justification defense in Connecticut

2017These defenses operate to exempt from punishment otherwise criminal conduct when the harm from such conduct is deemed to be outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryan , 307 Conn. 823 , 832-33, 60 A.3d 246 (2013). "[T]he defendant bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise the issue[s] of self-defense [and defense of others], this burden is slight." State v. Terwilliger , 105 Conn. App. 219 , 224 n.5, 937 A.2d 735 (2008), aff'd, 294 Conn. 399 , 984 A.2d 721 (2009). "[

2017These defenses operate to exempt from punishment otherwise criminal conduct when the harm from such conduct is deemed to be outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryan , 307 Conn. 823 , 832-33, 60 A.3d 246 (2013). "[T]he defendant bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise the issue[s] of self-defense [and defense of others], this burden is slight." State v. Terwilliger , 105 Conn. App. 219 , 224 n.5, 937 A.2d 735 (2008), aff'd, 294 Conn. 399 , 984 A.2d 721 (2009). "[

2017These defenses operate to exempt from punishment otherwise criminal conduct when the harm from such conduct is deemed to be outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryan , 307 Conn. 823 , 832-33, 60 A.3d 246 (2013). "[T]he defendant bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise the issue[s] of self-defense [and defense of others], this burden is slight." State v. Terwilliger , 105 Conn. App. 219 , 224 n.5, 937 A.2d 735 (2008), aff'd, 294 Conn. 399 , 984 A.2d 721 (2009). "[

2017These defenses operate to exempt from punishment otherwise criminal conduct when the harm from such conduct is deemed to be outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryan , 307 Conn. 823 , 832-33, 60 A.3d 246 (2013). "[T]he defendant bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise the issue[s] of self-defense [and defense of others], this burden is slight." State v. Terwilliger , 105 Conn. App. 219 , 224 n.5, 937 A.2d 735 (2008), aff'd, 294 Conn. 399 , 984 A.2d 721 (2009). "[

2015Combat by agreement, often referred to as ‘‘mutual combat,’’ is an exception that operates as a statutory disqualification from the justification defense of self- defense. ‘‘A jury instruction regarding the combat by agreement exception to self-defense is warranted when the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable infer- ence that such a mutual combat occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montanez, 277 Conn. 735, 747 , 894 A.2d 928 (2006). ‘‘The agreement required by . . . § 53a-19 (c) (3) need not be formal or express.’’ State v. Silveira, 198 Conn. 454, 471 , 503 A.2

2015Combat by agreement, often referred to as ‘‘mutual combat,’’ is an exception that operates as a statutory disqualification from the justification defense of self- defense. ‘‘A jury instruction regarding the combat by agreement exception to self-defense is warranted when the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable infer- ence that such a mutual combat occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montanez, 277 Conn. 735, 747 , 894 A.2d 928 (2006). ‘‘The agreement required by . . . § 53a-19 (c) (3) need not be formal or express.’’ State v. Silveira, 198 Conn. 454, 471 , 503 A.2

2026He seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).1 In Connecticut, once a criminal defendant raises the justification defense of self-defense, the state must 1 Pursuant to Golding, “a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitu- tional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alle

2026He seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).1 In Connecticut, once a criminal defendant raises the justification defense of self-defense, the state must 1 Pursuant to Golding, “a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitu- tional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alle

2025We then consider whether a defendant’s exercise of the right of self-defense, when the defendant used deadly force in the proper exercise of that right, applies to a charge of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm of an unintended victim, following our decision in State v. Hall, 213 Conn. 579 , 584–86, 569 A.2d 534 (1990).6 ‘‘A justification defense represents a legal acknowledg- ment that the harm caused by otherwise criminal con- 5 The defendant and other jurisdictions have referred to the defense as ‘‘trans- ferred intent self-defense’’ or ‘‘transferred innocent intent’’

2025We then consider whether a defendant’s exercise of the right of self-defense, when the defendant used deadly force in the proper exercise of that right, applies to a charge of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm of an unintended victim, following our decision in State v. Hall, 213 Conn. 579 , 584–86, 569 A.2d 534 (1990).6 ‘‘A justification defense represents a legal acknowledg- ment that the harm caused by otherwise criminal con- 5 The defendant and other jurisdictions have referred to the defense as ‘‘trans- ferred intent self-defense’’ or ‘‘transferred innocent intent’’

2024See State v. Terwilliger, supra, 294 Conn. 409 (defendant must produce evidence that he reasonably believed that victim was trespassing and that extent of force used was necessary); State v. Brunette, 92 Conn. App. 440, 448 , 886 A.2d 427 (2005) (victim must be criminally trespassing in order for defense of premises 8 The defendant argues that, as an issue of first impression in our state, § 53a-20 should apply not only to uses of physical force but also to threats of the use of physical force.

2024See State v. Terwilliger, supra, 294 Conn. 409 (defendant must produce evidence that he reasonably believed that victim was trespassing and that extent of force used was necessary); State v. Brunette, 92 Conn. App. 440, 448 , 886 A.2d 427 (2005) (victim must be criminally trespassing in order for defense of premises 8 The defendant argues that, as an issue of first impression in our state, § 53a-20 should apply not only to uses of physical force but also to threats of the use of physical force.

2022We therefore restate the question to properly read: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the jury did not need to be unanimous in its conclusion as to which particular component or components of the defense the state had disproved.’’ See, e.g., Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, 336 Conn. 168 , 174–75 n.3, 243 A.3d 1163 (2020) (this court may restate certified question). 4 Although, at times, we have spoken loosely of the ‘‘elements’’ of a self- defense claim; e.g., State v. Singleton, 292 Conn. 734, 747 , 974 A.2d 679 (2009); the different components of a justification defense

2020See, e.g., State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 634 , 490 A.2d 75 (1985); Edwards v. Grace Hospital Society, 130 Conn. 568, 575 , 36 A.2d 273 (1944).

2020See, e.g., State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 634 , 490 A.2d 75 (1985); Edwards v. Grace Hospital Society, 130 Conn. 568, 575 , 36 A.2d 273 (1944).

2019Id., n.14. 6 We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court’s judgment when it determined that (1) the trial court did not improperly charge the jury on the defendant’s justification defense of criminal trespass, (2) the special defense of others was not barred by insufficient evidence, and (3) no finding needed to be made on the plaintiff’s rights to the property?’’ Burke v. Mesniaeff, 328 Conn. 901 , 177 A.3d 564 (2018). 7 Section 53a-20 is a criminal statute, but the parties do not qu

2019Id., n.14. 6 We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court’s judgment when it determined that (1) the trial court did not improperly charge the jury on the defendant’s justification defense of criminal trespass, (2) the special defense of others was not barred by insufficient evidence, and (3) no finding needed to be made on the plaintiff’s rights to the property?’’ Burke v. Mesniaeff, 328 Conn. 901 , 177 A.3d 564 (2018). 7 Section 53a-20 is a criminal statute, but the parties do not qu

2019Cf. Brown v. Robishaw, 282 Conn. 628, 636 , 922 A.2d 1086 (2007) (‘‘it is well established that the defense of self-defense is available to a defendant faced with the intentional torts of civil assault and battery, provided that there is sufficient evidence in support of that defense’’). 8 The undisputed evidence established that the plaintiff had painted the interior of the Sharon house and managed the rental of an adjacent guest cottage. 9 Wrongful conduct, by contrast, is not a justification defense; it is a limitation on liability in civil actions premised on the notion that a plaintiff sh

2019Cf. Brown v. Robishaw, 282 Conn. 628, 636 , 922 A.2d 1086 (2007) (‘‘it is well established that the defense of self-defense is available to a defendant faced with the intentional torts of civil assault and battery, provided that there is sufficient evidence in support of that defense’’). 8 The undisputed evidence established that the plaintiff had painted the interior of the Sharon house and managed the rental of an adjacent guest cottage. 9 Wrongful conduct, by contrast, is not a justification defense; it is a limitation on liability in civil actions premised on the notion that a plaintiff sh

2018The plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 177 Conn. App. 824 , 173 A.3d 393 (2017), is granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court's judgment when it determined that (1) the trial court did not improperly charge the jury on the defendant's justification defense of criminal trespass, (2) the special defense of others was not barred by insufficient evidence, and (3) no finding needed to be made on the plaintiff's rights to the property?" McDONALD, J., did not participate in the consideration of or decision

2018The plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 177 Conn. App. 824 , 173 A.3d 393 (2017), is granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court's judgment when it determined that (1) the trial court did not improperly charge the jury on the defendant's justification defense of criminal trespass, (2) the special defense of others was not barred by insufficient evidence, and (3) no finding needed to be made on the plaintiff's rights to the property?" McDONALD, J., did not participate in the consideration of or decision

2018"A theory of self-defense is a justification defense ... [that] represents a legal acknowledgment that the harm caused by otherwise criminal conduct is, under special justifying circumstances, outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2015Combat by agreement, often referred to as ‘‘mutual combat,’’ is an exception that operates as a statutory disqualification from the justification defense of self- defense. ‘‘A jury instruction regarding the combat by agreement exception to self-defense is warranted when the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable infer- ence that such a mutual combat occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montanez, 277 Conn. 735, 747 , 894 A.2d 928 (2006). ‘‘The agreement required by . . . § 53a-19 (c) (3) need not be formal or express.’’ State v. Silveira, 198 Conn. 454, 471 , 503 A.2

2015Combat by agreement, often referred to as ‘‘mutual combat,’’ is an exception that operates as a statutory disqualification from the justification defense of self- defense. ‘‘A jury instruction regarding the combat by agreement exception to self-defense is warranted when the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable infer- ence that such a mutual combat occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montanez, 277 Conn. 735, 747 , 894 A.2d 928 (2006). ‘‘The agreement required by . . . § 53a-19 (c) (3) need not be formal or express.’’ State v. Silveira, 198 Conn. 454, 471 , 503 A.2

2015If you find their comments on the law differ from my explanation, you must put aside their comments.’’ Addi- tionally, the court thoroughly instructed the jury on the defendant’s justification defense and on the use of deadly physical force, and the defendant has not asserted that the court’s instructions on self-defense were improper.6 As our appellate courts previously have stated: ‘‘[T]he jury [is] presumed to follow the court’s directions in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 598 , 849 A.2d 626 (2004).

2015If you find their comments on the law differ from my explanation, you must put aside their comments.’’ Addi- tionally, the court thoroughly instructed the jury on the defendant’s justification defense and on the use of deadly physical force, and the defendant has not asserted that the court’s instructions on self-defense were improper.6 As our appellate courts previously have stated: ‘‘[T]he jury [is] presumed to follow the court’s directions in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 598 , 849 A.2d 626 (2004).

2014Co., 87 Conn. App. 416, 425, 866 A.2d 704 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 925 , 871 A.2d 1031 (2005).

2014Co., 87 Conn. App. 416, 425, 866 A.2d 704 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 925 , 871 A.2d 1031 (2005).

2010Section 53a-19 (a) requires, however, that the defendant’s belief ultimately must be found to be reasonable.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 232 Conn. 537, 546 , 656 A.2d 657 (1995). “[A] claim of self-defense is a justification defense.

2010Section 53a-19 (a) requires, however, that the defendant’s belief ultimately must be found to be reasonable.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 232 Conn. 537, 546 , 656 A.2d 657 (1995). “[A] claim of self-defense is a justification defense.

2009We do not interpret Ramos and its progeny 15 as requiring a specific mention of Golding by name, which would effectively add a fifth prong to its test. 16 “The only justification for the requirement that a defendant specifically cite Golding in its brief is that an appellate court should be clear on the level of review a defendant seeks because “[i]t is not appropriate to engage in a level of review that is not requested.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ghant v. Commissioner of Correction, 255 Conn. 1, 17 , 761 A.2d 740 (2000).

2009We do not interpret Ramos and its progeny 15 as requiring a specific mention of Golding by name, which would effectively add a fifth prong to its test. 16 “The only justification for the requirement that a defendant specifically cite Golding in its brief is that an appellate court should be clear on the level of review a defendant seeks because “[i]t is not appropriate to engage in a level of review that is not requested.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ghant v. Commissioner of Correction, 255 Conn. 1, 17 , 761 A.2d 740 (2000).