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8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Department of Natural Resources v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IVgreen2 sentences2018See DNR , 380 Wis. 2d 354 , ¶ 30, 909 N.W.2d 114 ("When the legislature uses a particular word more than once in an act, we understand it to carry the same meaning each time, absent textual or structural clues to the contrary."). ¶ 21 Even if the justification for the waiver abatement language in the Crime Victim/Witness statute were less than clear, still it would engender no doubt about the proper meaning of "shall" in the DNA Surcharge statute. 2018See DNR , 380 Wis. 2d 354 , ¶ 30, 909 N.W.2d 114 ("When the legislature uses a particular word more than once in an act, we understand it to carry the same meaning each time, absent textual or structural clues to the contrary."). ¶ 21 Even if the justification for the waiver abatement language in the Crime Victim/Witness statute were less than clear, still it would engender no doubt about the proper meaning of "shall" in the DNA Surcharge statute. | 2 | 2 |
Gregoire v. Biddlegreen2 sentences1980See, e.g., Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613 , 197 S.E. 163 (1938); Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085 , 150 S.W.2d 489 (1941); Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1970). [27] The justification for this immunity, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), is that "it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute 1980The justification for this immunity, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), is that “it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. ... | 1 | 1 |
Gurganious v. . Simpsongreen2 sentences1980See, e.g., Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613 , 197 S.E. 163 (1938); Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085 , 150 S.W.2d 489 (1941); Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1970). [27] The justification for this immunity, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), is that "it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute 1980See, e.g., Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613 , 197 S.E. 163 (1938); Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085 , 150 S.W.2d 489 (1941); Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1970). [27] The justification for this immunity, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), is that "it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bies v. State
green
2 sentences1980As we stated in Bies v. State, 76 Wis.2d 457 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), “The ultimate standard under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness of the search or seizure in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. 1980As we stated in Bies v. State, 76 Wis.2d 457 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), “The ultimate standard under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness of the search or seizure in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Ferguson v. Georgia
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 573 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 617 . "[B]oth the individual and society have significant interests in deterring intentional trespass to land, regardless of the lack of measurable harm that results." Id. ¶ 25. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Demge v. Feierstein
green
2 sentences1984This constituted a sub silentio overruling of Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199 , 268 N.W. 210 (1936); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66 , 288 N.W. 774 (1939), and Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins. 1984This constituted a sub silentio overruling of Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199 , 268 N.W. 210 (1936); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66 , 288 N.W. 774 (1939), and Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Seibel v. Leach
yellow
2 sentences1984This constituted a sub silentio overruling of Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199 , 268 N.W. 210 (1936); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66 , 288 N.W. 774 (1939), and Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins. 1984This constituted a sub silentio overruling of Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199 , 268 N.W. 210 (1936); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66 , 288 N.W. 774 (1939), and Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Rupp v. Jackson
green
1 sentence1980See, e.g., Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613 , 197 S.E. 163 (1938); Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085 , 150 S.W.2d 489 (1941); Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1970). [27] The justification for this immunity, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), is that "it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Crenshaw v. O'Connell
green
2 sentences1980See, e.g., Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613 , 197 S.E. 163 (1938); Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085 , 150 S.W.2d 489 (1941); Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1970). [27] The justification for this immunity, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), is that "it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute 1980See, e.g., Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613 , 197 S.E. 163 (1938); Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085 , 150 S.W.2d 489 (1941); Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1970). [27] The justification for this immunity, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), is that "it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.