justification rule in California

2009Hence, applicant did not have a vested right . . . .” (Graczyk, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1006 .) “The justification for the rule that a statutory right of action may be repealed is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the Legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.” (Id. at p. 1007, fn. 5; see Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67-68 [ 290 P. 438 ] [“all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time”]; Willcox v. Edwards (1912) 162 Cal. 455, 465 [ 123 P. 276 ] [“When the re

2009Hence, applicant did not have a vested right . . . .” (Graczyk, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1006 .) “The justification for the rule that a statutory right of action may be repealed is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the Legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.” (Id. at p. 1007, fn. 5; see Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67-68 [ 290 P. 438 ] [“all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time”]; Willcox v. Edwards (1912) 162 Cal. 455, 465 [ 123 P. 276 ] [“When the re

2023(Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023 (Zipperer).) “The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the Legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 (Mann), internal quotation marks omitted.) “This general common law rule has been applied in a multitude of contexts.

2018The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered ." ' " ( Mann , supra , at pp. 822-823, 830-831, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 , italics added, quoting Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1 , 11-12, 97 P.2d 963 .) " 'The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.' [Citation.]" ( Mann , supra , at p. 829, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 .) "This general common law rule has been applied in a multitude of cont

2022(Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 109 .) “ ‘ “The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.” ’ ” (Ibid.) As the trial court recognized, this principle is codified in Government Code section 9606, which states: “Any statute may be repealed at any time, except when vested rights would be impaired.

2005The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Physicians Com. for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926 ], italics omitted; see Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 109 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ]; see Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 831 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ]; see Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67 [ 290 P. 438 ].) “The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with ful

2023(Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023 (Zipperer).) “The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the Legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 (Mann), internal quotation marks omitted.) “This general common law rule has been applied in a multitude of contexts.

2010In such a circumstance, “ ‘a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.’ ” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ]; see also, e.g., Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023-1025 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 ].) “ ‘The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.’ ” (Governing Board, supra, at p. 829.) Here too, the particular timing of the events in this case me

2018The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered ." ' " ( Mann , supra , at pp. 822-823, 830-831, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 , italics added, quoting Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1 , 11-12, 97 P.2d 963 .) " 'The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.' [Citation.]" ( Mann , supra , at p. 829, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 .) "This general common law rule has been applied in a multitude of cont

2018The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered ." ' " ( Mann , supra , at pp. 822-823, 830-831, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 , italics added, quoting Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1 , 11-12, 97 P.2d 963 .) " 'The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.' [Citation.]" ( Mann , supra , at p. 829, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 .) "This general common law rule has been applied in a multitude of cont

2005The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Physicians Com. for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926 ], italics omitted; see Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 109 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ]; see Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 831 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ]; see Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67 [ 290 P. 438 ].) “The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with ful

2005The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Physicians Com. for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926 ], italics omitted; see Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 109 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 ]; see Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 831 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ]; see Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67 [ 290 P. 438 ].) “The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with ful

2003Appeals Bd. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 997 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 494 ], for example, the appellate court affirmed retroactive application of a statutory change limiting the definition of “employee” under the workers’ compensation law, holding there could be no constitutional objection to the retroactive operation of the statute because the applicant had no “vested right” to his status as an employee at the time of injury: “Because it is a creature of statute, the right of action exists only so far and in favor of such person as the legislative power may declare.” (Id. at p. 1007.) Similarly, the right to

2003Appeals Bd. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 997 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 494 ], for example, the appellate court affirmed retroactive application of a statutory change limiting the definition of “employee” under the workers’ compensation law, holding there could be no constitutional objection to the retroactive operation of the statute because the applicant had no “vested right” to his status as an employee at the time of injury: “Because it is a creature of statute, the right of action exists only so far and in favor of such person as the legislative power may declare.” (Id. at p. 1007.) Similarly, the right to

2003Appeals Bd. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 997 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 494 ], for example, the appellate court affirmed retroactive application of a statutory change limiting the definition of “employee” under the workers’ compensation law, holding there could be no constitutional objection to the retroactive operation of the statute because the applicant had no “vested right” to his status as an employee at the time of injury: “Because it is a creature of statute, the right of action exists only so far and in favor of such person as the legislative power may declare.” (Id. at p. 1007.) Similarly, the right to

2003Appeals Bd. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 997 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 494 ], for example, the appellate court affirmed retroactive application of a statutory change limiting the definition of “employee” under the workers’ compensation law, holding there could be no constitutional objection to the retroactive operation of the statute because the applicant had no “vested right” to his status as an employee at the time of injury: “Because it is a creature of statute, the right of action exists only so far and in favor of such person as the legislative power may declare.” (Id. at p. 1007.) Similarly, the right to

1995Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652, 655-656 [ 171 P.2d 5 ]; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843 [ 205 P.2d 1037 ]; Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 841 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ].) Chief Justice Traynor has pointed out: ‘The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business.’ (Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [ 181 P.2d 645 ].) Thus, it must be deemed settled in California that in accordance with

1995Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652, 655-656 [ 171 P.2d 5 ]; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843 [ 205 P.2d 1037 ]; Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 841 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ].) Chief Justice Traynor has pointed out: ‘The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business.’ (Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [ 181 P.2d 645 ].) Thus, it must be deemed settled in California that in accordance with

1995Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652, 655-656 [ 171 P.2d 5 ]; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843 [ 205 P.2d 1037 ]; Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 841 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ].) Chief Justice Traynor has pointed out: ‘The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business.’ (Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [ 181 P.2d 645 ].) Thus, it must be deemed settled in California that in accordance with

1995Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652, 655-656 [ 171 P.2d 5 ]; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843 [ 205 P.2d 1037 ]; Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 841 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ].) Chief Justice Traynor has pointed out: ‘The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business.’ (Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [ 181 P.2d 645 ].) Thus, it must be deemed settled in California that in accordance with

1995Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652, 655-656 [ 171 P.2d 5 ]; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843 [ 205 P.2d 1037 ]; Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 841 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ].) Chief Justice Traynor has pointed out: ‘The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business.’ (Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [ 181 P.2d 645 ].) Thus, it must be deemed settled in California that in accordance with

1995Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652, 655-656 [ 171 P.2d 5 ]; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843 [ 205 P.2d 1037 ]; Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 841 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ].) Chief Justice Traynor has pointed out: ‘The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business.’ (Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [ 181 P.2d 645 ].) Thus, it must be deemed settled in California that in accordance with

1995Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652, 655-656 [ 171 P.2d 5 ]; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843 [ 205 P.2d 1037 ]; Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 841 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ].) Chief Justice Traynor has pointed out: ‘The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business.’ (Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [ 181 P.2d 645 ].) Thus, it must be deemed settled in California that in accordance with

1995Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652, 655-656 [ 171 P.2d 5 ]; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843 [ 205 P.2d 1037 ]; Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 841 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ].) Chief Justice Traynor has pointed out: ‘The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business.’ (Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [ 181 P.2d 645 ].) Thus, it must be deemed settled in California that in accordance with

2018The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered ." ' " ( Mann , supra , at pp. 822-823, 830-831, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 , italics added, quoting Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1 , 11-12, 97 P.2d 963 .) " 'The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.' [Citation.]" ( Mann , supra , at p. 829, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 .) "This general common law rule has been applied in a multitude of cont

2018The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered ." ' " ( Mann , supra , at pp. 822-823, 830-831, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 , italics added, quoting Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1 , 11-12, 97 P.2d 963 .) " 'The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time.' [Citation.]" ( Mann , supra , at p. 829, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 .) "This general common law rule has been applied in a multitude of cont

2004Co. (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 659, 670-671 [ 102 P.2d 387 ]); “[as] a general rule, ... a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute. [Citations.] The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right ... at any time.” (Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67-68 [ 290 P. 438 ].) Mil acknowledges the numerous cases holding that when a remedial statute is amended or repealed

2004Co. (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 659, 670-671 [ 102 P.2d 387 ]); “[as] a general rule, ... a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute. [Citations.] The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right ... at any time.” (Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67-68 [ 290 P. 438 ].) Mil acknowledges the numerous cases holding that when a remedial statute is amended or repealed

2026Next, defendants invoke the well-settled rule “ ‘ “that a party to an action may not, for the first time on appeal, change the theory of the cause of action,” ’ ” but must instead “adhere to the theory (or theories) on which their cases were tried.” (Doe WHBE 3 v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1135 , 1152; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 8:229 (Eisenberg).) The justification for this rule is that permitting a party to “change [her] position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal . . . would not only be unfair to

2023Although “[t]he general rule is that nonstatutory motions to vacate are not appealable, . . . an exception applies when the appellant alleges that the underlying order or judgment is void. [Citation.] The justification for this exception is that if an order or judgment is void, an order denying a motion to vacate that order or judgment is also void and appealable because it gives effect to a void [order or] judgment.” (Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282 , 292 (Regents); cf. Shisler v. Sanfer Sports Cars, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [order denying a statut

2023He also does not cite any portion of the record showing that he objected to the award of $2,600 in costs or to the evidence supporting Behroyan’s claimed costs. “ ‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings . . . where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 988, 1002 [party waived claim that trial court improperly calculated the amount of child support by failing to raise the argument in the trial court].) The justification fo