inevitable discovery exception in Maine

2007The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence "inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." Storer, 583 A.2d at 1020 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)).

2007However, respecting our deferential standard of review, there is sufficient support for the Superior Court's finding that the "independence" element necessary to support the inevitable discovery doctrine has been demonstrated. [¶ 48] There is insufficient evidence, however, to support the second element that "use of the legal means would have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence." Almeida, 434 F.3d at 28 ; Storer, 583 A.2d at 1019-20 .

2018Inevitable Discovery Doctrine [¶ 18] “The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 19 , 930 A.2d 268 .

2018Inevitable Discovery Doctrine [¶ 18] “The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 19 , 930 A.2d 268 .

2007We concluded, “ ‘fairness can be assured by placing the State and the accused in the same positions they would have been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place,’ and, therefore, the court did not err in determining that the inevitable discovery doctrine saved the evidence from suppression.” Id. ¶ 22, 751 A.2d at 1024 (citation omitted) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 447 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 ). [¶ 81] In contrast to the search conducted in St.

2007We concluded, "`fairness can be assured by placing the State and the accused in the same positions they would have been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place,' and, therefore, the court did not err in determining that the inevitable discovery doctrine saved the evidence from suppression." Id. ¶ 22, 751 A.2d at 1024 (citation omitted) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 447 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 ). [¶ 81] In contrast to the search conducted in St.

2022In Nadeau, the Court adopted the First Circuit standard in State v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 2001) which added a third requirement for the State to establish in order to make out the inevitable discovery exception.

2007Although the court in Silvestri explicitly expressed concern about the impact of the inevitable discovery rule on further police misconduct, it focused its analysis "on the questions of independence and inevitability." Id. at 746 .

2025As described by the United States Supreme Court in Murray v. United States: The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered. 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988).

1990In order for the inevitable discovery exception to apply, the prosecution must establish “by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Id.; see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. at 543, 108 S.Ct. at 2536 .

2007United States v. Almeida, 434 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.2006); see also United States v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 106 (1st Cir.2004). [¶ 45] We have indicated that evidence may be admitted pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine if the prosecution proves two criteria: first, the information in the application for the search warrant that is independent of illegally obtained information must be sufficient to provide probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant, and, second, the independent information would have inevitably led to discovery of the evidence through lawful means.

2007However, respecting our deferential standard of review, there is sufficient support for the Superior Court's finding that the "independence" element necessary to support the inevitable discovery doctrine has been demonstrated. [¶ 48] There is insufficient evidence, however, to support the second element that "use of the legal means would have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence." Almeida, 434 F.3d at 28 ; Storer, 583 A.2d at 1019-20 .

2007The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence "inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." Storer, 583 A.2d at 1020 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)).

2007The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence "inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." Storer, 583 A.2d at 1020 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)).

2018“The prosecution may not rely on speculation but rather must meet this burden of proof based on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 36 , 1 A.3d 445 (quoting United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 377 (1st Cir. 1994). [¶ 19] We require proof of three elements before determining that evidence inevitably would have been lawfully discovered: (1) the evidence could have been gained lawfully from information that is truly independent from the warrantless search, (2) the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by such lawful means, an

2018“The prosecution may not rely on speculation but rather must meet this burden of proof based on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 36 , 1 A.3d 445 (quoting United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 377 (1st Cir. 1994). [¶ 19] We require proof of three elements before determining that evidence inevitably would have been lawfully discovered: (1) the evidence could have been gained lawfully from information that is truly independent from the warrantless search, (2) the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by such lawful means, an

2018“The prosecution may not rely on speculation but rather must meet this burden of proof based on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 36 , 1 A.3d 445 (quoting United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 377 (1st Cir. 1994). [¶ 19] We require proof of three elements before determining that evidence inevitably would have been lawfully discovered: (1) the evidence could have been gained lawfully from information that is truly independent from the warrantless search, (2) the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by such lawful means, an

2010Compare Jadlowe, 534 F.Supp.2d at 224 (“There was no egregious or gratuitously excessive conduct on the part of the agents ... [nor] was [there] rummaging, prying, or superfluous detention of any occupants .... ”), with United States v. Rullo, 748 F.Supp. 36, 45 (D.Mass.1990) (holding that the inevitable discovery exception did not apply where police used excessive physical force to compel a suspect to disclose the location of a gun and gave improper testimony at the suppression hearing).

2010See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also State v. May, 608 A.2d 772, 776 (Me.1992).

2010See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also State v. May, 608 A.2d 772, 776 (Me.1992).

2010See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also State v. May, 608 A.2d 772, 776 (Me.1992).

2010Id.; see also United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Almeida, 434 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.2006); State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 113 , ¶ 77 n. 15, 930 A.2d 268, 295 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting) (“A third aspect of the inevit *460 able discovery exception has been identified by the First Circuit, which I conclude is embedded in the first two Storer elements.”).

2010Compare Jadlowe, 534 F.Supp.2d at 224 (“There was no egregious or gratuitously excessive conduct on the part of the agents ... [nor] was [there] rummaging, prying, or superfluous detention of any occupants .... ”), with United States v. Rullo, 748 F.Supp. 36, 45 (D.Mass.1990) (holding that the inevitable discovery exception did not apply where police used excessive physical force to compel a suspect to disclose the location of a gun and gave improper testimony at the suppression hearing).

2007This derives from the conceptual difficulty of proving inevitability to a probability. 11 Thus, while recognizing Nix , the Second Circuit has held that “the government cannot prevail under the inevitable discovery doctrine merely by establishing that it is more probable than not that the disputed evidence would have been obtained without the constitutional violation.” Heath, 455 F.3d at 58 -59 & n. 6 (citing United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 472-73 (2nd Cir.1995)).

2007This derives from the conceptual difficulty of proving inevitability to a probability. [11] Thus, while recognizing Nix , the Second Circuit has held that "the government cannot prevail under the inevitable discovery doctrine merely by establishing that it is more probable than not that the disputed evidence would have been obtained without the constitutional violation." Heath, 455 F.3d at 58 -59 & n. 6 (citing United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 472-73 (2nd Cir. 1995)).

2007Similarly, the First Circuit requires that inevitability must be demonstrated “to a high degree of probability.” Almeida, 434 F.3d at 29 ; United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641, 646 (1st Cir.1996). [¶ 49] Heath involved application of the inevitable discovery doctrine when probable cause to support an arrest was discovered seconds or minutes after an arrest without probable cause. 455 F.3d at 53-54 .

2007Similarly, the First Circuit requires that inevitability must be demonstrated "to a high degree of probability." Almeida, 434 F.3d at 29 ; United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641, 646 (1st Cir.1996). [¶ 49] Heath involved application of the inevitable discovery doctrine when probable cause to support an arrest was discovered seconds or minutes after an arrest without probable cause. 455 F.3d at 53-54 .

2007United States v. Almeida, 434 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.2006); see also United States v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 106 (1st Cir.2004). [¶45] We have indicated that evidence may be admitted pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine if the prosecution proves two criteria: first, the information in the application for the search warrant that is independent of illegally obtained information must be sufficient to provide probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant, and, second, the independent information would have inevitably led to discovery of the evidence through lawful means.

2007United States v. Almeida, 434 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.2006); see also United States v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 106 (1st Cir.2004). [¶ 45] We have indicated that evidence may be admitted pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine if the prosecution proves two criteria: first, the information in the application for the search warrant that is independent of illegally obtained information must be sufficient to provide probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant, and, second, the independent information would have inevitably led to discovery of the evidence through lawful means.

2007Yet if probable cause means that discovery is inevitable, then the prior approval requirement has been nullified.”); United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir.1985) ("When the police forego legal means of investigation simply in order to obtain evidence in violation of a suspect’s constitutional rights, the need to deter is paramount and requires application of the exclusionary rule.”); cf. United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854 , 860 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that "special care is required on the part of a district court when the government relies on the subpoena power” in light of "the n

2007Yet if probable cause means that discovery is inevitable, then the prior approval requirement has been nullified."); United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir.1985) ("When the police forego legal means of investigation simply in order to obtain evidence in violation of a suspect's constitutional rights, the need to deter is paramount and requires application of the exclusionary rule."); cf. United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854 , 860 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that "special care is required on the part of a district court when the government relies on the subpoena power" in light of "the n

2007As the Second Circuit recently observed: "the inevitable discovery doctrine is available only where there is a high level of confidence that each of the contingencies required for the discovery of the disputed evidence would in fact have occurred." United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52, 55 (2nd Cir.2006). [¶ 41] In this case, the police and the prosecutor, at approximately 11:20 A.M., commenced the process to obtain a warrant to search the Rabons' home.

2007This derives from the conceptual difficulty of proving inevitability to a probability. [11] Thus, while recognizing Nix , the Second Circuit has held that "the government cannot prevail under the inevitable discovery doctrine merely by establishing that it is more probable than not that the disputed evidence would have been obtained without the constitutional violation." Heath, 455 F.3d at 58 -59 & n. 6 (citing United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 472-73 (2nd Cir. 1995)).

2004See State v. Sugar, 527 A.2d 1377 (N.J. 1987) (concluding discovery of body inevitable because of odor); see also State v. Beede, 406 A.2d 125 (N.H., 1979). 11 initial warrantless entry into the Defendant’s trailer on J anuary 6, 2003 was also justified by the doctrine of inevitable discovery. 4.