inevitable discovery doctrine in Michigan

2019The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the constitution so long as “the prosecution establishe[s] by a preponderance of the -4- evidence that the information . . . inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” People v Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 435 ; 622 NW2d 528 (2000).

2019The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the constitution so long as “the prosecution establishe[s] by a preponderance of the -4- evidence that the information . . . inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” People v Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 435 ; 622 NW2d 528 (2000).

1999Three exceptions to the exclusionary rule have emerged: the independent source exception, the attenuation exception, and the inevitable discovery exception. [People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 508-509 ; 556 NW2d 498 (1996) (citations omitted).] In Nix v Williams, 467 US 431 ; 104 S Ct 2501 ; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984), the United States Supreme Court considered whether there is an exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence that inevitably would have been discovered regardless of the constitutional violation.

1999Three exceptions to the exclusionary rule have emerged: the independent source exception, the attenuation exception, and the inevitable discovery exception. [People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 508-509 ; 556 NW2d 498 (1996) (citations omitted).] In Nix v Williams, 467 US 431 ; 104 S Ct 2501 ; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984), the United States Supreme Court considered whether there is an exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence that inevitably would have been discovered regardless of the constitutional violation.

2017Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 295-296 ; 111 S Ct 1246 ; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991) III We need not decide whether Stiles’s statement should have been suppressed, as the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix v Williams, 467 US 431, 444 ; 104 S Ct 2501 ; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984).

2017Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 295-296 ; 111 S Ct 1246 ; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991) III We need not decide whether Stiles’s statement should have been suppressed, as the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix v Williams, 467 US 431, 444 ; 104 S Ct 2501 ; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984).

2017A preserved, nonstructural error is harmless, and reversal is not required, if “the beneficiary of the error . . . prove[s], and the court . . . determine[s], beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” People v Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 405-406 ; 521 NW2d 538 (1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017A preserved, nonstructural error is harmless, and reversal is not required, if “the beneficiary of the error . . . prove[s], and the court . . . determine[s], beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” People v Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 405-406 ; 521 NW2d 538 (1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017The prolonged seizure of Kocevar’s vehicle clearly contravened a long line of United States Supreme Court cases, beginning with Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 500 ; 103 S Ct 1319 ; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983) (“This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”), followed by Illinois v Caballes, 543 US 405, 407 ; 125 S Ct 834 ; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005) (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reas

2017The prolonged seizure of Kocevar’s vehicle clearly contravened a long line of United States Supreme Court cases, beginning with Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 500 ; 103 S Ct 1319 ; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983) (“This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”), followed by Illinois v Caballes, 543 US 405, 407 ; 125 S Ct 834 ; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005) (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reas

2007We directed the parties to address the following issues: (1) whether the exclusionary rule applies to fruits of a confession extracted not by police misconduct, but by the abandonment of retained counsel during the interrogation, a critical stage of proceedings, in violation of United States v Cronic, 466 US 648 (1984); and, if so, (2) whether the inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v Williams, 467 US 431 (1984), applies in such circumstances; and, if so, (3) whether the exclusionary rule should be applied narrowly as suggested in United States v Ceccolini, 435 US 268 (1978), when the informa

2007We directed the parties to address the following issues: (1) whether the exclusionary rule applies to fruits of a confession extracted not by police misconduct, but by the abandonment of retained counsel during the interrogation, a critical stage of proceedings, in violation of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); and, if so, (2) whether the inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), applies in such circumstances; and, if so, (3) whether the exclusionary rule should be applied narrowly as s

1989The admissibility of blood test evidence under the inevitable discovery rule has been addressed in yet another recent decision by a panel of this Court, People v Kroll, 179 Mich App 423 ; 446 NW2d 317 (1989). 3 In Kroll , as in this case, the blood test evidence was first seized without a warrant.

1989The admissibility of blood test evidence under the inevitable discovery rule has been addressed in yet another recent decision by a panel of this Court, People v Kroll, 179 Mich App 423 ; 446 NW2d 317 (1989). 3 In Kroll , as in this case, the blood test evidence was first seized without a warrant.

1986Thus, while the independent source exception would not justify admission of evidence in this case, its rationale is wholly consistent with and justifies our adoption of the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the Exclusionary Rule. [ Nix, supra, 104 S Ct 2509 .] This principle was acknowledged by us in People v Harajli, 148 Mich App 189 ; 384 NW2d 126 (1986).

1986Thus, while the independent source exception would not justify admission of evidence in this case, its rationale is wholly consistent with and justifies our adoption of the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the Exclusionary Rule. [ Nix, supra, 104 S Ct 2509 .] This principle was acknowledged by us in People v Harajli, 148 Mich App 189 ; 384 NW2d 126 (1986).

2026You can go ahead.” See Jimeno, 500 US at 250-251 .

2026You can go ahead.” See Jimeno, 500 US at 250-251 .

2026Likewise, “[t]he individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). -4- “The inevitable discovery doctrine . . . permits the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the items found would have ultimately been obtained in a constitutionally accepted manner.” Hyde, 285 Mich App at 439-440 .

2025Regarding exigent circumstances, this Court has explained: The exigent-circumstance exception is applicable where the police have probable cause to believe that an immediate search will produce specific evidence of a crime and that an immediate search without a warrant is necessary in order to -7- (1) protect the officers or others, (2) prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, or (3) prevent the escape of an accused. [Id. at 587.] The trial court considered the second category, in which a warrantless search and seizure is required to “prevent the loss or destruction of evidence.” Id.

2023Rawlings v Kentucky, 448 US 98, 110-111 ; 100 S Ct 2556 ; 65 L Ed 2d 633 (1980).

2023Rawlings v Kentucky, 448 US 98, 110-111 ; 100 S Ct 2556 ; 65 L Ed 2d 633 (1980).

2019The inevitable discovery doctrine “allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source.” Utah v Strieff, ___US___, ___; 136 S Ct 2056, 2061 ; 195 L Ed 2d 400 (2016).

2019Under the related doctrine of attenuation, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected -6- by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” Id. at ___; 136 S Ct at 206 (citation omitted).

2015People v King, 297 Mich App 465, 475 ; 824 NW2d 258 (2012) (affirming a correct result that a trial court reached for a wrong reason).

2015People v King, 297 Mich App 465, 475 ; 824 NW2d 258 (2012) (affirming a correct result that a trial court reached for a wrong reason).

2007But the federal district court order will always bind this particular case because the prosecution failed to appeal the ruling. [2] The majority characterizes its discussion of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Cronic as an explanation of its reasoning.

2007But the federal district court order will always bind this particular case because the prosecution failed to appeal the ruling. [2] The majority characterizes its discussion of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Cronic as an explanation of its reasoning.

2007We directed the parties to address the following issues: (1) whether the exclusionary rule applies to fruits of a confession extracted not by police misconduct, but by the abandonment of retained counsel during the interrogation, a critical stage of proceedings, in violation of United States v Cronic, 466 US 648 (1984); and, if so, (2) whether the inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v Williams, 467 US 431 (1984), applies in such circumstances; and, if so, (3) whether the exclusionary rule should be applied narrowly as suggested in United States v Ceccolini, 435 US 268 (1978), when the informa

2007We directed the parties to address the following issues: (1) whether the exclusionary rule applies to fruits of a confession extracted not by police misconduct, but by the abandonment of retained counsel during the interrogation, a critical stage of proceedings, in violation of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); and, if so, (2) whether the inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), applies in such circumstances; and, if so, (3) whether the exclusionary rule should be applied narrowly as s

2006Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 .

2006Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 .

2004MCR 2.613(C); Farrow, supra. Having found no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the marijuana plants were illegally seized, we need not address the prosecution’s argument that the evidence found inside the residence is admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.

2004People v. Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich. 626, 636 , 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999), quoting People v. LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich. 496, 508-509 , 556 N.W.2d 498 (1996). [4] People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559 , 171 N.W. 557 (1919). [5] In Lo-Ji Sales, the local justice wholly abdicated his duty as a "detached and neutral magistrate" when he assisted in the search himself, and abandoned his judicial role when he authorized a search warrant that, except for specification of copies of two "adult" films previously purchased by an investigator, did not particularly describe the items to be seized, b

2004People v. Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich. 626, 636 , 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999), quoting People v. LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich. 496, 508-509 , 556 N.W.2d 498 (1996). [4] People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559 , 171 N.W. 557 (1919). [5] In Lo-Ji Sales, the local justice wholly abdicated his duty as a "detached and neutral magistrate" when he assisted in the search himself, and abandoned his judicial role when he authorized a search warrant that, except for specification of copies of two "adult" films previously purchased by an investigator, did not particularly describe the items to be seized, b