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15 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. . Tomlinsgreen2 sentences1988Justice Cardozo, in People v Tomlins, 213 NY 240, 243 ; 107 NE 496, 497 (1914), observed: "It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to retreat. 1988Justice Cardozo, in People v Tomlins, 213 NY 240, 243 ; 107 NE 496, 497 (1914), observed: "It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to retreat. | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Deleveauxgreen2 sentences2009The justification defense recognized by many state and federal courts is "`very narrow[ ]'" and is to be used only in "`extraordinary circumstances'" where there is "`imminent danger.'" United States v. White, 552 F.3d 240, 247 (C.A.2, 2009), quoting in part United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1297 (C.A.11, 2000) and United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 874-875 (C.A.4, 1995). 2009The justification defense recognized by many state and federal courts is “ ‘very narrowO’ ” and is to be used only in “ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ” where there is “ ‘imminent danger.’ ” United States v White, 552 F3d 240, 247 (CA 2, 2009), quoting in part United States v Deleveaux, 205 F3d 1292, 1297 (CA 11, 2000), and United States v Perrin, 45 F3d 869, 874-875 (CA 4, 1995). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Charles Odell Perringreen2 sentences2009The justification defense recognized by many state and federal courts is “ ‘very narrowO’ ” and is to be used only in “ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ” where there is “ ‘imminent danger.’ ” United States v White, 552 F3d 240, 247 (CA 2, 2009), quoting in part United States v Deleveaux, 205 F3d 1292, 1297 (CA 11, 2000), and United States v Perrin, 45 F3d 869, 874-875 (CA 4, 1995). 2009Indeed, “[i]t has been only on the rarest of occasions that our sister circuits have found defendants to be in the type of imminent danger that would warrant the application of a justification defense.” Perrin, supra at 874 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Marcos Perezgreen2 sentences2009See Butler, 485 F.3d at 575 , quoting United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (C.A.7, 1996) ("We must take care not to transform the narrow, non-statutory justification exception ... into something permitting a felon to possess a weapon for extended periods of time in reliance on some vague `fear' of street violence. 2009See Butler, 485 F3d at 575 , quoting United States v Perez, 86 F3d 735, 737 (CA 7, 1996) (“We must take care not to transform the narrow, non-statutory justification exception . . . into something permitting a felon to possess a weapon for extended periods of time in reliance on some vague ‘fear’ of street violence. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Whitegreen2 sentences2009The justification defense recognized by many state and federal courts is "`very narrow[ ]'" and is to be used only in "`extraordinary circumstances'" where there is "`imminent danger.'" United States v. White, 552 F.3d 240, 247 (C.A.2, 2009), quoting in part United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1297 (C.A.11, 2000) and United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 874-875 (C.A.4, 1995). 2009The justification defense recognized by many state and federal courts is “ ‘very narrowO’ ” and is to be used only in “ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ” where there is “ ‘imminent danger.’ ” United States v White, 552 F3d 240, 247 (CA 2, 2009), quoting in part United States v Deleveaux, 205 F3d 1292, 1297 (CA 11, 2000), and United States v Perrin, 45 F3d 869, 874-875 (CA 4, 1995). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Richard Williamsgreen2 sentences2009Instructive is United States v. Williams, 389 F.3d 402, 404 (C.A.2, 2004), in which the defendant admitted that he took a firearm from a 15 year old to "`get the gun off the street,'" and while he was headed for an incinerator to dispose of the gun, he dropped it when confronted by the police. 2009Instructive is United States v Williams, 389 F3d 402, 404 (CA 2, 2004), in which the defendant admitted that he took a firearm from a 15 year old to “ ‘get the gun off the street,’ ” and while he was headed for an incinerator to dispose of the gun, he dropped it when confronted by the police. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Juan Deshannon Butlergreen2 sentences2009See Butler, 485 F.3d at 575 , quoting United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (C.A.7, 1996) ("We must take care not to transform the narrow, non-statutory justification exception ... into something permitting a felon to possess a weapon for extended periods of time in reliance on some vague `fear' of street violence. 2009See Butler, 485 F3d at 575 , quoting United States v Perez, 86 F3d 735, 737 (CA 7, 1996) (“We must take care not to transform the narrow, non-statutory justification exception . . . into something permitting a felon to possess a weapon for extended periods of time in reliance on some vague ‘fear’ of street violence. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hernandez-Garciagreen2 sentences2009Dupree's trial counsel was correct; although the jury might have been instructed under the now-defunct momentary innocent possession theory as an alternative basis for excusing Dupree's continued possession after the fight ended, see People v. Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. 1039, 1040 , 728 N.W.2d 406 (2007), *484 overruling People v. Coffey, 153 Mich.App. 311 , 395 N.W.2d 250 (1986), this defense was distinct from the justification defense presented by Dupree's trial counsel. 2009Dupree’s trial counsel was correct; although the jury might have been instructed under the now-defunct momentary innocent possession theory as an alternative basis for excusing Dupree’s continued possession after the fight ended, see People v Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich 1039, 1040 (2007), overruling People v Coffey, 153 Mich App 311 ; 395 NW2d 250 (1986), this defense was distinct from the justification defense presented by Dupree’s trial counsel. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Padillagreen2 sentences2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 2 |
Hoffman v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026To that end, in order to compel the answer it must be “perfectly clear to the court ‘from a careful consideration of all of the circumstances in the case, that a witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such a tendency to incriminate.’ ” Id. at 169, quoting Hoffman, 341 US at 488 (alteration in original). | 1 | 1 |
PCS4LESS, LLC v. Stocktongreen1 sentence2026Accord PCS4LESS, 291 Mich App at 678 , and In re Morganroth, 718 F2d 161, 167 (CA 6, 1983) (the privilege should be applied liberally but cannot be applied “if it clearly appears that [the witness] is mistaken as to the justification for the privilege in advancing his claim as a subterfuge”). | 1 | 1 |
Virginia v. Blackgreen2 sentences2024See Black, 538 US at 359 (noting that true threats include “statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals”) (emphasis added); id. at 360 (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victims in fear of bodily harm or death.”) (emphasis added); id. (referring to the “fear of violence”) (emphasis added; 15 The prosecutor argues 2024See Black, 538 US at 359 (noting that true threats include “statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals”) (emphasis added); id. at 360 (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victims in fear of bodily harm or death.”) (emphasis added); id. (referring to the “fear of violence”) (emphasis added; 15 The prosecutor argues | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Thomas Nolangreen1 sentence2009See, e.g., United States v. Lemon, 824 F.2d 763, 765 (C.A.9, 1987) (finding that no imminent danger existed when the defendant's attacker had left the scene); see, also, United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 484 (C.A.9, 1983) (holding that the justification defense was inapplicable when the defendant pursued the alleged assailant after the assailant left the bar). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Oliver F. Lemongreen1 sentence2009See, e.g., United States v. Lemon, 824 F.2d 763, 765 (C.A.9, 1987) (finding that no imminent danger existed when the defendant's attacker had left the scene); see, also, United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 484 (C.A.9, 1983) (holding that the justification defense was inapplicable when the defendant pursued the alleged assailant after the assailant left the bar). | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alphonso Buster Gilbert, Sr.green1 sentence2009See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 508 F.3d 1321, 1325-1327 (C.A.10, 2007); United States v. Johnson, 459 F.3d 990, 996-997 (C.A.9, 2006), and United States v. Gilbert, 430 F.3d 215, 218-220 (C.A.4, 2005), and the cases they cite. [6] Both the lead opinion and the concurrence seem to overlook that fact, but the whole premise of their conclusion is based on transforming a duress defense (that was never requested) into a justification defense (that was never requested). [7] Or it could also be safely concluded that defendant has waived the issue by failing to raise the issue before the trial cou | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
Marrero v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wadkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Golstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kaptur v. Kapturgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Vasquez
green
2 sentences2022With respect to the courts that have addressed duress in the context of homicide accusations, nearly every case involved an intentional killing, and to the extent that unintentional killings have been discussed, it has generally been in dicta. 8 For example, in for all crimes except “an act by which one intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another”); Kan Stat Ann 21-5206 (allowing a duress defense for all crimes except murder or voluntary manslaughter); La Stat Ann 14:18 (defining duress as a justification defense but excluding “murder”); Mo Rev Stat 562.071 (making duress ava 2022With respect to the courts that have addressed duress in the context of homicide accusations, nearly every case involved an intentional killing, and to the extent that unintentional killings have been discussed, it has generally been in dicta. 8 For example, in for all crimes except “an act by which one intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another”); Kan Stat Ann 21-5206 (allowing a duress defense for all crimes except murder or voluntary manslaughter); La Stat Ann 14:18 (defining duress as a justification defense but excluding “murder”); Mo Rev Stat 562.071 (making duress ava | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Powell
green
2 sentences2022However, Anderson, id. at 784, acknowledged, and the court reaffirmed in People v Powell, 6 Cal 5th 136, 164; 425 P3d 1006 (2018), that duress may be raised as a defense to felony murder if it is a defense to the underlying felony. 2022However, Anderson, id. at 784, acknowledged, and the court reaffirmed in People v Powell, 6 Cal 5th 136, 164; 425 P3d 1006 (2018), that duress may be raised as a defense to felony murder if it is a defense to the underlying felony. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2022With respect to the courts that have addressed duress in the context of homicide accusations, nearly every case involved an intentional killing, and to the extent that unintentional killings have been discussed, it has generally been in dicta. 8 For example, in for all crimes except “an act by which one intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another”); Kan Stat Ann 21-5206 (allowing a duress defense for all crimes except murder or voluntary manslaughter); La Stat Ann 14:18 (defining duress as a justification defense but excluding “murder”); Mo Rev Stat 562.071 (making duress ava 2022With respect to the courts that have addressed duress in the context of homicide accusations, nearly every case involved an intentional killing, and to the extent that unintentional killings have been discussed, it has generally been in dicta. 8 For example, in for all crimes except “an act by which one intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another”); Kan Stat Ann 21-5206 (allowing a duress defense for all crimes except murder or voluntary manslaughter); La Stat Ann 14:18 (defining duress as a justification defense but excluding “murder”); Mo Rev Stat 562.071 (making duress ava | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Serrano
green
2 sentences2022With respect to the courts that have addressed duress in the context of homicide accusations, nearly every case involved an intentional killing, and to the extent that unintentional killings have been discussed, it has generally been in dicta. 8 For example, in for all crimes except “an act by which one intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another”); Kan Stat Ann 21-5206 (allowing a duress defense for all crimes except murder or voluntary manslaughter); La Stat Ann 14:18 (defining duress as a justification defense but excluding “murder”); Mo Rev Stat 562.071 (making duress ava 2022With respect to the courts that have addressed duress in the context of homicide accusations, nearly every case involved an intentional killing, and to the extent that unintentional killings have been discussed, it has generally been in dicta. 8 For example, in for all crimes except “an act by which one intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another”); Kan Stat Ann 21-5206 (allowing a duress defense for all crimes except murder or voluntary manslaughter); La Stat Ann 14:18 (defining duress as a justification defense but excluding “murder”); Mo Rev Stat 562.071 (making duress ava | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Humphrey v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Parker
neutral
2 sentences2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Commonwealth v. McCambridge
green
2 sentences2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Jones
neutral
2 sentences2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Crawford
green
2 sentences2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Coffey
green
2 sentences2009Dupree’s trial counsel was correct; although the jury might have been instructed under the now-defunct momentary innocent possession theory as an alternative basis for excusing Dupree’s continued possession after the fight ended, see People v Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich 1039, 1040 (2007), overruling People v Coffey, 153 Mich App 311 ; 395 NW2d 250 (1986), this defense was distinct from the justification defense presented by Dupree’s trial counsel. 2009Dupree’s trial counsel was correct; although the jury might have been instructed under the now-defunct momentary innocent possession theory as an alternative basis for excusing Dupree’s continued possession after the fight ended, see People v Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich 1039, 1040 (2007), overruling People v Coffey, 153 Mich App 311 ; 395 NW2d 250 (1986), this defense was distinct from the justification defense presented by Dupree’s trial counsel. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Castrillo
green
2 sentences2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Govan
green
2 sentences2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if 2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Blache
green
1 sentence2009See Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich. at 1040 n. 1, 728 N.W.2d 406 (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the accused must have knowingly possessed the weapon); People v. Davis, 126 Mich.App. 66, 69 , 337 N.W.2d 315 (1983) (noting that, in order to be convicted of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, the defendant must have knowingly possessed the firearm). [3] See State v. Padilla, 114 Hawai`i 507, 513-514, 164 P.3d 765 (Hawai'i App., 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Parker green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Waterford School District v. State Board of Education green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Briley green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Trammel v. United States green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Dixon green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Watts v. Department of State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.