inevitable discovery doctrine in Texas

2025However, “the language of Article 38.23 plainly does not accommodate a doctrine of inevitable discovery.” State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Crim.

2025“The inevitable discovery doctrine assumes a causal relationship between the illegality and the evidence.” Id.

2020This was not, however, an application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, where the search is illegal but the fruits are admissible because they would have inevitably been discovered.12 Instead, the search at issue was held to be legal because “once it becomes unequivocally clear that the item is to accompany the detainee, the right of inspection accrues 8 Id. (citing Bullwinkle, see supra at n.4). 9 See supra at nn. 4, 8. 10 Bullwinkle, 105 Cal. App. 3d at 87 , 164 Cal. Rptr. at 166 . 11 Id. 12 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (“It is clear that the cases implementing the exclu

1996Weeks v. United States, *484 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Article 38.23, supra. Nevertheless, the State cites Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and urges this Court to adopt the inevitable discovery doctrine.

2013In Garcia , a plurality of this Court observed that the inevitable discovery doctrine is “a species of harmless error rule which holds that constitutional violations in the seizure of evidence are inconsequential for purposes of admissibility ... when the outcome of police investigation was probably unaffected by it.” 829 S.W.2d at 798 .

2013In Garcia, a plurality of this Court observed that the inevitable discovery doctrine is “a species of harmless error rule which holds that Wehrenberg - 22 constitutional violations in the seizure of evidence are inconsequential for purposes of admissibility . . . when the outcome of police investigation was probably unaffected by it.” 829 S.W.2d at 798 .

1992In Vanderbilt \supra ], this Court noted that the “[t]hree commonly advanced exceptions to the exclusionary rule include the ‘independent source,’ ‘inevitable discovery,’ and ‘attenuation’ doctrines.” With respect to the doctrine of inevitable discovery, the United States Supreme Court adopted and explained the inevitable discovery concept in Nix [supra ]: “If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be r

1992In Vanderbilt [supra], this Court noted that the "[t]hree commonly advanced exceptions to the exclusionary rule include the `independent source,' `inevitable discovery,' and `attenuation' doctrines." With respect to the doctrine of inevitable discovery, the United States Supreme Court adopted and explained the inevitable discovery concept in Nix [supra]: "If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be rec

2012See 871 S.W.2d 744, 749-51 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (“If the evidence is not ‘obtained’ in violation of the law, then its admission into evidence is not in contravention of Art. 38.23.”).

2012See 871 S.W.2d 744 , 749–51 (Tex. Crim.

2003"The inevitable discovery doctrine renders the exclusionary rule inapplicable to otherwise suppressible evidence if said evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means." Henderson v. State , 82 S.W.3d 750 , 753 n.3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing United States v. Grosenheider , 200 F.3d 321 , 328 n.8 (5th Cir. 2000)).

2003“The inevitable discovery doctrine renders the exclusionary rule inapplicable to otherwise suppressible evidence if said evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means.” Henderson v. State, 82 S.W.3d 750 , 753 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. refd) (citing United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321 , 328 n. 8 (5th Cir.2000)).

2005State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); see also Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862 , 870 n. 12 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (same). .

2003State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 271-73 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); see also Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862 , 871 n. 12 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (noting that the Texas exclusionary rule does not contain the inevitable discovery exception).

2012In State v. Powell, police learned that appellee was making forged checks in his home, and they obtained a warrant to search his home and to seize, among other things, “checks and materials to make forged checks.” 306 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tex.Crim.App.2010).

2012In State v. Powell, police learned that appellee was making forged checks in his home, and they obtained a warrant to search his home and to seize, among other things, “checks and materials to make forged checks.” 306 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tex. Crim.

2012The Supreme Court has even stated as much: “The inevitable discovery doctrine ... is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2534 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (emphasis omitted).

2012The Supreme Court has even stated as much: “The inevitable discovery doctrine ... is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2534 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (emphasis omitted).

1996See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 787, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 , 107 S.Ct. 910 , 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987); Dickey v. State, 716 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, *279 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 268 , 83 L.Ed.2d 204 (1984); Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 722-23 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1760 , 72 L.Ed.2d 169 (1982); Pitts v. State, 614 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Cr.App.1981); McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1973);

1996See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 787, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 , 107 S.Ct. 910 , 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987); Dickey v. State, 716 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. de nied, 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 268 , 88 L.Ed.2d 204 (1984); Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 722-28 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1760 , 72 L.Ed.2d 169 (1982); Pitts v. State, 614 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Johns

1996See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 787, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 , 107 S.Ct. 910 , 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987); Dickey v. State, 716 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. de nied, 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 268 , 88 L.Ed.2d 204 (1984); Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 722-28 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1760 , 72 L.Ed.2d 169 (1982); Pitts v. State, 614 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Johns

1985See Santiago v. State, 444 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Crim.App.1969); Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973); Wyatt v. State, 566 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) and Miller v. State of Texas, 667 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).

2013See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 (describing inevitable discovery doctrine as applying when the evidence at issue was not later obtained independently, but it “ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means”); see also United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir.2010) (“To establish inevitable discovery, the government must show that the evidence would have been acquired lawfully through an independent source absent the government misconduct.”).

2013See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (describing inevitable discovery doctrine as applying when the evidence at issue was not later obtained independently, but it “ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means”); see also United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 2010) (“To establish inevitable discovery, the government must show that the evidence would have been acquired lawfully through an independent source absent the government misconduct.”).

2013See Wehrenberg, 385 S.W.3d at 727 (noting that “several federal courts . . . do not draw a relevant distinction” between those doctrines, and describing inevitable discovery as an “extrapolation” from independent source).

2013See Wehrenberg , 385 S.W.3d at 727 (noting that "several federal courts . . . do not draw a relevant distinction" between those doctrines, and describing inevitable discovery as an "extrapolation" from independent source).

2009Id. ; see also Dowthitt , 931 S.W.2d at 258-59 (applying plain meaning statutory construction analysis to Article 38.22, Section 3) (citing Boykin v. State , 818 S.W.2d 782 , 785-86 & 787 n.4 (Tex. Crim.

2009Id.; see also Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 258-59 (applying plain meaning statutory construction analysis to Article 38.22, Section 3) (citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 , 785-86 & 787 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)). .

2009Id. ; see also Dowthitt , 931 S.W.2d at 258-59 (applying plain meaning statutory construction analysis to Article 38.22, Section 3) (citing Boykin v. State , 818 S.W.2d 782 , 785-86 & 787 n.4 (Tex. Crim.

2009Id.; see also Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 258-59 (applying plain meaning statutory construction analysis to Article 38.22, Section 3) (citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 , 785-86 & 787 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)). .

2003See Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Romero v. State , 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim.

2003Price v. State, 93 S.W.3d 358, 370 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh'g).

2003Price v. State, 93 S.W.3d 358, 370 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh’g).

2002See United States v. Shugart , 889 F. Supp. 963, 978 (E.D.Tex. 1995), aff = d , 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 1997); Stevens , 597 N.W.2d at 69 B 70 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) ( A Under a rationale such as this, the evidence will always have been > inevitably = discovered. @ ); see also United States v. Jones , 149 F.3d 715 , 716 B 17 (7th Cir.1998) ( A It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but > inevitable = once the police arrive with a warrant . . . @ ).

2002See United States v. Shugart, 889 F.Supp. 963, 978 (E.D.Tex.1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir.1997); Stevens, 597 N.W.2d at 69-70 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Under a rationale such as this, the evidence will always have been ‘inevitably’ discovered.”); see also United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir.1998) (“It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevitable’ once the police arrive with a warrant ...”).

2002Compare Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 443 B 44 (1984) with Wilson , 514 U.S. at 937 n.4 (declining to address the possible application, if any, of the independent source and inevitable discovery rules in the Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce context as the issues were not addressed by the court below and not within the narrow question upon which certiorari granted).

2002Compare Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) with Wilson, 514 U.S. at 937 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. 1914 (declining to address the possible application, if any, of the independent source and inevitable discovery rules in the Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce context as the issues were not addressed by the court below and not within the narrow question upon which certiorari granted).

2002See United States v. Shugart , 889 F. Supp. 963, 978 (E.D.Tex. 1995), aff = d , 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 1997); Stevens , 597 N.W.2d at 69 B 70 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) ( A Under a rationale such as this, the evidence will always have been > inevitably = discovered. @ ); see also United States v. Jones , 149 F.3d 715 , 716 B 17 (7th Cir.1998) ( A It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but > inevitable = once the police arrive with a warrant . . . @ ).

2002See United States v. Shugart, 889 F.Supp. 963, 978 (E.D.Tex.1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir.1997); Stevens, 597 N.W.2d at 69-70 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Under a rationale such as this, the evidence will always have been ‘inevitably’ discovered.”); see also United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir.1998) (“It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevitable’ once the police arrive with a warrant ...”).

2002See United States v. Shugart , 889 F. Supp. 963, 978 (E.D.Tex. 1995), aff = d , 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 1997); Stevens , 597 N.W.2d at 69 B 70 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) ( A Under a rationale such as this, the evidence will always have been > inevitably = discovered. @ ); see also United States v. Jones , 149 F.3d 715 , 716 B 17 (7th Cir.1998) ( A It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but > inevitable = once the police arrive with a warrant . . . @ ).

2002See United States v. Shugart, 889 F.Supp. 963, 978 (E.D.Tex.1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir.1997); Stevens, 597 N.W.2d at 69-70 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Under a rationale such as this, the evidence will always have been ‘inevitably’ discovered.”); see also United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir.1998) (“It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevitable’ once the police arrive with a warrant ...”).

2002App. Ct. 2001) (declining to find the independent source and inevitable discovery rules apply to trump the exclusionary rule in knock-and-announce case); contra Stevens , 597 N.W.2d at 62 (holding that the inevitable discovery exception should be available in knock-and-announce cases).

2002See State v. Lee, 836 S.W.2d 126, 127-29 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991) (finding the State’s reliance on the inevitable discovery and independent source exceptions “misplaced” in knock-and-announce case); People v. Tate, 323 Ill.App.3d 905 , 257 Ill.Dec. 152 , 753 N.E.2d 347, 351-52 (Ill.App.Ct.2001) (declining to find the independent source and inevitable discovery rules apply to trump The exclu *371 sionary rule in knock-and-announce case); contra Stevens, 597 N.W.2d at 62 (holding that the inevitable discovery exception should be available in knock-and-announce cases).

2002See Crews, 445 U.S. at 477 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 .

2002See Crews, 445 U.S. at 477 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 .

1996Following the lead of this Court's plurality opinion in Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), the Second Court of Appeals in this cause declined to recognize an inevitable discovery exception to the statutory exclusionary rule embodied in Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P. [1] Daugherty v. State, 876 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994).

1996Following the lead of this Court’s plurality opinion in Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), the Second Court of Appeals in this cause declined to recognize an inevitable discovery exception to the statutory exclusionary rule embodied in Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P. 1 Daugherty v. State, 876 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994).

1996See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 787, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 , 107 S.Ct. 910 , 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987); Dickey v. State, 716 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, *279 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 268 , 83 L.Ed.2d 204 (1984); Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 722-23 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1760 , 72 L.Ed.2d 169 (1982); Pitts v. State, 614 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Cr.App.1981); McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1973);

1996See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 787, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 , 107 S.Ct. 910 , 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987); Dickey v. State, 716 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. de nied, 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 268 , 88 L.Ed.2d 204 (1984); Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 722-28 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1760 , 72 L.Ed.2d 169 (1982); Pitts v. State, 614 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Johns