9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bell v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.green1 sentence2015Co., 738 P.2d 949, 953-54 (Okla.Civ.App.1986), the court provided a lengthy historical analysis of the justification for this exception. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Deleveauxgreen1 sentence2011See United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 403 (1st Cir.2007) ("[Wle hold that where ... proof of the justification defense does not negate an ele ment of the charged crime, the burden of proof in connection with that defense rests with the defendant."); United States v. Leal-Cruz, 431 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir.2005) ("[Wle conclude that the Due Process Clause forbids shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on an issue only where establishing the defense would necessarily negate an element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt under Winship"); United States v. Brown, 367 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leahygreen1 sentence2011See United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 403 (1st Cir.2007) ("[Wle hold that where ... proof of the justification defense does not negate an ele ment of the charged crime, the burden of proof in connection with that defense rests with the defendant."); United States v. Leal-Cruz, 431 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir.2005) ("[Wle conclude that the Due Process Clause forbids shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on an issue only where establishing the defense would necessarily negate an element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt under Winship"); United States v. Brown, 367 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Peter Johnsongreen1 sentence2011Thus, if a defendant asserts a defense that has the effect of negating any element of the offense, the prosecution must disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt." (citations omitted); United States v. Unser, 165 F.3d 755, 764 (10th Cir.1999) ("[Wlhen evidence has been produced of a defense which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would negate an element of the offense, the government must bear the ultimate burden of persuasion on that element, including disproving the defense."); United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 208, 213-14 (2d Cir.1992) ("To be valid, an affirmative defense may not, | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert W. Unsergreen1 sentence2011Thus, if a defendant asserts a defense that has the effect of negating any element of the offense, the prosecution must disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt." (citations omitted); United States v. Unser, 165 F.3d 755, 764 (10th Cir.1999) ("[Wlhen evidence has been produced of a defense which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would negate an element of the offense, the government must bear the ultimate burden of persuasion on that element, including disproving the defense."); United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 208, 213-14 (2d Cir.1992) ("To be valid, an affirmative defense may not, | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Reginald Doddgreen1 sentence2011See United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 403 (1st Cir.2007) ("[Wle hold that where ... proof of the justification defense does not negate an ele ment of the charged crime, the burden of proof in connection with that defense rests with the defendant."); United States v. Leal-Cruz, 431 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir.2005) ("[Wle conclude that the Due Process Clause forbids shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on an issue only where establishing the defense would necessarily negate an element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt under Winship"); United States v. Brown, 367 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Don Browngreen1 sentence2011See United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 403 (1st Cir.2007) ("[Wle hold that where ... proof of the justification defense does not negate an ele ment of the charged crime, the burden of proof in connection with that defense rests with the defendant."); United States v. Leal-Cruz, 431 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir.2005) ("[Wle conclude that the Due Process Clause forbids shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on an issue only where establishing the defense would necessarily negate an element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt under Winship"); United States v. Brown, 367 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Roberto Leal-Cruzgreen1 sentence2011See United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 403 (1st Cir.2007) ("[Wle hold that where ... proof of the justification defense does not negate an ele ment of the charged crime, the burden of proof in connection with that defense rests with the defendant."); United States v. Leal-Cruz, 431 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir.2005) ("[Wle conclude that the Due Process Clause forbids shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on an issue only where establishing the defense would necessarily negate an element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt under Winship"); United States v. Brown, 367 | 1 | 1 |
Robert G. Vaughn v. Bernard Rosen, Executive Director, United States Civil Service Commissiongreen1 sentence1998See id. | 1 | 1 |
Stallman v. Youngquistgreen2 sentences1994Glaskox, 614 So.2d at 912 (quoting Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill.App.3d 859 , 85 Ill.Dec. 32, 35 , 473 N.E.2d 400, 403 (1984)). 1994Glaskox, 614 So.2d at 912 (quoting Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill.App.3d 859 , 85 Ill.Dec. 32, 35 , 473 N.E.2d 400, 403 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Andersen v. Whitleygreen2 sentences1981See Andersen v. Whitley, 194 Colo. 87 , 570 P.2d 525 (1977); Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo.App. 335 , 535 P.2d 219 (1975), cert. dismissed sub nom., Miller v. Mangus, 189 Colo. 481 , 569 P.2d 1390 (1975). 1981See Andersen v. Whitley, 194 Colo. 87 , 570 P.2d 525 (1977); Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo.App. 335 , 535 P.2d 219 (1975), cert. dismissed sub nom., Miller v. Mangus, 189 Colo. 481 , 569 P.2d 1390 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apartments
green
1 sentence2020Instead, the question is whether the failure to disclose the evidence in a timely fashion will prejudice the opposing party by denying that party an adequate opportunity to defend against the evidence.” Id. ¶ 20 Mr. Skivington hasn’t presented any coherent argument explaining how he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of Exhibit 2. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Glaskox by and Through Denton v. Glaskox
green
1 sentence1994Glaskox, 614 So.2d at 912 (quoting Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill.App.3d 859 , 85 Ill.Dec. 32, 35 , 473 N.E.2d 400, 403 (1984)). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
green
2 sentences1994Noting this categorical rule, Justice Scalia suggested the justification for the rule was "simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." Lucas , ____ U.S. at ____, 112 S.Ct. at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. 1994Noting this categorical rule, Justice Scalia suggested the justification for the rule was “simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.” Lucas , — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego
green
2 sentences1994Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 , 101 S.Ct. 1287, 1304 , 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 1994Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 , 101 S.Ct. 1287, 1304 , 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Miller v. Mangus
neutral
1 sentence1981See Andersen v. Whitley, 194 Colo. 87 , 570 P.2d 525 (1977); Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo.App. 335 , 535 P.2d 219 (1975), cert. dismissed sub nom., Miller v. Mangus, 189 Colo. 481 , 569 P.2d 1390 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Lewis v. People
neutral
2 sentences1981In Lewis v. People, 189 Colo. 552 , 543 P.2d 722 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that the requirement for a motion for new trial is an integral part of Colorado procedure, that such a motion does not constitute merely a routine or perfunctory gesture, and that the justification for the requirement is that the trial court must be given an opportunity to correct possible errors made in the course of the trial. 1981In Lewis v. People, 189 Colo. 552 , 543 P.2d 722 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that the requirement for a motion for new trial is an integral part of Colorado procedure, that such a motion does not constitute merely a routine or perfunctory gesture, and that the justification for the requirement is that the trial court must be given an opportunity to correct possible errors made in the course of the trial. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Mangus v. Miller
green
1 sentence1981See Andersen v. Whitley, 194 Colo. 87 , 570 P.2d 525 (1977); Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo.App. 335 , 535 P.2d 219 (1975), cert. dismissed sub nom., Miller v. Mangus, 189 Colo. 481 , 569 P.2d 1390 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Brown v. DISTRICT COURT, ETC.
green
1 sentence1981See Andersen v. Whitley, 194 Colo. 87 , 570 P.2d 525 (1977); Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo.App. 335 , 535 P.2d 219 (1975), cert. dismissed sub nom., Miller v. Mangus, 189 Colo. 481 , 569 P.2d 1390 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State ex rel. Twichel v. Hall
neutral
1 sentence1952I have yet to learn, however, that the making of any such pre-election promises were ever contemplated by the framers of our government, or that a show of force in the shape of numerously signed petitions, should serve as a proper justification for a violation of my oath of office, and a reason why I should hold that to be the law which I do not believe to be the law. * * *" [ 44 N.D. 459 , 171 N.W. 234 .] *322 It is indeed unfortunate that the discredited opinion in Hall v. State, supra, is cited and relied on by this court as a precedent for the opinion in Baker v. Bosworth, supra, when nume | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.