justification defense in Florida

2016The necessity defense, oftentimes referred to as the justification defense, recognizes “that there may be circumstances under which a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm would be justified and his conduct declared not criminal.” Marrero v. State, 516 So.2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 3d DGA 1987) (footnotes omitted).

1995It appears from the record that the jury must have found that either (a) the defendant did not physically possess the firearm during the struggle with the decedent, or (b) if he did possess the firearm, such possession was within the justification defense of Marrero v. State, 516 So.2d 1052, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

2010However, that rule has not been extended to intentional tort cases "where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages." Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950); see also Rowell, 850 So.2d at 478 n. 1 (noting that intentional torts "have been deemed exclusions from . . . the impact rule"); Rivers v. Grimsley Oil Co., 842 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)

2010However, that rule has not been extended to intentional tort cases “where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages.” Kirksey v. Jemi-gan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950); see also Rowell, 850 So.2d at 478 n. 1 (noting that intentional torts “have been deemed exclusions from ... the impact rule”); Rivers v. Grimsley Oil Co., 842 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (

2010However, that rule has not been extended to intentional tort cases "where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages." Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950); see also Rowell, 850 So.2d at 478 n. 1 (noting that intentional torts "have been deemed exclusions from . . . the impact rule"); Rivers v. Grimsley Oil Co., 842 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)

2010However, that rule has not been extended to intentional tort cases “where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages.” Kirksey v. Jemi-gan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950); see also Rowell, 850 So.2d at 478 n. 1 (noting that intentional torts “have been deemed exclusions from ... the impact rule”); Rivers v. Grimsley Oil Co., 842 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (

2010However, that rule has not been extended to intentional tort cases "where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages." Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950); see also Rowell, 850 So.2d at 478 n. 1 (noting that intentional torts "have been deemed exclusions from . . . the impact rule"); Rivers v. Grimsley Oil Co., 842 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)

2010However, that rule has not been extended to intentional tort cases “where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages.” Kirksey v. Jemi-gan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950); see also Rowell, 850 So.2d at 478 n. 1 (noting that intentional torts “have been deemed exclusions from ... the impact rule”); Rivers v. Grimsley Oil Co., 842 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (

2024Fund, 427 So. 2d 153, 158 (Fla. 1982)).

2022The justification for this standard is hardly mysterious; “[t]he personal knowledge requirement . . . is meant to prevent the trial court from relying on hearsay when deciding a motion for summary judgment.” Johns v. Dannels, 186 So. 3d 620, 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).

2019Evaluations of a hearsay exception under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment often use language similar to the language providing the justification for the exception. “[H]earsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values and ‘stem from the same roots.’” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

2016A substantive. justification for the defense can be found in the second quotation recounted in the Marianna opinion, which came from the case of Wadley, Jones & Co. v. Jones, 55 Ga. 329, 330 (1875).

2012See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 , 105 S.Ct. 2794 , 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985).

2012See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 , 105 S.Ct. 2794 , 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985).

2012See Marrero v. State, 516 So.2d 1052 , 1054 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (stating “the defendant may very well be excused from his assault upon his assailant by reason of duress or self-defense without being excused from his possession of the firearm”); see also Dorsey, 74 So.3d at 527 (explaining that when “a defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity or was in a place where he did not have a right to be at the time he was attacked, the common law duty to retreat still applies”).

2011See Keyes v. State, 804 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("As a general rule, a defendant's contention that his injury of another was an accident bars an instruction on self[-]defense or defense of another.”); Roberts v. State, 753 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (affirming denial of instruction where defendant failed to present any evidence to support self-defense); Moyer v. State, 558 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (affirming denial of justification jury instruction because it was inconsistent with alibi defense).

2011See Keyes v. State, 804 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("As a general rule, a defendant's contention that his injury of another was an accident bars an instruction on self[-]defense or defense of another.”); Roberts v. State, 753 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (affirming denial of instruction where defendant failed to present any evidence to support self-defense); Moyer v. State, 558 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (affirming denial of justification jury instruction because it was inconsistent with alibi defense).

2009Dade County v. Rolle, 661 So.2d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (quoting Allstate Ins.

2009Dade County v. Rolle, 661 So.2d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (quoting Allstate Ins.

2005See Giles, 831 So.2d at 1263 (quoting Barton Protective Servs., Inc. v. Faber, 745 So.2d 968, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)); see also Davis v. State, 804 So.2d 400, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (fundamental error to give misleading instruction negating sole defensive theory).

2005See Giles, 831 So.2d at 1263 (quoting Barton Protective Servs., Inc. v. Faber, 745 So.2d 968, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)); see also Davis v. State, 804 So.2d 400, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (fundamental error to give misleading instruction negating sole defensive theory).

2005See Giles, 831 So.2d at 1263 (quoting Barton Protective Servs., Inc. v. Faber, 745 So.2d 968, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)); see also Davis v. State, 804 So.2d 400, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (fundamental error to give misleading instruction negating sole defensive theory).

2001See State v. County of Manatee, 93 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla.1957).

1997Ctr. v. Schiegner, 654 So.2d 131 (Fla.1995). [7] In Sova Drugs, Inc. v. Barnes, 661 So.2d 393, 394 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), the fifth district explained the reason for exercising certiorari jurisdiction in this limited instance: The justification for this exception is to promote the purpose of the statutory procedures under the Act, which are designed to encourage settlement of cases.

1987We agree with Marrero, and reverse. [1] Although Section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1985), makes it unlawful for "any person who has been convicted of a felony ... to have in his care, custody, possession, or control any firearm," the law has long recognized that there may be circumstances under which a convicted felon's possession of a firearm would be justified and his conduct declared not criminal. [2] , [3] While *1055 Florida courts have not offered an explicit definition of this justification defense, a recent and workable definition is found in State v. Crawford, 308 Md. 683, 699 , 521 A

1987We agree with Marrero, and reverse. [1] Although Section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1985), makes it unlawful for "any person who has been convicted of a felony ... to have in his care, custody, possession, or control any firearm," the law has long recognized that there may be circumstances under which a convicted felon's possession of a firearm would be justified and his conduct declared not criminal. [2] , [3] While *1055 Florida courts have not offered an explicit definition of this justification defense, a recent and workable definition is found in State v. Crawford, 308 Md. 683, 699 , 521 A