64 New York opinions name it 11 courts 1894–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospitalred2 sentences2000Hosp., 211 NY 125, 129 [1914].) Generally, “a patient’s right to determine the course of his medical treatment was paramount to what might otherwise be the doctor’s obligation to provide medical care, and that the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment must be honored, even though the recommended treatment may be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient’s life [citation omitted]. 1999Hosp., 211 NY 125, 129 [1914]). | 3 | 4 |
Perma Pave Contracting Corp. v. Paerdegat Boat & Racquet Club, Inc.green2 sentences2007Corp. v Paerdegat Boat & Racquet Club, 156 AD2d at 551 [emphasis added]). 2007Corp. v Paerdegat Boat & Racquet Club, 156 AD2d 550, 551 [1989]; see Contelmo’s Sand & Gravel v J & J Milano, 96 AD2d 1090 [1983]), here, the parties presented conflicting testimony on the issue whether defendant in fact hired a general contractor as opposed to a project manager. | 2 | 2 |
Rivers v. Katzgreen2 sentences2017In Rivers v Katz, this Court stated that "[i]t is a firmly established principle of the common law of New York that every individual of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body" ( 67 NY2d at 492 ). 2006Rivers v Katz (supra) is the seminal New York case explaining an adult’s due process rights to oppose medication. 9 The Court of Appeals (at 492) noted therein, “[i]t is a firmly established principle of the common law of New York that every individual ‘of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body’ . . . and to control the course of his medical treatment,” even to refuse medical treatment which might be beneficial or lifesaving. | 1 | 3 |
Barbara C. v. Philip V.green2 sentences2007Corp. v Paerdegat Boat & Racquet Club, 156 AD2d 550, 551 [1989]; see Contelmo’s Sand & Gravel v J & J Milano, 96 AD2d 1090 [1983]), here, the parties presented conflicting testimony on the issue whether defendant in fact hired a general contractor as opposed to a project manager. 1989The owner’s mere consent to and acceptance of improvements placed on his property by the subcontractor, without more, does not render it liable to the subcontractor (see, Contelmo’s Sand & Gravel v J & J Milano, supra). | 1 | 2 |
Scarpelli v. Marshallgreen2 sentences1994In short, the common law must be held to be no further abrogated than the clear import of the language used in the statute absolutely requires.” (Scarpelli v Marshall, 92 Misc 2d 244, 247 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1977]; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 301.) As the Third Department has pointed out: " 'the Legislature is not lightly to be charged with enacting a statute which will operate harshly or unjustly; and, if a statute apparently has such effect, some other construction is to be sought, if possible.’ ” (Matter of Granger v Urda, 54 AD2d 377, 380 [3d Dept 1976], quoting McKin 1978(See McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 301.)” (Scarpelli v Marshall, 92 Misc 2d 244, 247 , supra.) The Scarpelli decision comes closer to the true intent of the statute than any other decision. | 1 | 2 |
Rossi v. Boehnergreen2 sentences1991The firmly established rule in this State is that, "absent fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances, an attorney is not liable to third parties, not in privity, for harm caused by professional negligence” (Estate of Spivey v Pulley, 138 AD2d 563, 564 ; see also, Viscardi v Lerner, 125 AD2d 662, 663-664 ; see also, Rossi v Boehner, 116 AD2d 636, 637 ; Harder v Arthur F. McGinn, Jr., P. C., 89 AD2d 732, 733 , affd 58 NY2d 663 ). 1986The firmly established rule in New York State with respect to attorney malpractice is that absent fraud, collusion, mali cious acts or other special circumstances, an attorney is not liable to third parties not in privity for harm caused by professional negligence (see, e.g., Rossi v Boehner, 116 AD2d 636 ; Kramer v Belfi, 106 AD2d 615 ; Calamari v Grace, 98 AD2d 74, 80 ). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Baldigreen2 sentences1990It is now a firmly established rule of New York law that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be premised solely upon trial counsel’s unsuccessful employment of a trial strategy, even when the strategy in question may be "daring and innovative” (People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 151 ; see also, People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 798 ). 1990While the defendant’s trial counsel may have employed some strategy which ultimately proved unsuccessful, ”[i]t is now a firmly established rule of New York law that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be premised solely upon trial counsel’s unsuccessful employment of a trial strategy” (People v Sullivan, 153 AD2d 223, 227 ; see, People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 ). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Riveragreen2 sentences1990"The right to counsel was not intended to afford a defendant, aided by the wisdom of hindsight, to second guess matters of trial strategy employed by counsel” (People v Aiken, 45 NY2d 394, 399 ; see, People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 ; People v Benn, 68 NY2d 941 ; see also, People v Coleman, 142 AD2d 586, 587-588 ; People v Nevarez, 141 AD2d 861, 862 ). 1990Moreover, viewing counsel’s over-all performance in light of the strength of the prosecution’s case and the applicable law, we conclude that the defendant was afforded meaningful representation at trial (see, People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 ; People v Benn, 68 NY2d 941 ). | 1 | 2 |
New York State Society of Enrolled Agents v. New York State Division of Tax Appealsgreen1 sentence2012The court has recognized “the firmly established principle that legislative enactments are cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality” (New York Socy. of Enrolled Agents v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, 161 AD2d 1, 5-6 [2d Dept 1990]). | 1 | 1 |
Pyle v. . Pylegreen1 sentence2006Undivided loyalty is the supreme test, unlimited and unconfirmed by the bounds of classified transactions” (City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v Cannon, 291 NY 125, 131 [1943]; see also Pyle v Pyle, 137 App Div 568, 572 [1910], affd 199 NY 538 [1910] [a trustee “owes an undivided duty to his beneficiary, and he must not, under any circumstances, place himself in a position whereby his personal interest will come in conflict with the interest of his cestui que trust“]-, Matter of Hall, 275 AD2d 979, 980 [2000] [“(i)f the personal interests of a trustee conflict with her interest as a trustee, the cour | 1 | 1 |
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannongreen1 sentence2006Undivided loyalty is the supreme test, unlimited and unconfirmed by the bounds of classified transactions” (City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v Cannon, 291 NY 125, 131 [1943]; see also Pyle v Pyle, 137 App Div 568, 572 [1910], affd 199 NY 538 [1910] [a trustee “owes an undivided duty to his beneficiary, and he must not, under any circumstances, place himself in a position whereby his personal interest will come in conflict with the interest of his cestui que trust“]-, Matter of Hall, 275 AD2d 979, 980 [2000] [“(i)f the personal interests of a trustee conflict with her interest as a trustee, the cour | 1 | 1 |
Pyle v. Pylegreen1 sentence2006Undivided loyalty is the supreme test, unlimited and unconfirmed by the bounds of classified transactions” (City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v Cannon, 291 NY 125, 131 [1943]; see also Pyle v Pyle, 137 App Div 568, 572 [1910], affd 199 NY 538 [1910] [a trustee “owes an undivided duty to his beneficiary, and he must not, under any circumstances, place himself in a position whereby his personal interest will come in conflict with the interest of his cestui que trust“]-, Matter of Hall, 275 AD2d 979, 980 [2000] [“(i)f the personal interests of a trustee conflict with her interest as a trustee, the cour | 1 | 1 |
In re Hallgreen1 sentence2006Undivided loyalty is the supreme test, unlimited and unconfirmed by the bounds of classified transactions” (City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v Cannon, 291 NY 125, 131 [1943]; see also Pyle v Pyle, 137 App Div 568, 572 [1910], affd 199 NY 538 [1910] [a trustee “owes an undivided duty to his beneficiary, and he must not, under any circumstances, place himself in a position whereby his personal interest will come in conflict with the interest of his cestui que trust“]-, Matter of Hall, 275 AD2d 979, 980 [2000] [“(i)f the personal interests of a trustee conflict with her interest as a trustee, the cour | 1 | 1 |
| Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG.green | 1 | 1 |
| Granger v. Urdagreen | 1 | 1 |
| SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sortino v. Fishergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jenningsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Viscardi v. Lernergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Spivey v. Pulleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Corporate Property Investors v. Biny Clothing, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Burchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Satterfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York City Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williamson v. . Brown
green
2 sentences1957Williams v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354 ; Reed v. Gannon, 50 id. 345. * * * The fact, admitted upon the record, that none of the grantees had actual knowledge of the terms of this particular tenant’s lease is immaterial, and in no wise destroys the legal presumption of knowledge arising from the facts. 1911Williams v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354 ; Reed v. Gannon, 50 N. Y. 345 .” This diligence of inquiry clearly devolved on the petitioner, not only as owner but also as grantee, when she received a reconveyance of the leased premises from Ortolani, to whom she had previously deeded the property. | 3 | 1904–1957 |
Dunn v. Hudson River Electric Co.
green
2 sentences1928(Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398 .) If the client has the right to terminate the relationship of attorney and client at any time without cause, it follows as a corollary that the client cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising a right which is an implied condition of the contract. 1920(Tenney v. Berger, supra; Andrewes v. Haas, supra; Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398 ; Johnson v. Ravitch, 113 App. Div. 810, 812 ; Martin v. Camp, supra; Matter of City of New York, 219 N. Y. 192 .) In Martin v. Camp this court said: “ The contract under which an attorney is employed by a client has peculiar and distinctive features which differentiate it from ordinary contracts of employment. * * * That the client may at any time for any reason or without any reason discharge his attorney is a firmly established rule which springs from the personal and confidential nature *74 of the relation whi | 3 | 1916–1928 |
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Taher
green
2 sentences2019OPINION & ORDER It is by now a firmly established principle that the issue of whether a plaintiff lacks standing to commence an action is waived unless it is raised in the answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss ( see CPLR 3211[a][3]; [e]; Matter of Prudco Realty Corp. v Palermo , 60 NY2d 656, 657 ; US Bank N.A. v Konstantinovic , 147 AD3d 1002, 1004 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher , 104 AD3d 815, 817 ). 2019OPINION & ORDER It is by now a firmly established principle that the issue of whether a plaintiff lacks standing to commence an action is waived unless it is raised in the answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss ( see CPLR 3211[a][3]; [e]; Matter of Prudco Realty Corp. v Palermo , 60 NY2d 656, 657 ; US Bank N.A. v Konstantinovic , 147 AD3d 1002, 1004 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher , 104 AD3d 815, 817 ). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
US Bank National Ass'n v. Konstantinovic
green
2 sentences2019OPINION & ORDER It is by now a firmly established principle that the issue of whether a plaintiff lacks standing to commence an action is waived unless it is raised in the answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss ( see CPLR 3211[a][3]; [e]; Matter of Prudco Realty Corp. v Palermo , 60 NY2d 656, 657 ; US Bank N.A. v Konstantinovic , 147 AD3d 1002, 1004 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher , 104 AD3d 815, 817 ). 2019OPINION & ORDER It is by now a firmly established principle that the issue of whether a plaintiff lacks standing to commence an action is waived unless it is raised in the answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss ( see CPLR 3211[a][3]; [e]; Matter of Prudco Realty Corp. v Palermo , 60 NY2d 656, 657 ; US Bank N.A. v Konstantinovic , 147 AD3d 1002, 1004 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher , 104 AD3d 815, 817 ). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Prudco Realty Corp. v. Palermo
green
2 sentences2019OPINION & ORDER It is by now a firmly established principle that the issue of whether a plaintiff lacks standing to commence an action is waived unless it is raised in the answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss ( see CPLR 3211[a][3]; [e]; Matter of Prudco Realty Corp. v Palermo , 60 NY2d 656, 657 ; US Bank N.A. v Konstantinovic , 147 AD3d 1002, 1004 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher , 104 AD3d 815, 817 ). 2019OPINION & ORDER It is by now a firmly established principle that the issue of whether a plaintiff lacks standing to commence an action is waived unless it is raised in the answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss ( see CPLR 3211[a][3]; [e]; Matter of Prudco Realty Corp. v Palermo , 60 NY2d 656, 657 ; US Bank N.A. v Konstantinovic , 147 AD3d 1002, 1004 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher , 104 AD3d 815, 817 ). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Martin v. . Camp
green
2 sentences1993The client, with or without cause, may terminate the contract at any time (Martin v Camp, 219 NY 170 , order amended 220 NY 653 ). 1920(Tenney v. Berger, supra; Andrewes v. Haas, supra; Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398 ; Johnson v. Ravitch, 113 App. Div. 810, 812 ; Martin v. Camp, supra; Matter of City of New York, 219 N. Y. 192 .) In Martin v. Camp this court said: “ The contract under which an attorney is employed by a client has peculiar and distinctive features which differentiate it from ordinary contracts of employment. * * * That the client may at any time for any reason or without any reason discharge his attorney is a firmly established rule which springs from the personal and confidential nature *74 of the relation whi | 2 | 1920–1993 |
Kramer v. Belfi
green
2 sentences1991While we recognize that a limited exception to the privity rule has been carved out in the case of accountants, courts have "repeatedly and recently declined to enlarge the application of this exception to [other] professionals” (Estate of Spivey v Pulley, supra, at 564; see, Council Commerce Corp. v Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, 144 AD2d 422, 424 , lv denied 74 NY2d 606 ; cf., Kramer v Belfi, 106 AD2d 615 ; see also, 3 Warren’s Heaton, Surrogates’ Courts § 221 [1] [d], at 64 [Supp 11th ed]). 1986The firmly established rule in New York State with respect to attorney malpractice is that absent fraud, collusion, mali cious acts or other special circumstances, an attorney is not liable to third parties not in privity for harm caused by professional negligence (see, e.g., Rossi v Boehner, 116 AD2d 636 ; Kramer v Belfi, 106 AD2d 615 ; Calamari v Grace, 98 AD2d 74, 80 ). | 2 | 1986–1991 |
People v. Benn
green
2 sentences1990"The right to counsel was not intended to afford a defendant, aided by the wisdom of hindsight, to second guess matters of trial strategy employed by counsel” (People v Aiken, 45 NY2d 394, 399 ; see, People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 ; People v Benn, 68 NY2d 941 ; see also, People v Coleman, 142 AD2d 586, 587-588 ; People v Nevarez, 141 AD2d 861, 862 ). 1990Moreover, viewing counsel’s over-all performance in light of the strength of the prosecution’s case and the applicable law, we conclude that the defendant was afforded meaningful representation at trial (see, People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 ; People v Benn, 68 NY2d 941 ). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
green
2 sentences1968In the interpretation of tax statutes it is a firmly established principle that exemptions are the exception and are strictly construed (Matter of Burnham, 112 Misc. 560 , affd. 196 App. Div. 948 , affd. 232 N. Y. 506 ; Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 ). 1950(Matter of Burnham, 112 Misc. 560 , affd. 196 App. Div. 948 , affd. 232 N. Y. 506 ; Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 .) Our Tax Law now is an ££ Estate Tax ” as distinguished from a ££ transfer tax ”. | 2 | 1950–1968 |
In re the Appraisal for Transfer Tax of the Estate of Burnham
neutral
2 sentences1968In the interpretation of tax statutes it is a firmly established principle that exemptions are the exception and are strictly construed (Matter of Burnham, 112 Misc. 560 , affd. 196 App. Div. 948 , affd. 232 N. Y. 506 ; Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 ). 1950(Matter of Burnham, 112 Misc. 560 , affd. 196 App. Div. 948 , affd. 232 N. Y. 506 ; Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 .) Our Tax Law now is an ££ Estate Tax ” as distinguished from a ££ transfer tax ”. | 2 | 1950–1968 |
In Re the Estate of Burnham
neutral
2 sentences1968In the interpretation of tax statutes it is a firmly established principle that exemptions are the exception and are strictly construed (Matter of Burnham, 112 Misc. 560 , affd. 196 App. Div. 948 , affd. 232 N. Y. 506 ; Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 ). 1950(Matter of Burnham, 112 Misc. 560 , affd. 196 App. Div. 948 , affd. 232 N. Y. 506 ; Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 .) Our Tax Law now is an ££ Estate Tax ” as distinguished from a ££ transfer tax ”. | 2 | 1950–1968 |
Hitching v. Robinson
neutral
2 sentences1968In the interpretation of tax statutes it is a firmly established principle that exemptions are the exception and are strictly construed (Matter of Burnham, 112 Misc. 560 , affd. 196 App. Div. 948 , affd. 232 N. Y. 506 ; Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 ). 1950(Matter of Burnham, 112 Misc. 560 , affd. 196 App. Div. 948 , affd. 232 N. Y. 506 ; Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 .) Our Tax Law now is an ££ Estate Tax ” as distinguished from a ££ transfer tax ”. | 2 | 1950–1968 |
Dwight v. . E., C. N.R.R. Co.
green
2 sentences1914Co., 132 N.Y. 199 ; Disbrow v. Westchester Hardwood Co., 164 N.Y. 415 .) Such was the firmly-established rule when the constitutional provision was promulgated and adopted, and the people have not by constitution or statute prescribed any other. 1914Co., 132 N. Y. 199 ; Disbrow v. Westchester Hardwoo d Co., 164 N Y. 415.) Such was the firmly-established rule when the constitutional provision was promulgated and adopted, and the people have not by constitution or statute prescribed any other. | 2 | 1914–1914 |
Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd.
green
2 sentences2014Motorola argues that we abrogated the rule five years ago in Koehler v Bank of Bermuda Ltd. ( 12 NY3d 533 [2009]), a case in which a judgment creditor secured a CPLR 5225 turnover order directing a garnishee bank in Bermuda to deliver stock certificates belonging to the judgment debtor. 2014Motorola argues that we abrogated the rule five years ago in Koehler v Bank of Bermuda Ltd. ( 12 NY3d 533 [2009]), a case in which a judgment creditor secured a CPLR 5225 turnover order directing a garnishee bank in Bermuda to deliver stock certificates belonging to the judgment debtor. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. McCoy
neutral
1 sentence2000“It is a firmly established principle that a suspect who is in custody need not be given the full litany of rights prior to questioning if he has previously been informed of those rights within a short time interval” (People v McCoy, 122 AD2d 957, 958 , lv denied 69 NY2d 714 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lake v. Van Wormer
green
1 sentence1997Kropp v Shepsky, 305 NY 465, 468 ; Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 548-549 ; Matter of Male Infant L., 61 NY2d 420, 426-427 ; Matter of Ronald FF. v Cindy GG., 70 NY2d 141, 144 ; Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 309 ). 1 It is only where a court determines that there are extraordinary circumstances, such as parental unfitness, surrender, abandonment, or persistent neglect, that there may then be an inquiry into the child’s best interests (see, Matter of Male Infant L., 61 NY2d, at 427 , supra; Matter of Ronald FF. v Cindy GG., 70 NY2d, at 144, supra; Matter of Lake v Van Wormer, 2 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Bennett v. Jeffreys green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| In re the Adoption of Male Infant L. Christina L. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In re Michael B.
green
1 sentence1997Kropp v Shepsky, 305 NY 465, 468 ; Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 548-549 ; Matter of Male Infant L., 61 NY2d 420, 426-427 ; Matter of Ronald FF. v Cindy GG., 70 NY2d 141, 144 ; Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 309 ). 1 It is only where a court determines that there are extraordinary circumstances, such as parental unfitness, surrender, abandonment, or persistent neglect, that there may then be an inquiry into the child’s best interests (see, Matter of Male Infant L., 61 NY2d, at 427 , supra; Matter of Ronald FF. v Cindy GG., 70 NY2d, at 144, supra; Matter of Lake v Van Wormer, 2 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Martin v. . Camp neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Seaboard Surety Co. v. Gillette Co. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Mayo green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Deegan green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Reyes green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Harder v. McGinn green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Harder v. McGinn green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Nevarez neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Sullivan green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Aiken green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Custer Builders, Inc. v. Quaker Heritage, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Crosby green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Jeanne M. v. Richard G. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| La Blanc v. La Blanc neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Calamari v. Grace green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Chenango County Support Collection Unit ex rel. Mersereau v. De Brie neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Sementilli v. Sementilli green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Glinsman green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Short green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.