justification rule in District of Columbia

2014See Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1233-34 (D.C. 2010) (“[T]he canon of constitutional avoidance ‘is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.’” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009)); accord Edward J.

2014See Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1233-34 (D.C. 2010) (“[T]he canon of constitutional avoidance „is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.‟” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009)); accord Edward J.

2014See Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1233-34 (D.C. 2010) (“[T]he canon of constitutional avoidance ‘is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.’” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009)); accord Edward J.

2014See Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1233-34 (D.C. 2010) (“[T]he canon of constitutional avoidance „is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.‟” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009)); accord Edward J.

2019The justification for this rule is that the existence of an express bar against oral modification does not remove the parties' continuing rights to contract anew on the subject and to modify or rescind the oral modification provision like any other term of the contract." Clark , 535 A.2d at 876 (citation omitted).

2014Clark v. Clark, 535 A.2d 872, 876 (D.C. 1987).

2025The parties rightly agree that the independent justification requirement must be reflected in the instruction given to the jury regarding the offense of unlawful entry (remaining on public premises without authority). “[W]here, as here, provisions of the statute would be unconstitutional absent such an interpretation, the court must assure that a defendant’s conviction is based upon the statute as construed.” Hasty, 669 A.2d at 129 ; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 118 (1990) (“[W]here a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally overbroad statute, the State must ensure that def

2025The parties rightly agree that the independent justification requirement must be reflected in the instruction given to the jury regarding the offense of unlawful entry (remaining on public premises without authority). “[W]here, as here, provisions of the statute would be unconstitutional absent such an interpretation, the court must assure that a defendant’s conviction is based upon the statute as construed.” Hasty, 669 A.2d at 129 ; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 118 (1990) (“[W]here a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally overbroad statute, the State must ensure that def

2025Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia No. 5.401(B) (5th ed. 2024). 23 the “plain language” of the jury instruction to determine what the jury would have read the instruction to mean); Townsend v. Donaldson, 933 A.2d 282, 289 (D.C. 2007) (same); cf. Hasty, 669 A.2d at 133 (rejecting as “not persuasive” the government’s argument that the court’s instruction adequately conveyed the law to the jury where the government itself turned to the dictionary to define a term in the instructions that was undefined). 7 The clarity that is missing from the model instruction comes into relie

2025Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia No. 5.401(B) (5th ed. 2024). 23 the “plain language” of the jury instruction to determine what the jury would have read the instruction to mean); Townsend v. Donaldson, 933 A.2d 282, 289 (D.C. 2007) (same); cf. Hasty, 669 A.2d at 133 (rejecting as “not persuasive” the government’s argument that the court’s instruction adequately conveyed the law to the jury where the government itself turned to the dictionary to define a term in the instructions that was undefined). 7 The clarity that is missing from the model instruction comes into relie

2025See Buskey v. United States, 148 A.3d 1193, 1208 (D.C. 2016) (explaining that a “jury instruction as a whole should provide the jury with a clear path to understanding the substantive law”); 9C Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2556 (3d ed. 2025) (“It is axiomatic that the trial court should charge the jury in plain language.”); see, e.g., (Lester) Williams v. United States, 314 A.3d 1158 , 1180 (D.C. 2024) (focusing on 6 The unreasonableness of expecting the jury to draw implications from the structure of the model instruction is enhanced where that instruction contains seven e

2023This difference is not relevant for our purposes. 32 In United States v. Newcomb, the Sixth Circuit likewise held that a justification defense extends for a brief period beyond the threat that animated it. 6 F.3d 1129, 1138 (6th Cir. 1993).

2023Id. at 1137-38 .

2023But it is clear that the court was speaking of “the emergency situation” far more broadly 33 In United States v. Mooney, the Fourth Circuit similarly held that a defendant was entitled to a justification defense where he continued to possess a firearm for some minutes after the danger had passed. 497 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 2007).

2023Id. at 409 .

2023Second, while our court has never confronted this precise issue, other courts have persuasively explained that the justification defense must extend for some brief period after the immediate need for 28 self-defense has subsided, leaving “the reasonableness of the defendant’s course of conduct [as] a question for a jury.” United States v. Ricks, 573 F.3d 198, 204 (4th Cir. 2009).

2023In other words, the court held that the emergency situation underlying a justification defense may extend to some reasonable period of time after the immediate threat dissipates, as we effectively hold today. 34 The Fourth Circuit later made clear, in United States v. Ricks, that Mooney’s analysis extends beyond cases where an individual is intent on turning the weapon over to police. 6 Ricks and his partner, Blue, got into a fight in their shared living room. 573 F.3d at 199-200 .

2023The most similar case is Marrero v. State, in which a Florida appellate court held that a defendant was entitled to a justification defense 4 when he continued to possess a firearm in the moments after using it in self-defense. 516 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. Dist.

2023The Fourth Circuit disagreed and held that a justification defense could extend to the period after the threat had dissipated, even though Ricks had no intention of turning 6 The District recognizes a distinct “innocent possession” defense that is applicable only when a person takes possession of a firearm or other contraband— if they find it abandoned in a public space, for instance—with the “intent to take the items to the police as soon as possible.” See Stewart v. United States, 439 A.2d 461, 463 (D.C. 1981).

2018See, e.g. , United States v. Leahy , 473 F.3d 401 , 403 (1st Cir. 2007) ("We hold that there is a justification defense available in felon-in-possession cases, which typically encompass duress, necessity, and self-defense."); United States v. Panter , 688 F.2d 268 , 272 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[W]here a convicted felon, reacting out of a reasonable fear for the life or safety of himself, in the actual, physical course of a conflict that he did not provoke, takes temporary possession of a firearm for the purpose or in the course of defending himself, he is not guilty of [a felon in possession of fire

1999Because the incriminatory element was created by D’Anjou himself through his non-truthful responses, this case is unlike those in which a truthful response would in fact be incriminating and where the justification for an exception would be more persuasive. 16 F.3d at 609 (emphasis added). 19 .

1999See also the language we have italicized in the quotations from Brown, 101 F.3d at 1274 , and D’Anjou, 16 F.3d at 609 , for additional distinctions between those cases and this one. 20 .

1999See also the language we have italicized in the quotations from Brown, 101 F.3d at 1274 , and D’Anjou, 16 F.3d at 609 , for additional distinctions between those cases and this one. 20 .

1987Id.; accord, Hoffman v. Glock, 20 Md.App. 284, 287 , 315 A.2d 551, 554 (1974); cf. Clurman v. Clurman, 84 Misc.2d 148, 152 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 951, 957 (Sup.Ct.1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 915 , 382 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1976) (power to modify agreement incorporated in divorce decree cannot be restricted by a contrary stipulation in original agreement).

1987Id.; accord, Hoffman v. Glock, 20 Md.App. 284, 287 , 315 A.2d 551, 554 (1974); cf. Clurman v. Clurman, 84 Misc.2d 148, 152 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 951, 957 (Sup.Ct.1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 915 , 382 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1976) (power to modify agreement incorporated in divorce decree cannot be restricted by a contrary stipulation in original agreement).

1987See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249 , 366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (1977) (“We take this occasion to announce that if the point comes before us we shall feel free to reexamine the justification for the rule.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 , 98 S.Ct. 777 , 54 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978)).

1987See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249 , 366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (1977) (“We take this occasion to announce that if the point comes before us we shall feel free to reexamine the justification for the rule.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 , 98 S.Ct. 777 , 54 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978)).

1987Id.; accord, Hoffman v. Glock, 20 Md.App. 284, 287 , 315 A.2d 551, 554 (1974); cf. Clurman v. Clurman, 84 Misc.2d 148, 152 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 951, 957 (Sup.Ct.1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 915 , 382 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1976) (power to modify agreement incorporated in divorce decree cannot be restricted by a contrary stipulation in original agreement).

1987Id.; accord, Hoffman v. Glock, 20 Md.App. 284, 287 , 315 A.2d 551, 554 (1974); cf. Clurman v. Clurman, 84 Misc.2d 148, 152 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 951, 957 (Sup.Ct.1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 915 , 382 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1976) (power to modify agreement incorporated in divorce decree cannot be restricted by a contrary stipulation in original agreement).

1987See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249 , 366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (1977) (“We take this occasion to announce that if the point comes before us we shall feel free to reexamine the justification for the rule.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 , 98 S.Ct. 777 , 54 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978)).

1987See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249 , 366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (1977) (“We take this occasion to announce that if the point comes before us we shall feel free to reexamine the justification for the rule.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 , 98 S.Ct. 777 , 54 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978)).

1987See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249 , 366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (1977) (“We take this occasion to announce that if the point comes before us we shall feel free to reexamine the justification for the rule.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 , 98 S.Ct. 777 , 54 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978)).

1987See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249 , 366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (1977) (“We take this occasion to announce that if the point comes before us we shall feel free to reexamine the justification for the rule.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 , 98 S.Ct. 777 , 54 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978)).

1970The justification for this rule was aptly expressed in Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va. 124 , 81 S.E. 706, 707-708 (1914): That the children may not have been within the jurisdiction of the court at the time of the institution of the suit or entry of the decree is immaterial, since the parties litigant were the father and the mother, and the cause of action, the right of custody, in so far as it affected the children, was between them, and the court had full jurisdiction over them with power to render a personal decree. 27 .

1970The justification for this rule was aptly expressed in Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va. 124 , 81 S.E. 706, 707-708 (1914): That the children may not have been within the jurisdiction of the court at the time of the institution of the suit or entry of the decree is immaterial, since the parties litigant were the father and the mother, and the cause of action, the right of custody, in so far as it affected the children, was between them, and the court had full jurisdiction over them with power to render a personal decree. 27 .