justification defense in Georgia

2025See Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 829 (2016) (“The jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-de- fense.”). 9 Mack also contends that the evidence was not sufficient as a matter of Georgia statutory law because it was wholly circumstan- tial and failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of accident for Bridget’s murder and self-defense for Jeremy’s murder.

2024See also Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 829 (785 SE2d 277) (2016) (“The jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-defense.”); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the 7 Appellant does not challenge the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence supporting his other convictions. 12 credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (cleaned up)).

2026Moreover, “questions about the existence of justification are for the jury to resolve, and the jury may reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and accept evidence that a shooting was not done in self-defense.” Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 564 (2020) (punctuation omitted).

2026Moreover, “questions about the existence of justification are for the jury to resolve, and the jury may reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and accept evidence that a shooting was not done in self-defense.” Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 564 (2020) (punctuation omitted).

2021See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LEd2d 560) (1979); Morris v. State, 301 Ga. 702, 705 (804 SE2d 42) (2017) (“The jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-defense.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LEd2d 560) (1979); Morris v. State, 301 Ga. 702, 705 (804 SE2d 42) (2017) (“The jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-defense.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024See also Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 829 (785 SE2d 277) (2016) (“The jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-defense.”); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the 7 Appellant does not challenge the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence supporting his other convictions. 12 credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (cleaned up)).

2024See also Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 829 (785 SE2d 277) (2016) (“The jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-defense.”); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the 7 Appellant does not challenge the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence supporting his other convictions. 12 credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (cleaned up)).

2015See id. (finding evidence of childhood abuse committed against the defendant by someone other than the victim inadmissible to support a justification defense); Bryant v. State, 271 Ga. 99 (3) ( 515 SE2d 836 ) (1999) (same as to expert testimony that the defendant suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder from childhood abuse committed by someone other than the victim).

2015See id. (finding evidence of childhood abuse committed against the defendant by someone other than the victim inadmissible to support a justification defense); Bryant v. State, 271 Ga. 99 (3) ( 515 SE2d 836 ) (1999) (same as to expert testimony that the defendant suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder from childhood abuse committed by someone other than the victim).

2020Calmer filed a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which provides that a defendant is immune from criminal prosecution if he used justifiable force to protect himself or his home.7 To avoid trial based on a justification defense presented at an immunity hearing, “a defendant bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (3) ( 667 SE2d 605 ) (2008).

2020Calmer filed a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which provides that a defendant is immune from criminal prosecution if he used justifiable force to protect himself or his home.7 To avoid trial based on a justification defense presented at an immunity hearing, “a defendant bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (3) ( 667 SE2d 605 ) (2008).

2026But “[q]uestions about the existence of justification are for the jury to resolve, and the jury may reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and accept evidence that a [killing] was not done in self-defense.” Goodson v. State, 305 Ga. 246, 248 (2019).

2026See Milton v. State, 318 Ga. 737 , 742 n.5 (2024). 2 But “[q]uestions about the existence of justification are for the jury to resolve, and the jury may reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and accept evidence that a [killing] was not done in self-defense.” Goodson v. State, 305 Ga. 246, 248 (2019).

2021Contrary to Willerson’s assertion that his history of abuse and mental illness supports his claim of self-defense, “the subjective fears of a particular defendant are irrelevant in the evaluation of this defense,” and “[t]he critical factor in a justification defense is whether a defendant acted with the fear of a reasonable person under the circumstances.” O’Connell v. State, 294 Ga. 379, 382 (3) 8 (754 SE2d 29) (2014).

2021Contrary to Willerson’s assertion that his history of abuse and mental illness supports his claim of self-defense, “the subjective fears of a particular defendant are irrelevant in the evaluation of this defense,” and “[t]he critical factor in a justification defense is whether a defendant acted with the fear of a reasonable person under the circumstances.” O’Connell v. State, 294 Ga. 379, 382 (3) 8 (754 SE2d 29) (2014).

2026See Williams, 316 Ga. at 150 (“It is the role of the jury to evaluate the evidence and, when doing so, the jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-defense.” (cleaned up)).

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2012For example, [a] defendant is not permitted to support a justification defense with an explanation that he or she had been the victim of an earlier attack committed by an unknown person; such evidence is not relevant to the critical question of whether the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes on trial would have excited the fears of an objective reasonable person to the point where the defendant’s actions were justified.12 11 See Tyner v. State, 313 Ga. App. 557, 566 (6) (d) ( 722 SE2d 177 ) (2012) (finding no ineffective assistance because defendant did not disclose alleged

2012For example, [a] defendant is not permitted to support a justification defense with an explanation that he or she had been the victim of an earlier attack committed by an unknown person; such evidence is not relevant to the critical question of whether the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes on trial would have excited the fears of an objective reasonable person to the point where the defendant’s actions were justified.12 11 See Tyner v. State, 313 Ga. App. 557, 566 (6) (d) ( 722 SE2d 177 ) (2012) (finding no ineffective assistance because defendant did not disclose alleged

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2024Further, and importantly, Georgia’s appellate courts have “similarly rejected attempts to extend the use of evidence regarding the defendant’s BPS or other psychological conditions to support other affirmative defenses that traditionally and statutorily require application of an objective, reasonable-person standard, including the defense of coercion.”30 And given that our appellate courts have precluded even the introduction of evidence of BPS to support any defense other than self defense in homicide cases, the trial court here did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on Murphy’s modifie

2024Further, and importantly, Georgia’s appellate courts have “similarly rejected attempts to extend the use of evidence regarding the defendant’s BPS or other psychological conditions to support other affirmative defenses that traditionally and statutorily require application of an objective, reasonable-person standard, including the defense of coercion.”30 And given that our appellate courts have precluded even the introduction of evidence of BPS to support any defense other than self defense in homicide cases, the trial court here did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on Murphy’s modifie

2020See 296 Ga. at 814 (3) (b). 4 (“OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2) applies to all felonies and, although it does not completely eliminate the possibility of a justification defense to felony murder, such a defense requires the jury to find that the underlying felony was justified.”).

2020See also Woodard, 296 Ga. at 814 (3) (b) n.10.

2014See James v. State, 270 Ga. 675 (2) ( 513 SE2d 207 ) (1999) (exclusion of marijuana found in victim’s blood was proper because the defense could not demonstrate how the use of drugs contributed to the victim’s behavior or that it would have been relevant to the defendant’s justification defense).

2014See James v. State, 270 Ga. 675 (2) ( 513 SE2d 207 ) (1999) (exclusion of marijuana found in victim’s blood was proper because the defense could not demonstrate how the use of drugs contributed to the victim’s behavior or that it would have been relevant to the defendant’s justification defense).

2019See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Cotton v. State , 297 Ga. 257 , 258 (1), 773 S.E.2d 242 (2015) (despite defendant's claim of self-defense, jury is "free to accept the evidence that [a] stabbing was not done in self-defense and to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense") (citation and punctuation omitted). 2.

2019See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Cotton v. State , 297 Ga. 257 , 258 (1), 773 S.E.2d 242 (2015) (despite defendant's claim of self-defense, jury is "free to accept the evidence that [a] stabbing was not done in self-defense and to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense") (citation and punctuation omitted). 2.

2012This Court reversed, holding that a trial court may not prohibit a defendant from presenting a justification defense in a felony murder case where there is "sufficient evidence of a confrontation between the defendant and the victim, or other circumstances which ordinarily would support a charge on justification." Id. at 262-263 , 403 S.E.2d 438 .

2012This Court reversed, holding that a trial court may not prohibit a defendant from presenting a justification defense in a felony murder case where there is "sufficient evidence of a confrontation between the defendant and the victim, or other circumstances which ordinarily would support a charge on justification." Id. at 262-263 , 403 S.E.2d 438 .

2023See Wainwright, 305 Ga. at 72 (5) (b) (evidence that appellant shot victim when victim began to overpower appellant’s accomplice did not support justification instruction because victim initiated physical struggle with accomplice only after appellant pointed a gun in victim’s face while demanding that second victim empty his pockets); Brunson v. State, 293 Ga. 226, 227-228 (744 SE2d 695) (2013) (no justification charge warranted where evidence showed that unarmed victim initiated struggle with appellant only after appellant threatened victim with a gun).

2020In this case, Crider “has pointed to no evidence to support a reasonable belief that shooting the victim was necessary to defend [her]self . . . from any imminent use of unlawful force.” Garner, 303 Ga. at 790 (2); see also Hunter, 281 Ga. at 694 (2) (“To establish justification, a defendant must show the circumstances were such as to excite the fears of a reasonable person that [her] safety was in danger.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Bruson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 226, 227-228 (2) ( 744 SE2d 695 ) (2013) (although a defendant is not required to testify in support of a justification de

2026See Willerson, 312 Ga. at 373 (“[T]he critical factor in a justification defense is whether a defendant acted with the fear of a reasonable person under the circumstances.” (quotation marks omitted)).

2025See Willerson v. State, 312 Ga. 369, 373 (1) (863 SE2d 50) (2021) (“[T]he critical factor in a justification defense is whether a defendant acted with the fear of a reasonable person under the circumstances.” (citation omitted)).

2026See Mills v. State, 320 Ga. 457, 465 (2024) (holding that the prosecutorial need for evidence that two weeks earlier the defendant and others had assaulted another person who disrespected a fellow gang member was significant, given that the State had to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and his motive was not otherwise clear); Miller v. State, 320 Ga. 255 , 264– 67 (2024) (holding that two prior incidents of domestic violence between the victim and the defendant had significant probative value because they explained in the context of their relationship why he would start shooting

2026See Mills v. State, 320 Ga. 457, 465 (2024) (holding that the prosecutorial need for evidence that two weeks earlier the defendant and others had assaulted another person who disrespected a fellow gang member was significant, given that the State had to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and his motive was not otherwise clear); Miller v. State, 320 Ga. 255 , 264– 67 (2024) (holding that two prior incidents of domestic violence between the victim and the defendant had significant probative value because they explained in the context of their relationship why he would start shooting

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2022When a justification defense applies, we have said that adults were “not engaged in any crime at all,” Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768, 771 (2) (723 SE2d 915) (2012), “committed no crime,” 26 we hold that a child defending against a charge of having committed a “delinquent act” based on an alleged violation of Georgia’s Criminal Code must be permitted to raise a defense of insanity or State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 655 n.6 (4) (697 SE2d 757) (2010), or were engaged in “lawful” conduct, Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812, 814 (2) (a) (607 SE2d 581) (2005).

2022When a justification defense applies, we have said that adults were “not engaged in any crime at all,” Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768, 771 (2) (723 SE2d 915) (2012), “committed no crime,” 26 we hold that a child defending against a charge of having committed a “delinquent act” based on an alleged violation of Georgia’s Criminal Code must be permitted to raise a defense of insanity or State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 655 n.6 (4) (697 SE2d 757) (2010), or were engaged in “lawful” conduct, Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812, 814 (2) (a) (607 SE2d 581) (2005).

2018On appeal from a trial court's grant or denial of pretrial immunity, "we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and we accept the trial court's findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them." State v. Bunn , 288 Ga. 20 , 23, 701 S.E.2d 138 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Sifuentes v. State , 293 Ga. 441 , 444 (2), 746 S.E.2d 127 (2013).

2018On appeal from a trial court's grant or denial of pretrial immunity, "we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and we accept the trial court's findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them." State v. Bunn , 288 Ga. 20 , 23, 701 S.E.2d 138 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Sifuentes v. State , 293 Ga. 441 , 444 (2), 746 S.E.2d 127 (2013).

2015While Cotton claims that the evidence presented a “textbook” case of self-defense, 2 the jury “was free to accept the evidence that the stabbing was not done in self-defense and to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense.” Grimes v. State, 293 Ga. 559, 560 (1) ( 748 SE2d 441 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2015While Cotton claims that the evidence presented a “textbook” case of self-defense, 2 the jury “was free to accept the evidence that the stabbing was not done in self-defense and to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense.” Grimes v. State, 293 Ga. 559, 560 (1) ( 748 SE2d 441 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

1995In the later case of Clenney v. State, 256 Ga. 123, 124 (3) ( 344 SE2d 216 ) (1986), a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that “evidence regarding a justification defense should be based solely upon the circumstances which occur between a defendant and the victim.” The Supreme Court modified Clenney in Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407 (3) (b) ( 405 SE2d 669 ) (1991), by holding that “evidence of specific acts of violence by a victim against third persons shall be admissible where the defendant claims justification.” This court has applied Chandler as overruling Clenney only to the exte

1995In the later case of Clenney v. State, 256 Ga. 123, 124 (3) ( 344 SE2d 216 ) (1986), a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that “evidence regarding a justification defense should be based solely upon the circumstances which occur between a defendant and the victim.” The Supreme Court modified Clenney in Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407 (3) (b) ( 405 SE2d 669 ) (1991), by holding that “evidence of specific acts of violence by a victim against third persons shall be admissible where the defendant claims justification.” This court has applied Chandler as overruling Clenney only to the exte

2025In sum, Johnson recognized that a felon who possesses a gun is not categorically barred from raising a justification defense and he may avail himself of the defense with respect to a charge of felon-in-possession and felony murder predicated on such an offense. 11 And in Floyd,2 we decided, in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance, that trial counsel was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984), for failing to understand the law governing a convicted felon’s statutory right to use a firearm in self-defense, which resulted in counse

2025In sum, Johnson recognized that a felon who possesses a gun is not categorically barred from raising a justification defense and he may avail himself of the defense with respect to a charge of felon-in-possession and felony murder predicated on such an offense. 11 And in Floyd,2 we decided, in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance, that trial counsel was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984), for failing to understand the law governing a convicted felon’s statutory right to use a firearm in self-defense, which resulted in counse

2025It is the jury’s role, however, “to evaluate the evidence and, when doing so, the jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” Russell v. State, 319 Ga. 556, 559 (2) (905 SE2d 578) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025But it is the role of the jury “to evaluate the evidence and, when doing so, the jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” Russell v. State, 319 Ga. 556 , 559 (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019See, e.g., Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418 , 423, 774 S.E.2d 652 (2015) (holding that evidence of the defendant's PTSD stemming from abuse he experienced during childhood, offered to support his claim of self defense based on BPS, was properly excluded because "evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense"); O'Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379 , 381-382, 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's BPS and PTSD based on abuse by individuals other than the victim was inadmissib

2019See, e.g., Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418 , 423, 774 S.E.2d 652 (2015) (holding that evidence of the defendant's PTSD stemming from abuse he experienced during childhood, offered to support his claim of self defense based on BPS, was properly excluded because "evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense"); O'Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379 , 381-382, 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's BPS and PTSD based on abuse by individuals other than the victim was inadmissib

2026And Graham notably does not claim, nor does the evidence support, that 11 Franklin was trying to enter Graham’s home.6 It is well settled that trial counsel “does not perform deficiently when he fails to advance a legal theory that would require an extension of existing precedents and the adoption of an unproven theory of law.” Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 438 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

2026And Graham notably does not claim, nor does the evidence support, that 11 Franklin was trying to enter Graham’s home.6 It is well settled that trial counsel “does not perform deficiently when he fails to advance a legal theory that would require an extension of existing precedents and the adoption of an unproven theory of law.” Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 438 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

2026Danger of Unfair Prejudice “The prejudicial effect of evidence is ‘unfair’ if the evidence has the capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged, or an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 738 (2023) (punctuation omitted).

2026Danger of Unfair Prejudice “The prejudicial effect of evidence is ‘unfair’ if the evidence has the capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged, or an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 738 (2023) (punctuation omitted).