inevitable discovery doctrine in Minnesota

2024To meet its burden under the inevitable-discovery exception, the state’s showing must “involve[] no speculative elements but focus[] on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 444 n.5 (1984).

2024See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5 (stating that application of the inevitable-discovery exception cannot be based on “speculative elements”); State v. Dotson, 900 N.W.2d 445, 453 (Minn. App. 2017) (declining to apply the inevitable-discovery doctrine based on “mere speculation” that law enforcement would have lawfully obtained the evidence).

2023State v. Barajas, 817 N.W.2d 204, 219 (Minn. App. 2012); see also State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989) (holding that Minnesota courts consider, among other factors, intervening circumstances and whether evidence would have been obtained in the absence of illegality in determining whether evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree”); Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 105 (“We recognize an exception to this general rule, however, when the police would have obtained 9 the evidence if no misconduct had taken place.”) (quotation omitted).

2015The supreme court reversed based on the inevitable-discovery doctrine: Because application of the inevitable [] discovery [exception] precludes the suppression of the DNA profile evidence in this case, we do not believe there is any problem with the admissibility of the confession. .... 2 See Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254-55 (remanding to determine if physical evidence would have been inevitably discovered on defendant); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011) (considering but rejecting the use of the exception for a cigarette package); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 105 (Minn.

2024As noted above, the inevitable-discovery exception applies to evidence that “inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254 (emphasis added).

2024Inevitable-Discovery Exception Under the inevitable-discovery exception, “[i]f the state can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search violated the warrant requirement.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).

2024On this record, the state has not met its burden to show that Steeprock’s DNA “inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254 -55 12 Because the record here does not support an appellate determination of probable cause, we reject the state’s reliance on In re Welfare of J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. 1998) (determining that the record “was sufficient to establish probable cause to search” under the inevitable-discovery exception). 22 (declining to apply the inevitable-discovery exception and remanding for factual findings because the district court did no

2016Cf. State v. Hatton, 389 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that illegally-obtained evidence is not admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine simply because the officers could have obtained a warrant prior to the search), review denied (Minn. Aug. 13, 1986).

2024On this record, the state has not met its burden to show that Steeprock’s DNA “inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254 -55 12 Because the record here does not support an appellate determination of probable cause, we reject the state’s reliance on In re Welfare of J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. 1998) (determining that the record “was sufficient to establish probable cause to search” under the inevitable-discovery exception). 22 (declining to apply the inevitable-discovery exception and remanding for factual findings because the district court did no

2016The inevitable discovery doctrine allows the admission of seized evidence “[i]f the state can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

2024On this record, the state has not met its burden to show that Steeprock’s DNA “inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254 -55 12 Because the record here does not support an appellate determination of probable cause, we reject the state’s reliance on In re Welfare of J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. 1998) (determining that the record “was sufficient to establish probable cause to search” under the inevitable-discovery exception). 22 (declining to apply the inevitable-discovery exception and remanding for factual findings because the district court did no

2003See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); see also In re J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn.1998) (following Nix and holding that “[t]he rationale of the inevitable discovery exception * * * is that exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered would [improperly] put the prosecution in a worse position.”).

2023State v. Barajas, 817 N.W.2d 204, 219 (Minn. App. 2012); see also State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989) (holding that Minnesota courts consider, among other factors, intervening circumstances and whether evidence would have been obtained in the absence of illegality in determining whether evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree”); Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 105 (“We recognize an exception to this general rule, however, when the police would have obtained 9 the evidence if no misconduct had taken place.”) (quotation omitted).

2015The supreme court reversed based on the inevitable-discovery doctrine: Because application of the inevitable [] discovery [exception] precludes the suppression of the DNA profile evidence in this case, we do not believe there is any problem with the admissibility of the confession. .... 2 See Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254-55 (remanding to determine if physical evidence would have been inevitably discovered on defendant); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011) (considering but rejecting the use of the exception for a cigarette package); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 105 (Minn.

2015See State v. Lembke, 509 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding that drugs found in a search were admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine because the defendant would have inevitably been arrested and searched). 6 Galvan also argues that the district court erred by concluding that the drugs in the car also would have inevitably been discovered.

2015The supreme court reversed based on the inevitable-discovery doctrine: Because application of the inevitable [] discovery [exception] precludes the suppression of the DNA profile evidence in this case, we do not believe there is any problem with the admissibility of the confession. .... 2 See Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254-55 (remanding to determine if physical evidence would have been inevitably discovered on defendant); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011) (considering but rejecting the use of the exception for a cigarette package); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 105 (Minn.

2024See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5 (stating that application of the inevitable-discovery exception cannot be based on “speculative elements”); State v. Dotson, 900 N.W.2d 445, 453 (Minn. App. 2017) (declining to apply the inevitable-discovery doctrine based on “mere speculation” that law enforcement would have lawfully obtained the evidence).

2024See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5 (stating that application of the inevitable-discovery exception cannot be based on “speculative elements”); State v. Dotson, 900 N.W.2d 445, 453 (Minn. App. 2017) (declining to apply the inevitable-discovery doctrine based on “mere speculation” that law enforcement would have lawfully obtained the evidence).

2024Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). 9

2024See State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Minn. 2000) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)) (explaining the inevitable-discovery doctrine and noting that “[o]nce a vehicle is in police custody, warrantless inventory searches are constitutional”).

2023State v. Barajas, 817 N.W.2d 204, 219 (Minn. App. 2012); see also State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989) (holding that Minnesota courts consider, among other factors, intervening circumstances and whether evidence would have been obtained in the absence of illegality in determining whether evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree”); Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 105 (“We recognize an exception to this general rule, however, when the police would have obtained 9 the evidence if no misconduct had taken place.”) (quotation omitted).

2023State v. Barajas, 817 N.W.2d 204, 219 (Minn. App. 2012); see also State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989) (holding that Minnesota courts consider, among other factors, intervening circumstances and whether evidence would have been obtained in the absence of illegality in determining whether evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree”); Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 105 (“We recognize an exception to this general rule, however, when the police would have obtained 9 the evidence if no misconduct had taken place.”) (quotation omitted).

2017“In a criminal case, the remedy for an illegal search or seizure is generally limited to the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 36 (Minn. 2016).

2015The supreme court reversed based on the inevitable-discovery doctrine: Because application of the inevitable [] discovery [exception] precludes the suppression of the DNA profile evidence in this case, we do not believe there is any problem with the admissibility of the confession. .... 2 See Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254-55 (remanding to determine if physical evidence would have been inevitably discovered on defendant); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011) (considering but rejecting the use of the exception for a cigarette package); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 105 (Minn.

2015See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , 288, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (stating that issues that were never “raised or called to the attention of the court” do not represent binding law); In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. App. 2007) (“[A]ssumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point that is assumed.”).

2015See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (stating that issues that were never “raised or called to the attention of the court” do not represent binding law); In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn.App.2007) (“[A]ssumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point that is assumed.”).

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the inevitable- 15 discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (D.

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.Sd 192, 196 (3d Cir.1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1176 (D.Kan.2004) (citing the rule from Polanco); Erickson v. State, 181 P.3d 1117, 1120 (Alaska Ct.App.2008) (refusing to apply inevitable-discovery doctrine to statement based on facts); State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai’i

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.Sd 192, 196 (3d Cir.1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1176 (D.Kan.2004) (citing the rule from Polanco); Erickson v. State, 181 P.3d 1117, 1120 (Alaska Ct.App.2008) (refusing to apply inevitable-discovery doctrine to statement based on facts); State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai’i

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.Sd 192, 196 (3d Cir.1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1176 (D.Kan.2004) (citing the rule from Polanco); Erickson v. State, 181 P.3d 1117, 1120 (Alaska Ct.App.2008) (refusing to apply inevitable-discovery doctrine to statement based on facts); State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai’i

2015See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , 288, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (stating that issues that were never “raised or called to the attention of the court” do not represent binding law); In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. App. 2007) (“[A]ssumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point that is assumed.”).

2015See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (stating that issues that were never “raised or called to the attention of the court” do not represent binding law); In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn.App.2007) (“[A]ssumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point that is assumed.”).

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the inevitable- 15 discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (D.

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the inevitable- 15 discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (D.

2015See, e.g., United States v. Mohammed, 512 F. App’x 583 , 589–90 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the inevitable-discovery doctrine renders the defendant’s statements admissible because he “would have been asked the same questions under substantially similar circumstances” and would have made “materially similar” statements under either the hypothetical lawful or actual unlawful police course).

2015See, e.g., United States v. Mohammed, 512 Fed.Appx. 583, 589-90 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that the inevitable-discovery doctrine renders the defendant’s statements admissible because he “would have been asked the same questions under substantially similar circumstances” and would have made “materially similar” statements under either the hypothetical lawful or actual unlawful police course).

2015When the facts are not in dispute and the district court’s decision is a question of law, we “independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 8 2004) (“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.”).

2015When the facts are not in dispute and the district court’s decision is a question of law, we “independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn.2003) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn.2004) (“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.”).

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.Sd 192, 196 (3d Cir.1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1176 (D.Kan.2004) (citing the rule from Polanco); Erickson v. State, 181 P.3d 1117, 1120 (Alaska Ct.App.2008) (refusing to apply inevitable-discovery doctrine to statement based on facts); State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai’i

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.Sd 192, 196 (3d Cir.1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1176 (D.Kan.2004) (citing the rule from Polanco); Erickson v. State, 181 P.3d 1117, 1120 (Alaska Ct.App.2008) (refusing to apply inevitable-discovery doctrine to statement based on facts); State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai’i

2015When the facts are not in dispute and the district court’s decision is a question of law, we “independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 8 2004) (“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.”).

2015When the facts are not in dispute and the district court’s decision is a question of law, we “independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn.2003) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn.2004) (“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.”).

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the inevitable- 15 discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (D.

2015See United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.Sd 192, 196 (3d Cir.1998) (declining to use the inevitable-discovery doctrine for a statement but not adopting a general rule); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not apply to an unconstitutional inculpatory statement); United States v. White, 339 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1176 (D.Kan.2004) (citing the rule from Polanco); Erickson v. State, 181 P.3d 1117, 1120 (Alaska Ct.App.2008) (refusing to apply inevitable-discovery doctrine to statement based on facts); State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai’i

2015See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , 288, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (stating that issues that were never “raised or called to the attention of the court” do not represent binding law); In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. App. 2007) (“[A]ssumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point that is assumed.”).

2015See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (stating that issues that were never “raised or called to the attention of the court” do not represent binding law); In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn.App.2007) (“[A]ssumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point that is assumed.”).

2012Because the state has not demonstrated the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement, the district court erred by denying Barajas’s motion to suppress the challenged photographs. 9 ■ “A constitutional error does not mandate reversal and a new trial if ... the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Minn.2006); State v. Morrison, 351 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn.1984) (concluding that district court’s error in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2012Because the state has not demonstrated the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement, the district court erred by denying Barajas’s motion to suppress the challenged photographs. 9 ■ “A constitutional error does not mandate reversal and a new trial if ... the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Minn.2006); State v. Morrison, 351 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn.1984) (concluding that district court’s error in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).