justification rule in Illinois

2020The justification for the rule “is that the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of contracts or other relations that may exist between the injured party and third persons.” Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 320 (citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill. 2d 353 (1979)).

2007The court noted that the justification for the rule was the ideal that the “ ‘wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party in procuring insurance coverage.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Peterson, 76 Ill. 2d at 362-63 , 392 N.E.2d at 5 , quoting 22 Am.

2017Specifically, defendant notes that “constitutional issues that were previously raised at trial and could be raised later in a postconviction petition are not subject to forfeiture on direct appeal.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 54 ; see also People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 (1988) (“[W]hen the defendant fails to comply with the statutory requirement to file a post-trial motion, our review will be limited to constitutional issues which have properly been raised at trial and which can be raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition [citation], sufficienc

2016Specifically, defendant notes that “constitutional issues that were previously raised at trial and could be raised later in a postconviction petition are not subject to forfeiture on direct appeal.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 54 ; see also People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 (1988) (“[W]hen the defendant fails to comply with the statutory requirement to file a post- trial motion, our review will be limited to constitutional issues which have properly been raised - 28 - No. 1-13-2284 at trial and which can be raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition

1978(Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 .) The justification for this doctrine may be found “in a reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit.” (Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619 , 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 .) However, “the rationale behind the rule loses its persuasive force as one considers situations involving other than the actual parent.” (Gulledge v. Gulledge (1977), 51 Ill.

1978(Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 .) The justification for this doctrine may be found “in a reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit.” (Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619 , 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 .) However, “the rationale behind the rule loses its persuasive force as one considers situations involving other than the actual parent.” (Gulledge v. Gulledge (1977), 51 Ill.

1978(Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 .) The justification for this doctrine may be found “in a reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit.” (Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619 , 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 .) However, “the rationale behind the rule loses its persuasive force as one considers situations involving other than the actual parent.” (Gulledge v. Gulledge (1977), 51 Ill.

1978(Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 .) The justification for this doctrine may be found “in a reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit.” (Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619 , 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 .) However, “the rationale behind the rule loses its persuasive force as one considers situations involving other than the actual parent.” (Gulledge v. Gulledge (1977), 51 Ill.

2020Id.

2020Id.

1997Wolff , 284 Ill.

1997Wolff, 284 Ill.

2024Lewis, 2020 IL 124107, ¶ 46 . ¶ 45 In conclusion, I would have reversed the dismissal of Viera’s complaint and allowed the case to proceed. 21 No. 1-22-1521 Hulsh v. Hulsh, 2024 IL App (1st) 221521 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 20-CH- 00831; the Hon.

2024As the court stated, section 7-4 of the Criminal Code of 2012 provides that a justification defense is not available to individuals who are “attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony.” Id. § 7-4(a).

2024Id.

2024Lewis, 2020 IL 124107, ¶ 46 . ¶ 45 In conclusion, I would have reversed the dismissal of Viera’s complaint and allowed the case to proceed. 21 No. 1-22-1521 Hulsh v. Hulsh, 2024 IL App (1st) 221521 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 20-CH- 00831; the Hon.

2011Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 79 , 295 Ill.Dec. 641 , 833 L.Ed.2d 847 ; Wilson, 131 Ill.2d at 320 , 137 Ill.Dec. 579 , 546 N.E.2d 524 ; Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill.2d 353, 362 , 29 Ill.Dec. 444 , 392 N.E.2d 1 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Wills, 229 Ill.2d at 414-15 , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018 . "[A] benefit that is directed to [an] injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for the tortfeasor." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A cmt. b (1979); see also Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 78-79 , 295 Ill.Dec. 641 , 833 N.E.2d 847 (quoting the Restatement).

2011Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 79 , 295 Ill.Dec. 641 , 833 L.Ed.2d 847 ; Wilson, 131 Ill.2d at 320 , 137 Ill.Dec. 579 , 546 N.E.2d 524 ; Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill.2d 353, 362 , 29 Ill.Dec. 444 , 392 N.E.2d 1 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Wills, 229 Ill.2d at 414-15 , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018 . "[A] benefit that is directed to [an] injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for the tortfeasor." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A cmt. b (1979); see also Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 78-79 , 295 Ill.Dec. 641 , 833 N.E.2d 847 (quoting the Restatement).

2009Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d at 433 , 793 N.E.2d at 585 , citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 , 35 L.

2009Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d at 433 , 793 N.E.2d at 585 , citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 , 35 L.

2009Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d at 433 , 793 N.E.2d at 585 , citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 , 35 L.

2009Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d at 433 , 793 N.E.2d at 585 , citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 , 35 L.

2009In Hoobler v. Voelpel, 246 Ill.

1996Since the sexual misconduct alleged here serves no conceivable public purpose and advanced a completely personal objective (see Medlin v. Bass, 327 N.C. 587 , 398 N.E.2d 460 ), there would be little if any utility in imposing a duty upon the public entity to indemnify an employee charged with such conduct.

1995Ed. 2d at 1441 , 79 S. a. at 1339.) Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions, "[a]n absolute privilege cannot be overcome by a showing of improper motivation or knowledge of [the statement’s] falsity [citation], i.e., made with malice.” Geick, 236 Ill.

1995Ed. 2d at 1443 , 79 S. a. at 1341.) Our supreme court recognized this doctrine in Blair v. Walker (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 1 , and held that the Governor of Elinois was immune from liability for making statements "which are legitimately related to matters committed to his responsibility.” (Blair, 64 Ill. 2d at 10 .) The justification for the privilege is the need to ensure that government officials are "free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties— suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be dev

1995Ed. 2d at 1443 , 79 S. a. at 1341.) Our supreme court recognized this doctrine in Blair v. Walker (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 1 , and held that the Governor of Elinois was immune from liability for making statements "which are legitimately related to matters committed to his responsibility.” (Blair, 64 Ill. 2d at 10 .) The justification for the privilege is the need to ensure that government officials are "free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties— suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be dev

1995Ed. 2d at 1443 , 79 S. a. at 1341.) Our supreme court recognized this doctrine in Blair v. Walker (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 1 , and held that the Governor of Elinois was immune from liability for making statements "which are legitimately related to matters committed to his responsibility.” (Blair, 64 Ill. 2d at 10 .) The justification for the privilege is the need to ensure that government officials are "free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties— suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be dev

1995Ed. 2d at 1443 , 79 S. a. at 1341.) Our supreme court recognized this doctrine in Blair v. Walker (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 1 , and held that the Governor of Elinois was immune from liability for making statements "which are legitimately related to matters committed to his responsibility.” (Blair, 64 Ill. 2d at 10 .) The justification for the privilege is the need to ensure that government officials are "free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties— suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be dev

1994The danger is that other-crimes evidence "over-persuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment.” People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137 .

1994The danger is that other-crimes evidence "overpersuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment." People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill.2d 129, 137 , 37 Ill.Dec. 348 , 402 N.E.2d 238 .