justification defense in Texas

2025Id. at 80; see also Tex[.] Beef, 921 S.W.2d at 212 (“[W]e disavow good faith as relevant to the justification defense when the defendant establishes its legal right to act as it did.”).

2025There is no evidence that was Storable’s goal, but that issue is moot because if “the defendant had a legal right to interfere with a contract, then the defendant has conclusively established the justification defense … and the motivation behind assertion of that right is irrelevant,” even if the defendant acted with “actual malice.” Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211-212 (Tex. 1996). b.

2021Ultimately, a justification defense is a fact issue that is determined by the jury, and “[a] jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s [justification]-defense theory.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609 (quoting Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ); Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 .

2020This is because when the defendant has raised a justification defense, and “a jury finds the defendant guilty, 5 there is an implicit finding against the defensive theory.” Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim.

2019Self-defense is a justification defense that arises only when “the defendant’s defensive evidence essentially admits to every element of the offense including the culpable mental state but interposes the justification to excuse the otherwise criminal conduct.” Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim.

2017Self-defense is a justification defense that arises only when “the defendant’s defensive evidence essentially admits to every element of the offense including the culpable mental state, but interposes the justification to excuse the otherwise criminal conduct.”7 Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 659 ; see Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.02 , 9.31(a) (West 2011); Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125 , 7 Justification defenses, which fall under Chapter 9 of the penal code, are also referred to as confession-and-avoidance defenses.

2004Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently construed its holding in Vasquez somewhat narrowly, see Young, 991 S.W.2d at 839 , and this case involves trial counsel’s failure to seek an instruction that would have mitigated punishment, as opposed to trial counsel’s failure to assert the justification defense of necessity, we find the reasoning of Vasquez is applicable here.

2004Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently construed its holding in Vasquez somewhat narrowly, see Young , 991 S.W.2d at 839 , and this case involves trial counsel = s failure to seek an instruction that would have mitigated punishment, as opposed to trial counsel = s failure to assert the justification defense of necessity, we find the reasoning of Vasquez is applicable here.

2023Defense of a third person is a justification defense: “Chapter 9 of the Penal Code recognizes certain justifications that, under Section 2.03, are defenses to prosecution.” Alonzo v. State, 353 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Tex. Crim.

2013The Court of Criminal Appeals held the court of appeals “erred by holding that a defendant can be convicted for a lesser-included offense when a fact-finder has acquitted the defendant for the greater offense based on a justification defense, and by holding that a defendant cannot raise the justification of self-defense when charged with manslaughter.” Alonzo, 353 S.W.3d at 783.

1996Thus, if the trial court finds as a matter of law that the defendant had a legal right to interfere with a contract, then the defendant has conclusively established the justification defense, see Steck, 669 S.W.2d at 107 , and the motivation behind assertion of that right is irrelevant.

1996Thus, if the trial court finds as a matter of law that the defendant had a legal right to interfere with a contract, then the defendant has conclusively established the justification defense, see Steck, 669 S.W.2d at 107 , and the motivation behind assertion of that right is irrelevant.

2019Id. at 211 ; Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

2008Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex.1984), overruled on other grounds by Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989).

2013Id.; see also Anderson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (a defendant must admit the offense to be entitled to an instruction on self-defense).

2003Id . at 745; see also Anderson v. State , 11 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex. App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (stating that a defendant must admit the offense to get a self-defense instruction).

2024Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 . 7 B.

2021Ultimately, a justification defense is a fact issue that is determined by the jury, and “[a] jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s [justification]-defense theory.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609 (quoting Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ); Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 .

2021Ultimately, a justification defense is a fact issue that is determined by the jury, and “[a] jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s [justification]-defense theory.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609 (quoting Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ); Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 .

2020To resolve whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s implicit rejection of a justification defense, we do not look to whether the State produced evidence refuting the defendant’s self-defense testimony; rather, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against the defendant on his defensive issue beyond a reasonable doubt.2 See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608–09; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 2.03 (

2004Id. at 950-51 .

2004Id. at 950-51 .

2019“The justification defense of necessity applies when action is needed ‘immediately’ (i.e., now) to avoid ‘imminent’ harm (i.e., harm that is near at hand).” Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 89 .

2019“The justification defense of necessity applies when action is needed ‘immediately’ (i.e., now) to avoid ‘imminent’ harm (i.e., harm that is near at hand).” Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 89 .

2021Only at the third step does the “persuasiveness of the justification for the challenge become[] relevant.” Davis, 268 S.W.3d at 514 n.4. “[A]t this stage . . . implausible justifications for striking potential jurors ‘may (and probably will) be found [by the trial court] to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.’” Id. (citing Goode 943 S.W.2d at 445-46 ).

2021However, “‘the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the [peremptory] strike.’” Id. (citing Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445-46 ).

2026Id.

2021The justification defense “does not apply when the interference is by illegal or tortious means, such as misrepresentation or fraud.” Id.

2024See Villarreal, 453 S.W.3d at 439 (factor weighed “substantially” against egregious harm when there was significant evidence that defendant was aggressor and, “save for appellant’s own statements to police, none of the other evidence presented at trial supported a justification defense”). 3.

2021See id. at 439 (factor weighed “substantially” against egregious harm when there was significant evidence that defendant was aggressor and, “save for appellant’s own statements to police, none of the other evidence presented at trial supported a justification defense”).

2024Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 367 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 900 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (“Jury nullification is not an argument that a defendant is entitled to make because there is no constitutional right to jury nullification and because there is no constitutional requirement that the jury be instructed on nullification.” (citing Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 367 (Tex. Crim.

2021See id.; Crayton v. State, No. 03-14-00570-CR, 2016 WL 6068250 , at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 14, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Thus, the jury’s decision to acquit appellant of murder based on self-defense does not mean that the murder did not occur; it means only that appellant claimed, and the jury decided, that the murder was justified.”); see also Stahmann, 548 S.W.3d at 63 (holding Section 37.09(d)(1) “requires a showing that the defendant have knowledge that an ‘offense’ occurred[;] it does not require that the ‘offense’ be committed by the defendant”).

2021See id.; Crayton v. State, No. 03-14-00570-CR, 2016 WL 6068250 , at *9 (Tex. App.— Austin Oct. 14, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Thus, the jury’s decision to acquit appellant of murder based on self-defense does not mean that the murder did not occur; it means only that appellant claimed, and the jury decided, that the murder was justified.”); see also Stahmann, 548 S.W.3d at 63 (holding Section 37.09(d)(1) “requires a showing that the defendant have knowledge that an ‘offense’ occurred[;] it does not require that the ‘offense’ be committed by the defendant”).

2021See Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398 , 401–02 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. Crim.

2018To reverse a trial court’s rejection of a justification defense, an appellate court would need to conclude that the defense was “shown as a matter of law.” Roberts v. State, 363 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. Crim.

2018To reverse a trial court’s rejection of a justification defense, an appellate court would need to conclude that the defense was “shown as a matter of law.” Roberts v. State, 363 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. Crim.

2025Review Services, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74 , 81–83 (Tex. 2000), which held actions that “falsely and maliciously disparage” are not protected by the justification defense because those acts are “tortious in themselves.” However, the claims in SafeLease’s petition do not allege any disparagement.

2015Co. of Am. v. Financial Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 80 (Tex. 2000) (observing that the justification defense to a tortious interference claim presents a question oflaw and "can be based on the exercise of either (1) one's own legal rights or (2) a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right, even though that claim ultimately proves to be mistaken"). 115 CR 505, at 11. 6-22; CR 508, at 11. 6-14; CR 509, at 11. 1-2. 39 Again, however, those same witnesses conceded that any such risk is only a "possibility, not a probability" 116 and is miniscule at best. 117 48.

2024To that end, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently reiterated that “[a]dmitting to the conduct does not necessarily mean admitting to every element of the offense,” and “[t]he evidence need not unequivocally show that the defendant engaged in the conduct.” Id.; Gamino, 537 S.W.3d at 512–13. “[A] defendant’s testimony explicitly denying a culpable mental state or asserting accident does not automatically foreclose a justification defense if his testimony may otherwise imply a culpable mental state.” Rodriguez, 629 S.W.3d at 232 (discussing Martinez v. State, 775 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Crim.

2003See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding admission by felon of possession of firearm sufficient admission of offense to require submission of necessity defense where he stated he needed gun to escape after being kidnaped by gang members); Willis v. State, 790 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (holding denial of knowledge that goods were stolen did not preclude submission of *296 justification defense of good faith purchase); Martinez v. State, 775 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (holding admission that defendant held gun, had finger on trigger, and fi

2003See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding admission by felon of possession of firearm sufficient admission of offense to require submission of necessity defense where he stated he needed gun to escape after being kidnaped by gang members); Willis v. State, 790 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (holding denial of knowledge that goods were stolen did not preclude submission of *296 justification defense of good faith purchase); Martinez v. State, 775 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (holding admission that defendant held gun, had finger on trigger, and fi

2003Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 950 ; Willis, 790 S.W.2d at 314 ; Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 647 .

1996Id.; Chrysler Motors Corp., 846 S.W.2d at 143 .

1996I agree with the Austin Court of Appeals, however, that “the reasoned justification requirement was not intended to be applied clause by clause but rather to the rule as a whole.” See Chrysler Motors v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 846 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, no writ).

1995The justification for this rule was explained in United States v. Tateo , 377 U.S. 463, 466 , 12 L.Ed.2d 448 , 84 S. Ct. 1587 (1964), as follows: While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice.

1995The justification for this rule was explained in United States v. Tateo , 377 U.S. 463, 466 , 12 L.Ed.2d 448 , 84 S. Ct. 1587 (1964), as follows: While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice.

2024A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a justification defense “if the issue is raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of the defense.” Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim.

2024To that end, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently reiterated that “[a]dmitting to the conduct does not necessarily mean admitting to every element of the offense,” and “[t]he evidence need not unequivocally show that the defendant engaged in the conduct.” Id.; Gamino, 537 S.W.3d at 512–13. “[A] defendant’s testimony explicitly denying a culpable mental state or asserting accident does not automatically foreclose a justification defense if his testimony may otherwise imply a culpable mental state.” Rodriguez, 629 S.W.3d at 232 (discussing Martinez v. State, 775 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Crim.

2016An important justification for this immunity is pragmatic: it shields “the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their governments.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex.2006).

2016An important justification for this immunity is pragmatic: it shields “the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their governments.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006).