35 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aultgreen2 sentences2019See Ault , 150 Ariz. at 466 , 724 P.2d at 552 (declining "to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant's home ... regardless of the position the United States Supreme Court would take on this issue"); Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 263 -65 , 689 P.2d at 522-24 (declining to follow United States Supreme Court case involving warrantless entry of home to "secure" it until search warrant obtained). ¶15 While Arizona's appellate courts have never extended article II, § 8 beyond the Fourth Amendment outside the context of the home, see Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23 , n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 , our supreme court 2019See Ault , 150 Ariz. at 466 , 724 P.2d at 552 (declining "to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant's home ... regardless of the position the United States Supreme Court would take on this issue"); Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 263 -65 , 689 P.2d at 522-24 (declining to follow United States Supreme Court case involving warrantless entry of home to "secure" it until search warrant obtained). ¶15 While Arizona's appellate courts have never extended article II, § 8 beyond the Fourth Amendment outside the context of the home, see Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23 , n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 , our supreme court | 7 | 14 |
State v. Lambgreen2 sentences2024In State v. Lamb, 116 Ariz. 134, 138 (1977), this Court agreed with other courts that “evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search need not be suppressed where, in the normal course of the police investigation and absent the illicit conduct, the evidence would have been discovered anyway.” Although the events demonstrating inevitable discovery there had occurred at the time of the illegal search, nothing in Lamb precluded application of the inevitable discovery exception if new events had occurred after the illegal search. 2024See id. ¶46 The cases Mitcham cites from other jurisdictions admittedly use language suggesting that the inevitable discovery exception applies only when investigative facts existing before an illegal search demonstrate inevitable discovery. | 6 | 7 |
Nix v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024To prove the inevitable discovery exception, the State cannot speculate but must instead “focus[] on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. 2016The State could not successfully argue that Hollins spontaneously admitted ownership after repeated questions if he owned the backpack. 6 STATE v. HOLLINS Decision of the Court 207 Ariz. at 204 , ¶ 35 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); State v. Lamb, 116 Ariz. 134, 138 (1977)). ¶16 Valid inventory searches fall within the inevitable discovery doctrine because they are routine administrative searches where police discretion is limited by standardized criteria on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity. | 5 | 8 |
State v. Castanedagreen2 sentences2015See Pope, 686 F.3d at 1084 . ¶20 Furthermore, the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence that the State can show by a preponderance of the evidence “would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984); see State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 387 (1986) (recognizing the inevitable discovery doctrine in Arizona). 1986We recognize the inevitable discovery doctrine in Arizona, State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382 , 724 P.2d 1 (1986); State v. Hein, 138 Ariz. 360 , 674 P.2d 1358 (1983); State v. Lamb, 116 Ariz. 134 , 568 P.2d 1032 (1977), but will allow its use only in appropriate circumstances. | 5 | 5 |
State v. Boltgreen2 sentences2019See Ault , 150 Ariz. at 466 , 724 P.2d at 552 (declining "to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant's home ... regardless of the position the United States Supreme Court would take on this issue"); Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 263 -65 , 689 P.2d at 522-24 (declining to follow United States Supreme Court case involving warrantless entry of home to "secure" it until search warrant obtained). ¶15 While Arizona's appellate courts have never extended article II, § 8 beyond the Fourth Amendment outside the context of the home, see Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23 , n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 , our supreme court 2019See Ault , 150 Ariz. at 466 , 724 P.2d at 552 (declining "to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant's home ... regardless of the position the United States Supreme Court would take on this issue"); Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 263 -65 , 689 P.2d at 522-24 (declining to follow United States Supreme Court case involving warrantless entry of home to "secure" it until search warrant obtained). ¶15 While Arizona's appellate courts have never extended article II, § 8 beyond the Fourth Amendment outside the context of the home, see Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23 , n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 , our supreme court | 4 | 5 |
State v. Rojersgreen2 sentences2016Siewert testified at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that, even if alcohol was not a factor in this case, because the Corvette’s driver was not at the crime scene, Siewert would have collected a DNA sample from Clary in an effort to determine if that sample matched up to evidence on “the airbag or something of that manner.” See State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, 559, ¶ 18 , 169 P.3d 651, 655 (App. 2007) (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, which is an exception to the exclusionary rule, provides that illegally obtained evidence is admissible [i]f the prosecution can establish by a prepondera 2016Siewert testified at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that, even if alcohol was not a factor in this case, because the Corvette’s driver was not at the crime scene, Siewert would have collected a DNA sample from Clary in an effort to determine if that sample matched up to evidence on “the airbag or something of that manner.” See State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, 559, ¶ 18 , 169 P.3d 651, 655 (App. 2007) (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, which is an exception to the exclusionary rule, provides that illegally obtained evidence is admissible [i]f the prosecution can establish by a prepondera | 4 | 4 |
State of Arizona v. Homer Ray Roseberrygreen2 sentences2018See State v. Rosberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508, ¶ 7 (2015) (“We will affirm a trial court’s decision if it is legally correct for any reason.”). 2016Cf. State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507 , 508 ¶ 7, 353 P.3d 847, 848 (2015) (“We will affirm a trial court’s decision if it is legally correct for any reason.”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2024The inevitable discovery doctrine provides that “evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search need not be suppressed when, in the normal course of police investigation and conduct, and absent the illicit conduct, the evidence would have been discovered inevitably or ultimately.” State v. Acosta, 166 Ariz. 254, 258 (App. 1990). ¶14 Arizona law has recognized this exception where officers found evidence during an illegal pat-down where the defendant “would have been arrested on independent grounds and the evidence would inevitably have been discovered during a lawful search incident to th 2015Pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally obtained evidence is admissible if “ ‘the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the illegally seized items or information would have inevitably been seized by lawful means.’” State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, ¶ 18 , 169 P.3d 651, 655 (App.2007), quoting State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 481 , 917 P.2d 200, 210 (1996). ¶ 19 The detectives eventually obtained a warrant to search the cell phone. 5 But Ontiveros-Loya argues the application for the warrant was based on the photographs found during the initial search of | 2 | 3 |
Colorado v. Bertinegreen2 sentences2016The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into ‘a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.’” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 , 110 S.Ct. 1632 , 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring). ¶ 27 In State v. Calabrese, we concluded the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to an “accelerated” booking search of a defendant arrested for a misdemeanor. 157 Ariz. 189, 191 , 755 P.2d 1177, 1179 (App. 1988). 5 There, officer 2016The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into ‘a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.’” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 , 110 S.Ct. 1632 , 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring). ¶ 27 In State v. Calabrese, we concluded the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to an “accelerated” booking search of a defendant arrested for a misdemeanor. 157 Ariz. 189, 191 , 755 P.2d 1177, 1179 (App. 1988). 5 There, officer | 2 | 3 |
State v. Acostagreen2 sentences2024The inevitable discovery doctrine provides that “evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search need not be suppressed when, in the normal course of police investigation and conduct, and absent the illicit conduct, the evidence would have been discovered inevitably or ultimately.” State v. Acosta, 166 Ariz. 254, 258 (App. 1990). ¶14 Arizona law has recognized this exception where officers found evidence during an illegal pat-down where the defendant “would have been arrested on independent grounds and the evidence would inevitably have been discovered during a lawful search incident to th 2024See Acosta, 166 Ariz. at 258 (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine where “evidence would have been discovered inevitably or ultimately”). | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016See Davis, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. at 2429 (“An officer who conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent does no more than ‘ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act’ under the circumstances____The deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to discourage the officer from ‘do[ing] his duty.’”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 2016See Davis, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. at 2429 (“An officer who conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent does no more than ‘ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act’ under the circumstances____The deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to discourage the officer from ‘do[ing] his duty.’”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Rodolfo Echegoyengreen2 sentences2016Such a claim amounts to the unacceptable assertion that police would have done it right had they not done it wrong.”); see also United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 , 1280 n. 7 (9th Cir.1986) (rejecting application of the inevitable discovery exception because “to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment”). 2016Such a claim amounts to the unacceptable assertion that police would have done it right had they not done it wrong.”); see also United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 , 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting application of the inevitable discovery exception because “to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Davoltgreen2 sentences2024The inevitable discovery doctrine provides that “evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search need not be suppressed when, in the normal course of police investigation and conduct, and absent the illicit conduct, the evidence would have been discovered inevitably or ultimately.” State v. Acosta, 166 Ariz. 254, 258 (App. 1990). ¶14 Arizona law has recognized this exception where officers found evidence during an illegal pat-down where the defendant “would have been arrested on independent grounds and the evidence would inevitably have been discovered during a lawful search incident to th 2024Notably, “Arizona has adopted the broad view of the inevitable discovery rule,” and so “the State is not required to demonstrate that police initiated lawful means to acquire evidence prior to its seizure.” State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191 , 204 ¶ 37 (2004). | 1 | 4 |
Brown v. McClennen ex rel. County of Maricopagreen2 sentences2024This case, however, is more comparable to Brown v. McClennen, the Arizona Supreme Court’s most recent case applying the inevitable discovery doctrine, where the State illegally obtained a sample of the 5 STATE v. PALMARES Decision of the Court defendant’s blood. 239 Ariz. 521 (2016). 2024Brown affirmed the ruling that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply, because it was not inevitable that law enforcement would have obtained the sample “by lawful, independent means.” Id. at 525 ¶ 15. | 1 | 2 |
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 542 . ¶41 We are not persuaded by Mitcham’s arguments against application of the inevitable discovery exception. 1997Id. at 539 , 108 S.Ct. at 2534 . | 1 | 2 |
In re Sabino R.green1 sentence2025The superior court implicitly took judicial notice of the Department Orders when ruling that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied because Cash was going into custody and “her possessions would necessarily be inventoried at jail.” We may “take judicial notice of anything of which the trial court could take notice.” In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 4 (App. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arre Kennedygreen1 sentence2024The court “view[s] affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search” and then determines “what would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred.” United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854 , 861 (2d Cir. 1992)). ¶38 Here, the verifiable facts demonstrate inevitable discovery of Mitcham’s DNA profile. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bollgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Boll, 651 N.W.2d 710 , 716–17 ¶¶ 20–26 (S.D. 2002) (similarly distinguishing these exceptions). 2. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John William Drostengreen1 sentence2024See United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that application of the exception requires a court “to determine whether a reasonable probability of discovery existed prior to the unlawful conduct, based on the information possessed and investigations being pursued at such time” (quoting United States v. Drosten, 819 F.2d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 1987))); Eng, 971 F.2d at 861 (“[T]he alternate means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree, imminent, if yet unrealized.” (alteration in original) 17 STATE V. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Shu Yan Enggreen2 sentences2024The court “view[s] affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search” and then determines “what would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred.” United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854 , 861 (2d Cir. 1992)). ¶38 Here, the verifiable facts demonstrate inevitable discovery of Mitcham’s DNA profile. 2024See United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that application of the exception requires a court “to determine whether a reasonable probability of discovery existed prior to the unlawful conduct, based on the information possessed and investigations being pursued at such time” (quoting United States v. Drosten, 819 F.2d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 1987))); Eng, 971 F.2d at 861 (“[T]he alternate means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree, imminent, if yet unrealized.” (alteration in original) 17 STATE V. | 1 | 1 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ference LANG, Defendant-Appellantgreen1 sentence2024See United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that application of the exception requires a court “to determine whether a reasonable probability of discovery existed prior to the unlawful conduct, based on the information possessed and investigations being pursued at such time” (quoting United States v. Drosten, 819 F.2d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 1987))); Eng, 971 F.2d at 861 (“[T]he alternate means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree, imminent, if yet unrealized.” (alteration in original) 17 STATE V. | 1 | 1 |
Darryl J. Sutton v. Randy Pfistergreen1 sentence2024See id. at 822 . | 1 | 1 |
| Kent K. v. Bobby M.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Boltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wymangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Carvergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Paxtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hackmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Calabresegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Travis Popegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gonzalez-Gutierrezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jesus Ramirez-Sandovalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sanchezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Woolbrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Michelenagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jose Francisco Andradegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michigan v. Longgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aultgreen2 sentences2019See Ault , 150 Ariz. at 466 , 724 P.2d at 552 (declining "to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant's home ... regardless of the position the United States Supreme Court would take on this issue"); Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 263 -65 , 689 P.2d at 522-24 (declining to follow United States Supreme Court case involving warrantless entry of home to "secure" it until search warrant obtained). ¶15 While Arizona's appellate courts have never extended article II, § 8 beyond the Fourth Amendment outside the context of the home, see Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23 , n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 , our supreme court 2019See Ault , 150 Ariz. at 466 , 724 P.2d at 552 (declining "to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant's home ... regardless of the position the United States Supreme Court would take on this issue"); Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 263 -65 , 689 P.2d at 522-24 (declining to follow United States Supreme Court case involving warrantless entry of home to "secure" it until search warrant obtained). ¶15 While Arizona's appellate courts have never extended article II, § 8 beyond the Fourth Amendment outside the context of the home, see Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23 , n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 , our supreme court | 2 | 14 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Somer v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the "independent source" doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir.1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the "attenuated connection" limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). 1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the “independent source” doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the “attenuated connection” limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the “independent source” doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the “attenuated connection” limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). 1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the “independent source” doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the “attenuated connection” limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Nardone v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the “independent source” doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the “attenuated connection” limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). 1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the “independent source” doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the “attenuated connection” limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Charles W. Seohnlein
green
2 sentences1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the "independent source" doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir.1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the "attenuated connection" limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). 1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the “independent source” doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the “attenuated connection” limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Clinton v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the "independent source" doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir.1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the "attenuated connection" limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). 1978Among the limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are: (1) the “independent source” doctrine set forth in the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the inevitable discovery doctrine, see, Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1943); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 , 90 S.Ct. 2215 , 26 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); and (3) the “attenuated connection” limitation as expressed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Canez
green
2 sentences2024Accordingly, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply here. ¶16 Recognizing the superior court’s ruling will be upheld if it is correct for any reason, Canez, 202 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 51, and tacitly conceding issues with inevitable discovery, the State’s primary argument is that denial of the motion to suppress was proper because the officers acted reasonably under the emergency–aid exception. 2024Accordingly, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply here. ¶16 Recognizing the superior court’s ruling will be upheld if it is correct for any reason, Canez, 202 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 51, and tacitly conceding issues with inevitable discovery, the State’s primary argument is that denial of the motion to suppress was proper because the officers acted reasonably under the emergency–aid exception. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Sharp
green
1 sentence2024While warrantless entries into homes are presumptively disallowed, the emergency aid exception authorizes such warrantless entries when “(1) police have reasonable grounds to believe there is an emergency that requires their immediate assistance to protect life or property and (2) there is a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the place to be searched.” State v. Inzunza, 234 Ariz. 78 , 82 ¶ 12 (App. 2014). 6 STATE v. PALMARES Decision of the Court ¶17 The superior court here rejected the application of the emergency aid exception because officers “did not make entry until 5.5 hour | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State of Arizona v. Miguel Francisco Inzunza
green
1 sentence2024While warrantless entries into homes are presumptively disallowed, the emergency aid exception authorizes such warrantless entries when “(1) police have reasonable grounds to believe there is an emergency that requires their immediate assistance to protect life or property and (2) there is a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the place to be searched.” State v. Inzunza, 234 Ariz. 78 , 82 ¶ 12 (App. 2014). 6 STATE v. PALMARES Decision of the Court ¶17 The superior court here rejected the application of the emergency aid exception because officers “did not make entry until 5.5 hour | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Peltz green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State of Arizona v. Anthony Lito Hernandez green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Pool v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Florida v. Wells green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Illinois v. Lafayette green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Jones v. United States green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Jones v. United States red | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Rakas v. Illinois green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| United States v. Salvucci green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Hein green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Segura v. United States green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Reynolds green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.