inevitable discovery doctrine in Massachusetts

2024Lastly, while the inevitable discovery exception is concerned with "putting police in the same, not a worse position [than] they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred" (footnote and citations omitted), Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (analogizing to the closely related independent source doctrine); see O'Connor, 406 Mass. at 114 , the cases require us to consider the severity 10 of the constitutional violation at issue, even if the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.

2016“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the Commonwealth can demonstrate by a preponderance standard that discovery of the evidence by lawful means was certain as a practical matter, the evidence may be admissible as long as the officers did not act in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular constitutional violation is not so severe as to require suppression.” Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810 (1997), citing Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 117-118 (1989).

2005Although the judge made no finding on the point, we shall assume for purposes of decision (and to the benefit of the defendant) that as a factual matter the police relied on the defendant’s statement in locating and seizing the handgun. 12 The inevitable discovery rule under art. 14 “requires a two-step analysis which focuses, first, on the question of inevitability, and, second, on the character of the police misconduct.” Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 546 (1990). “[T]he Commonwealth has the burden of proving the facts bearing on inevitability by a preponderance of the evidence and, o

2005Although the judge made no finding on the point, we shall assume for purposes of decision (and to the benefit of the defendant) that as a factual matter the police relied on the defendant’s statement in locating and seizing the handgun. 12 The inevitable discovery rule under art. 14 “requires a two-step analysis which focuses, first, on the question of inevitability, and, second, on the character of the police misconduct.” Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 546 (1990). “[T]he Commonwealth has the burden of proving the facts bearing on inevitability by a preponderance of the evidence and, o

2016“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence may be admissible as long as the Commonwealth can demonstrate that discovery of the evidence by lawful means was certain as a practical matter, ‘the officers did not act in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular constitutional violation is not so severe as to require suppression.’ ” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 386 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810 (1997).

2016“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the Commonwealth can demonstrate by a preponderance standard that discovery of the evidence by lawful means was certain as a practical matter, the evidence may be admissible as long as the officers did not act in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular constitutional violation is not so severe as to require suppression.” Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810 (1997), citing Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 117-118 (1989).

2012It does argue, however, that the information would have been “inevitably discovered.” “The significant difference between the tests is that under the independent source rule the inquiry is whether the government did in fact acquire certain evidence through an untainted source, while under the inevitable discovery rule the inquiry is whether evidence found because of a constitutional violation would inevitably have been discovered lawfully.” Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 217 (1981).

1989This court discussed the inevitable discovery exception in Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 217-219 (1981), where we declined to apply it because to do so would have undercut the protective warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 1 See State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 465-466 (1986) (State constitutional rule); State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 832-838 (N.D. 1989) (such evidence excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds).

2024Lastly, while the inevitable discovery exception is concerned with "putting police in the same, not a worse position [than] they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred" (footnote and citations omitted), Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (analogizing to the closely related independent source doctrine); see O'Connor, 406 Mass. at 114 , the cases require us to consider the severity 10 of the constitutional violation at issue, even if the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.

1990He followed instead the reasoning in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court applied its version of the inevitable discovery rule.

2024Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 558 (2010).

2011“Under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the Commonwealth satisfies the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘discovery by lawful means was certain as a practical matter.’ ” Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 558 (2010), quoting from Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 117 (1989). 3.

2023Where evidence is discovered in a manner that would compel its exclusion at a criminal trial against the defendant, it may be admissible if the Commonwealth can show by a preponderance of the evidence "that discovery of the evidence by lawful means was certain as a practical matter, 'the officers did not act in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular constitutional violation is not so severe as to require suppression.'" Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 386 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810 (1997).

2016“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence may be admissible as long as the Commonwealth can demonstrate that discovery of the evidence by lawful means was certain as a practical matter, ‘the officers did not act in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular constitutional violation is not so severe as to require suppression.’ ” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 386 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810 (1997).

2011For the principle of inevitable discovery to apply, the Commonwealth must prove “the facts bearing on inevitability by a preponderance of the evidence and, once the relevant facts have been proved, that discovery by lawful means was ‘certain as a practical matter.’ ” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 479 (2005), quoting from Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 547 (1990).

2007See McAfee, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 468 .

2024Commonwealth v. Fontaine, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 699, 709 (2014).

2023Following a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, see United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24, 30 (5th Cir. 1972), a small number of jurisdictions have adopted an exception to the requirement that the acting officer act with awareness of the other officers' knowledge, sometimes known as the inevitable discovery exception, see 2 W.R.

2023See Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95 , 104 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 247 (2010) ("The gravity of the crime and the present danger of the circumstances may be considered in the reasonable suspicion calculus"); Commonwealth 2 Of course, as the court notes, ante at , the inevitable discovery doctrine may not apply where a second officer both has been unable to communicate information to the acting officer and is not at the scene of the stop and patfrisk.

2016At the outset, we note that Rullo deals with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s three-prong articulation of the inevitable discovery exception set out in United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988), rather than the two-step analysis of O’Connor.

2016At the outset, we note that Rullo deals with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s three-prong articulation of the inevitable discovery exception set out in United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988), rather than the two-step analysis of O’Connor.

2015See Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 345-346 , cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 628 (2013).

2015See Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 345-346 , cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 628 (2013).

2009See Commonwealth v. Dejesus, 439 Mass. 616 (2003).

2002See Commonwealth v. DiMarzio, 436 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2002).

1990See also United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984).

1989We left open the question whether, in circumstances not requiring a warrant, we would adopt the inevitable discovery rule, which we viewed as an extension of the independent source rule of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), and principles stated in Wong Sun v. United States, *116 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963).

1989This court discussed the inevitable discovery exception in Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 217-219 (1981), where we declined to apply it because to do so would have undercut the protective warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 1 See State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 465-466 (1986) (State constitutional rule); State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 832-838 (N.D. 1989) (such evidence excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds).

1989This court discussed the inevitable discovery exception in Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 217-219 (1981), where we declined to apply it because to do so would have undercut the protective warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 1 See State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 465-466 (1986) (State constitutional rule); State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 832-838 (N.D. 1989) (such evidence excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds).

1989We left open the question whether, in circumstances not requiring a warrant, we would adopt the inevitable discovery rule, which we viewed as an extension of the independent source rule of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), and principles stated in Wong Sun v. United States, *116 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963).

1989Contra United States v. Whitehorn, 813 F.2d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1987).

1989This court discussed the inevitable discovery exception in Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 217-219 (1981), where we declined to apply it because to do so would have undercut the protective warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 1 See State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 465-466 (1986) (State constitutional rule); State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 832-838 (N.D. 1989) (such evidence excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds).

1989This court discussed the inevitable discovery exception in Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 217-219 (1981), where we declined to apply it because to do so would have undercut the protective warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 1 See State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 465-466 (1986) (State constitutional rule); State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 832-838 (N.D. 1989) (such evidence excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds).

1985See also Commonwealth v. Frodyma, supra at 440 (applying the independent source exception); Commonwealth v. Glavin, 354 Mass. 69 , *460 72 (1968) (applying the “connection so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” exception).