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 254-55 .

2006Id. at 4; see also Wilson v. Work, 122 Tex. 545 , 62 S.W.2d 490, 490-91 (1933); Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 254-55 .

2006Id. at 4; see also Wilson v. Work, 122 Tex. 545 , 62 S.W.2d 490, 490-91 (1933); Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 254-55 .

2005“It is the well settled law of this state that where a judgment is collaterally attacked, plain jurisdiction recitals contained therein must be accorded absolute verity.” Pure Oil Co. v. Reece , 78 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1935); see also Akers v. Simpson , 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 1969) (“It is the firmly established rule in Texas that a defendant who is not served and who does not appear may not, as a matter of public policy, attack the verity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding; the jurisdictional recitals import absolute verity.”).

2005“It is the well settled law of this state that where a judgment is collaterally attacked, plain jurisdiction recitals contained therein must be accorded absolute verity.” Pure Oil Co. v. Reece, 124 Tex. 476 , 78 S.W.2d 932, 934 (1935); see also Akers v. Simpson, 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex.1969) (“It is the firmly established rule in Texas that a defendant who is not served and who does not appear may not, as a matter of public policy, attack the verity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding; the jurisdictional recitals import absolute verity.”).

2006Id. at 4; see also Wilson v. Work , 122 Tex. 545 , 62 S.W.2d 490 , 490 B 91 (1933); Mellinger , 3 S.W. at 254 B 55.

2006Id. at 4; see also Wilson v. Work, 122 Tex. 545 , 62 S.W.2d 490, 490-91 (1933); Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 254-55 .

2026However, “it is a firmly established principle in this state that testimony elicited from a witness called by the accused and offered by the accused is not accomplice-witness testimony which must be corroborated as contemplated under Article 38.14.” Selman v. State, 807 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).“Accomplice-witness testimony must be corroborated and the jury so instructed only when the State calls the witness and seeks to rely on such witness’s testimony.” Id.; see -7- Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527 , 530-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding instruction under Article 38.14 does no

2022“Failure to plead the defense results in waiver.” Id. (citing Davis v. Crockett, 398 S.W.2d 302 , 306–07 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1965, no writ)); see Zorrilla, 469 S.W.3d at 159 ; Watson v. Tipton, 274 S.W.3d 791, 800 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).16 Thomas did not plead or prove the affirmative defense of homestead, which was not raised until he filed the bill of review.

2022“Failure to plead the defense results in waiver.” Id. (citing Davis v. Crockett, 398 S.W.2d 302 , 306–07 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1965, no writ)); see Zorrilla, 469 S.W.3d at 159 ; Watson v. Tipton, 274 S.W.3d 791, 800 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).16 Thomas did not plead or prove the affirmative defense of homestead, which was not raised until he filed the bill of review.

2022“The party asserting homestead also bears the burden of pleading the defense.” Id. (citing Bennett v. State Nat’l Bank, Odessa, Tex., 623 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“It is a firmly established principle of law that a plea of homestead is an affirmative defense and the burden of pleading and proving such defense rests upon the party asserting it.”)).

2022“Failure to plead the defense results in waiver.” Id. (citing Davis v. Crockett, 398 S.W.2d 302 , 306–07 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1965, no writ)); see Zorrilla, 469 S.W.3d at 159 ; Watson v. Tipton, 274 S.W.3d 791, 800 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).16 Thomas did not plead or prove the affirmative defense of homestead, which was not raised until he filed the bill of review.

2012Id. at 331-32 (sovereign immunity in the absence of a clear legislative waiver is the firmly established principle); see also Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 694 n. 3 (Tex.2003) (general rule is immunity).

2008However, “ [i]t is the firmly established rule in Texas that a defendant who is not served and who does not appear may not, as a matter of public policy, attack the verity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding; the jurisdictional recitals import absolute verity.” Akers v. Simpson , 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 1969); see also Armentor , 178 S.W.3d at 150 .

1996Id. at 610 , 110 S.Ct. at 2110 ; see also id. at 628, 110 S.Ct. at 2119 (White, J., concurring) (the rule allowing jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident by personal service in the forum state has been and is widely accepted throughout this country).

1996Id. at 610 , 110 S.Ct. at 2110 ; see also id. at 628, 110 S.Ct. at 2119 (White, J., concurring) (the rule allowing jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident by personal service in the forum state has been and is widely accepted throughout this country).

1991See also Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (trial court erred in instructing the jury a witness called by the defense was an accomplice witness; the State did not call the witness even though he had been granted immunity by the State); Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Cr.App.1978): Cranfil v. State, 525 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and authorities collected therein (authorities clearly support the rule that when an accused calls a person as a witness and offers the testimony of such witness the testimony is not that of an accomplice which must be corroborated under the st

1991See also Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (trial court erred in instructing the jury a witness called by the defense was an accomplice witness; the State did not call the witness even though he had been granted immunity by the State); Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Cranfil v. State, 525 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and authorities collected therein (authorities clearly support the rule that when an accused calls a person as a witness and offers the testimony of such witness the testimony is not that of an accomplice which must be corroborated under the st

1991See also Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (trial court erred in instructing the jury a witness called by the defense was an accomplice witness; the State did not call the witness even though he had been granted immunity by the State); Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Cr.App.1978): Cranfil v. State, 525 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and authorities collected therein (authorities clearly support the rule that when an accused calls a person as a witness and offers the testimony of such witness the testimony is not that of an accomplice which must be corroborated under the st

1991See also Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (trial court erred in instructing the jury a witness called by the defense was an accomplice witness; the State did not call the witness even though he had been granted immunity by the State); Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Cranfil v. State, 525 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and authorities collected therein (authorities clearly support the rule that when an accused calls a person as a witness and offers the testimony of such witness the testimony is not that of an accomplice which must be corroborated under the st

1991See also Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (trial court erred in instructing the jury a witness called by the defense was an accomplice witness; the State did not call the witness even though he had been granted immunity by the State); Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Cr.App.1978): Cranfil v. State, 525 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and authorities collected therein (authorities clearly support the rule that when an accused calls a person as a witness and offers the testimony of such witness the testimony is not that of an accomplice which must be corroborated under the st

1991See also Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (trial court erred in instructing the jury a witness called by the defense was an accomplice witness; the State did not call the witness even though he had been granted immunity by the State); Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Cranfil v. State, 525 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and authorities collected therein (authorities clearly support the rule that when an accused calls a person as a witness and offers the testimony of such witness the testimony is not that of an accomplice which must be corroborated under the st

1981Geiser v. Lawson, 584 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1979, no writ).