justification defense in Massachusetts

2012See Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 774 (2011) (“Defense of another tracks, and is interwoven with, the elements of self-defense”); Martin, supra at 650 (“the trend . . . has been to interweave closely the justification of defense of a third person with self-defense”); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 58 (1999) (“The defense of another instruction should mirror the self defense instruction”).

2003The court in Martin did, however, note that “the trend, which is exemplified by legislation adopted in many States, has been to interweave closely the justification of defense of a third person with self-defense.” Commonwealth v. Martin. 369 Mass. at 650 (footnote omitted).

2013See Commonwealth v. Martin, supra at 650 (“[T]he trend . . . has been to interweave closely the justification of defense of a third person with self-defense”); Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 774 (2011) (“Defense of another tracks, and is interwoven with, the elements of self-defense”); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 58 (1999) (“The defense of another instruction should mirror the self defense instruction”).

2012See Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 774 (2011) (“Defense of another tracks, and is interwoven with, the elements of self-defense”); Martin, supra at 650 (“the trend . . . has been to interweave closely the justification of defense of a third person with self-defense”); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 58 (1999) (“The defense of another instruction should mirror the self defense instruction”).

1977See United States v. Grimes, 413 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1969).

1976Without subscribing in advance to all the relevant provisions of the Model Penal Code of the American *650 Law Institute, we recommend it for study. 13 Accelerated by that Code, the trend, which is exemplified by legislation adopted in many States, 14 has been to interweave closely the justification of defense of a third person with self-defense; to eliminate some earlier authority restricting the justification of third-person defense to situations where the third person is seen retrospectively to have been entitled to use force in his own defense (regardless of the belief, which might be mist

2024The justification for the privilege is to encourage "citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials." Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).

2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. at 649 ; Commonwealth v. Arias, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 465-468 (2013).

2012The judge did just that, holding that “the proffered reason for a challenge is not bona fide, but rather is a mere sham.” 21 In light of the considerable support for the judge’s determination apparent from the record, 22 see Com monwealth v. Fruchtman, supra at 15 , quoting Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 552 (1981) (“we do not substitute our judgment for [the judge’s] if there is support for it on the record”), we conclude that the judge sufficiently discharged his responsibility to “considerQ both the adequacy and the genuineness” of the defendant’s justification for his cha

2012See, e.g., Batson v. State, 113 Nev. 669 , 674 n.2 (1997) (defendant “could only rely on the privilege of defense of others to the extent that [his wife] could have invoked the privilege of self-defense”); Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo. 1979) (“One asserting the justification of defense of another steps into the position of the person defended”).

2012See, e.g., Batson v. State, 113 Nev. 669 , 674 n.2 (1997) (defendant “could only rely on the privilege of defense of others to the extent that [his wife] could have invoked the privilege of self-defense”); Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo. 1979) (“One asserting the justification of defense of another steps into the position of the person defended”).

2007See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Ogbonna, 184 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1055 (1999).

2007See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Ogbonna, 184 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1055 (1999).

2005Cf. Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 834 (1977).

2003See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 804, 808 (2000); Commonwealth v. Calderon, 431 Mass. 21, 25 (2000); Commonwealth v. Curtiss, 424 Mass. 78 , 81- 82 (1997).

2003The right to use nondeadly force (such as one’s fists) in self-defense, by contrast, “arises at a somewhat lower level of danger . . . than the right to use a dangerous weapon.” Commonwealth v. Baseler, 419 Mass. 500, 502 (1995), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86, 105 (1980).

2003See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 804, 808 (2000); Commonwealth v. Calderon, 431 Mass. 21, 25 (2000); Commonwealth v. Curtiss, 424 Mass. 78 , 81- 82 (1997).

2003The right to use nondeadly force (such as one’s fists) in self-defense, by contrast, “arises at a somewhat lower level of danger . . . than the right to use a dangerous weapon.” Commonwealth v. Baseler, 419 Mass. 500, 502 (1995), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86, 105 (1980).

2001Furthermore, the respondent “is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself — his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.” Hoffman v. United States, supra at 486. “[T]he court may order a witness to answer if it clearly appears that he is mistaken as to the justification for the privilege in advancing his claim as a subterfuge.” In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 167 (6th Cir. 1983).

2001“It is for a judge, rather than a witness or his attorney, ‘to decide whether a witnesses] silence is justified.’ ” Commonwealth v. Martin, supra at 502 , quoting In re Morganroth, supra at 167 .

1993See Waldman v. American Honda Motor Co., 413 Mass. 320, 323 (1992); Crown Shade & Screen Co. v. Karlburg, 332 Mass. 229, 231 (1955).

1993See Waldman v. American Honda Motor Co., 413 Mass. 320, 323 (1992); Crown Shade & Screen Co. v. Karlburg, 332 Mass. 229, 231 (1955).

1991Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 855-858 (1983), explaining the justification for the principle that “concurrent wrongdoers are independently liable under statutes designed to impose a penalty.” Id. at 855 .

1991Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 855-858 (1983), explaining the justification for the principle that “concurrent wrongdoers are independently liable under statutes designed to impose a penalty.” Id. at 855 .