justification defense in Hawaii

2012“Because the requirements of HRS § 703-309(1) are set out in the conjunctive, rather than the *504 disjunctive, the prosecution needed only to disprove one element beyond a reasonable doubt to defeat the justification defense.” State v. Crouser, 81 Hawai'i 5, 11 , 911 P.2d 725, 731 (1996).

2012“Because the requirements of HRS § 703-309(1) are set out in the conjunctive, rather than the *504 disjunctive, the prosecution needed only to disprove one element beyond a reasonable doubt to defeat the justification defense.” State v. Crouser, 81 Hawai'i 5, 11 , 911 P.2d 725, 731 (1996).

1996Cfi State v. McNulty, 60 Haw. 259, 262 , 588 P.2d 438, 442 (1978) (“once evidence of justification has been adduced at trial, the prosecution has the burden of disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts constituting justification”), cer t. denied, 441 U.S. 961 , 99 S.Ct. 2406 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Raines v. State, 79 Hawai'i 219, 225 , 900 P.2d 1286, 1292 (1995).

1996Cfi State v. McNulty, 60 Haw. 259, 262 , 588 P.2d 438, 442 (1978) (“once evidence of justification has been adduced at trial, the prosecution has the burden of disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts constituting justification”), cer t. denied, 441 U.S. 961 , 99 S.Ct. 2406 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Raines v. State, 79 Hawai'i 219, 225 , 900 P.2d 1286, 1292 (1995).

2012The burden then shifts to the State to “disprove the justification evidence that was adduced or to prove facts negativing the justification defense, and to do so beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Kaimimoku, 9 Haw.App. 345, 350 , 841 P.2d 1076, 1079 (1992) (citations omitted).

2012The burden then shifts to the State to “disprove the justification evidence that was adduced or to prove facts negativing the justification defense, and to do so beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Kaimimoku, 9 Haw.App. 345, 350 , 841 P.2d 1076, 1079 (1992) (citations omitted).

2022In conclusion, for all of the foregoing reasons, viewing the evidence in the strongest light for the prosecution, see State v. Matavale, 115 Hawai#i 149, 157-58, 166 P.3d 322, 330-31 (2007), there was no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the Family Court that the justification defense did not apply, and thus, I would reverse the adjudication in this case. /s/ Karen T.

2012See State v. Matavale, 115 Hawai'i 149, 158-59 , 166 P.3d 322, 331-32 (2007) (plurality opinion) (“When a question of parental discipline is raised, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent’s ... conduct did not come within the scope of parental discipline as prescribed in HRS § 703-309(1).”) As previously noted, under HRS § 703-309(l)(a) and (b), parents are permitted to use force against minor children so long as: (a) The force is employed with due regard for the age and size of the minor and is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the we

2025Id.; see also State v. Eberly, 107 Hawai i 239, 250, 112 P.3d 725, 736 (2005) (holding "when a defendant asserts a non-affirmative defense and adduces evidence in support thereof, the circuit court must instruct the jury as to the prosecution's burden of proof with respect to negativing the defense") (citations omitted). 3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER We also reject the State's argument that, in essence, the erroneous jury instruction was harmless because the Circuit Court properly instructed the jury on the choice of evils justification defense, which was

2022State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai#i 507, 515, 164 P.3d 765, 773 (App. 2007); HRS § 703-304(1) (2014).

2020App. 448, 456-57 , 877 P.2d 891, 895 (1994)).

2020Although Kinny claims that Machuo was the first aggressor and came at him with a knife, "[t]he prosecution disproves a justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt when the trial court believes the prosecution's case and disbelieves the defendant's case." State v. Jhun, 83 Hawai#i 472, 483, 927 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER P.2d 1355, 1366 (1996) (citing State v. Gabrillo, 10 Haw.

2014The practical result of such a proposition, if allowed to be law, would be to prevent any trial whatever until the accused person himself should be pleased to permit it.” Id. at 457 , 32 S.Ct. 250 (quoting Falk v. United States, 15 App.D.C. 446, 454 (1899)).

2011Id. at 12, 911 P.2d at 732 . “[B]ecause the requirements of HRS § 703-309(1) are set out in the conjunctive, rather than the disjunctive, the prosecution needed only to disprove one element beyond a reasonable doubt to defeat the justification defense.” State v. Tanielu, 82 Hawai'i 373, 380 , 922 P.2d 986, 993 (App.1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2011Id. at 12, 911 P.2d at 732 . “[B]ecause the requirements of HRS § 703-309(1) are set out in the conjunctive, rather than the disjunctive, the prosecution needed only to disprove one element beyond a reasonable doubt to defeat the justification defense.” State v. Tanielu, 82 Hawai'i 373, 380 , 922 P.2d 986, 993 (App.1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2009Even if such a defense was made at trial, "[t]he prosecution disproves a justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt when the trial court believes the prosecution's case and disbelieves the defendant's case." State v. Jhun, 83 Hawai'i 472, 483 , 927 P.2d 1355, 1366 (1996).

2009Even if such a defense was made at trial, "[t]he prosecution disproves a justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt when the trial court believes the prosecution's case and disbelieves the defendant's case." State v. Jhun, 83 Hawai'i 472, 483 , 927 P.2d 1355, 1366 (1996).

2007Dixon v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 2437, 2447 , 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006); United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 405-09 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Beasley, 346 F.3d 930, 935-36 (9th Cir.2003). 6 .

2007In State v. Maumalanga, 90 Hawai'i 58, 63 , 976 P.2d 372, 377 (1999), the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that common law considerations cannot be grafted onto the choice of evils defense set forth in HRS § 703-302 (1993).

2007In State v. Maumalanga, 90 Hawai'i 58, 63 , 976 P.2d 372, 377 (1999), the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that common law considerations cannot be grafted onto the choice of evils defense set forth in HRS § 703-302 (1993).

2007Dixon v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 2437, 2447 , 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006); United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 405-09 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Beasley, 346 F.3d 930, 935-36 (9th Cir.2003). 6 .

2007See, e.g., Beasley, 346 F.3d at 933 ; Butler, 485 F.3d at 572 . 5 C.

2005But ultimately, “Lack of capacity to fabricate, rather than lack of time to fabricate is the justification for this rule.” Id. at 218 , 921 P.2d at 138 (brackets, citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2005But ultimately, “Lack of capacity to fabricate, rather than lack of time to fabricate is the justification for this rule.” Id. at 218 , 921 P.2d at 138 (brackets, citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2005See also Clark, 83 Hawai'i at 296 , 926 P.2d at 201 .

2005See also Clark, 83 Hawai'i at 296 , 926 P.2d at 201 .

1998Accord Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky.1983) (expanding Kentucky’s MPC-based choice of evils statute to include common law elements that were not present in the Kentucky statute); State v. O’Brien, 132 N.H. 587 , 567 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1989) (reasoning that New Hampshire’s MPC-based statute sets up a balancing test wherein “the desire or need to avoid the present harm must outweigh the harm sought to be prevented,” and therefore expanded the statute to include the common law element that there must be no lawful alternative); see also People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 677-79 (C

1998Accord Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky.1983) (expanding Kentucky’s MPC-based choice of evils statute to include common law elements that were not present in the Kentucky statute); State v. O’Brien, 132 N.H. 587 , 567 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1989) (reasoning that New Hampshire’s MPC-based statute sets up a balancing test wherein “the desire or need to avoid the present harm must outweigh the harm sought to be prevented,” and therefore expanded the statute to include the common law element that there must be no lawful alternative); see also People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 677-79 (C

1998Accord Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky.1983) (expanding Kentucky’s MPC-based choice of evils statute to include common law elements that were not present in the Kentucky statute); State v. O’Brien, 132 N.H. 587 , 567 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1989) (reasoning that New Hampshire’s MPC-based statute sets up a balancing test wherein “the desire or need to avoid the present harm must outweigh the harm sought to be prevented,” and therefore expanded the statute to include the common law element that there must be no lawful alternative); see also People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 677-79 (C

1998Accord Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky.1983) (expanding Kentucky’s MPC-based choice of evils statute to include common law elements that were not present in the Kentucky statute); State v. O’Brien, 132 N.H. 587 , 567 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1989) (reasoning that New Hampshire’s MPC-based statute sets up a balancing test wherein “the desire or need to avoid the present harm must outweigh the harm sought to be prevented,” and therefore expanded the statute to include the common law element that there must be no lawful alternative); see also People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 677-79 (C

1998Accord Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky.1983) (expanding Kentucky’s MPC-based choice of evils statute to include common law elements that were not present in the Kentucky statute); State v. O’Brien, 132 N.H. 587 , 567 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1989) (reasoning that New Hampshire’s MPC-based statute sets up a balancing test wherein “the desire or need to avoid the present harm must outweigh the harm sought to be prevented,” and therefore expanded the statute to include the common law element that there must be no lawful alternative); see also People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 677-79 (C

1996Cfi State v. McNulty, 60 Haw. 259, 262 , 588 P.2d 438, 442 (1978) (“once evidence of justification has been adduced at trial, the prosecution has the burden of disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts constituting justification”), cer t. denied, 441 U.S. 961 , 99 S.Ct. 2406 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Raines v. State, 79 Hawai'i 219, 225 , 900 P.2d 1286, 1292 (1995).

1996Cfi State v. McNulty, 60 Haw. 259, 262 , 588 P.2d 438, 442 (1978) (“once evidence of justification has been adduced at trial, the prosecution has the burden of disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts constituting justification”), cer t. denied, 441 U.S. 961 , 99 S.Ct. 2406 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Raines v. State, 79 Hawai'i 219, 225 , 900 P.2d 1286, 1292 (1995).

1996The basis for the “excited utterance” exception, ... is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. *297 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 [ 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 ] (1990) (citations omitted).

1996The basis for the “excited utterance” exception, ... is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. *297 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 [ 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 ] (1990) (citations omitted).