15 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. 1,378.65 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Vernon County, State of Missouri, and Laurance Phistergreen2 sentences2007Our Supreme Court has stated that the substantial justification test requires the agency to "show not merely that its position was marginally reasonable; its position must be clearly reasonable, well founded in law and fact, solid though not necessarily correct." Taft v. Pare , 536 A.2d 888 , 893 (R.I. 1988) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. 1,378.65 Acres of Land , 794 F.2d 1313,1318 (8 th Cir. 1986)). *Page 25 The Zoning Board argues on appeal that the appellant is not entitled to litigation expenses under the Act because "[t]here is no suggestion, and absolutely no evi 2002The Rhode Island Supreme Court has adopted the position of United States v. 1,378.65 Acres of Land, 794 F.2d 1313 , 1318 (8th Cir. 1986), in which the court held that in meeting the substantial justification test "the Government now must show not merely that its position was marginally reasonable; its position must be clearly reasonable, well founded in law and fact, solid though not necessarily correct." Taft v. Pare, 536 A.2d 888 , 893 (R.I. 1988). | 2 | 3 |
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Madigangreen1 sentence2019See, e.g. , id. at 1331-32 ; Kali v. Bowen , 854 F.2d 329 , 332 (9th Cir. 1988) ; Tarbox , 142 A.3d at 198 ; Krikorian v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services , 606 A.2d 671 , 676 (R.I. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taft v. Pare
green
2 sentences2008The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that in applying the substantial justification test, "the Government now must show not merely that its position was marginally reasonable; its position must be clearly reasonable, well founded in law and fact, solid though not necessarily correct." Taft v. Pare , 536 A.2d 888 , 893 (R.I. 1988). 2007Our Supreme Court has stated that the substantial justification test requires the agency to "show not merely that its position was marginally reasonable; its position must be clearly reasonable, well founded in law and fact, solid though not necessarily correct." Taft v. Pare , 536 A.2d 888 , 893 (R.I. 1988) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. 1,378.65 Acres of Land , 794 F.2d 1313,1318 (8 th Cir. 1986)). *Page 25 The Zoning Board argues on appeal that the appellant is not entitled to litigation expenses under the Act because "[t]here is no suggestion, and absolutely no evi | 12 | 1996–2008 |
Krikorian v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g. , id. at 1331-32 ; Kali v. Bowen , 854 F.2d 329 , 332 (9th Cir. 1988) ; Tarbox , 142 A.3d at 198 ; Krikorian v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services , 606 A.2d 671 , 676 (R.I. 1992). 2008Dep't of Human Servs. , 606 A.2d 671 , 675 (R.I. 1992) (quoting Taft v. Pare , 536 A.2d 888 , 892 (R.I. 1988)). | 3 | 2007–2019 |
Kali v. Bowen
green
1 sentence2019See, e.g. , id. at 1331-32 ; Kali v. Bowen , 854 F.2d 329 , 332 (9th Cir. 1988) ; Tarbox , 142 A.3d at 198 ; Krikorian v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services , 606 A.2d 671 , 676 (R.I. 1992). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Henry Tarbox v. Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Jamestown
green
1 sentence2019See, e.g. , id. at 1331-32 ; Kali v. Bowen , 854 F.2d 329 , 332 (9th Cir. 1988) ; Tarbox , 142 A.3d at 198 ; Krikorian v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services , 606 A.2d 671 , 676 (R.I. 1992). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
California v. Green
red
2 sentences2004The justification for the rule is that “the usual dangers of hearsay are largely nonexistent where the witness testifies at trial” because the declarant’s availability for cross-examination allows the adverse party to probe the veracity of the statement, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154-55 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970),,and “puts the trier-of-fact in as good a position to appraise the reliability of the prior statement as it would be if the prior statement were made under oath.” Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 801 at 1052. 2004The justification for the rule is that “the usual dangers of hearsay are largely nonexistent where the witness testifies at trial” because the declarant’s availability for cross-examination allows the adverse party to probe the veracity of the statement, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154-55 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970),,and “puts the trier-of-fact in as good a position to appraise the reliability of the prior statement as it would be if the prior statement were made under oath.” Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 801 at 1052. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.