inevitable discovery doctrine in New Mexico

2018The rule of inevitable discovery provides that “evidence originally 10 obtained through illegal means, which would, in all likelihood, inevitably have 11 been discovered through independent lawful means, is admissible at trial.” State v. 12 Corneau, 1989-NMCA-040 , ¶ 37, 109 N.M. 81 , 781 P.2d 1159 .

2017See State v. Corneau, 1989-NMCA-040 , ¶ 37, 109 N.M. 81 , 781 2 P.2d 1159 (“If the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained 3 inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching 4 by the police, there is no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to 5 ensure the fairness of the trial proceedings.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 6 citation omitted)); see also State v. Barragan, 2001-NMCA-086, ¶ 18 , 131 N.M. 281 , 7 34 P.3d 1157 (declining to address the inevitable discovery rule in part because the 8 district

2018Therefore, 14 1 we conclude that the State did not meet its burden of proving the applicability of 2 the inevitable discovery exception. 3 {15} Our Supreme Court has cautioned that New Mexico courts “cannot excuse 4 an unlawful search in violation of the constitutional rights of any citizen when 5 police could have performed a lawful search but failed to do so.” State v. Haidle, 6 2012-NMSC-033, ¶ 41 , 285 P.3d 668 .

2014See State v. Haidle, 2012-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 9, 39 , 285 P.3d 668 (stating that the inevitable discovery analysis is unnecessary unless we first determine that evidence was obtained through unlawful police conduct).

2012See State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 20 , 144 N.M. 663 , 191 P.3d 521 (recognizing the inevitable discovery rule in State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-1 17, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 713 , 930 P.2d 1165 (“[Ejvidence that was seized unlawfully but would have been seized independently and lawfully in due course is admissible under [the] inevitable discovery rule.”) and holding that inevitable discovery applied where a police search of the defendant’s wallet after an arrest uncovered evidence that inevitably would have been found during a mandatory and imminent inventory search), abrogated on other grounds by State

2012See State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 20 , 144 N.M. 663 , 191 P.3d 521 (recognizing the inevitable discovery rule in State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-1 17, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 713 , 930 P.2d 1165 (“[Ejvidence that was seized unlawfully but would have been seized independently and lawfully in due course is admissible under [the] inevitable discovery rule.”) and holding that inevitable discovery applied where a police search of the defendant’s wallet after an arrest uncovered evidence that inevitably would have been found during a mandatory and imminent inventory search), abrogated on other grounds by State

2018See 14 generally State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 17 , 144 N.M. 663 , 191 P.3d 521 15 (observing that the well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement for 16 searches incident to a custodial arrest permits “the search of an arrestee’s person 17 and any other area within the arrestee’s access” (emphasis added)), abrogated on 18 other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 357 , 210 19 P.3d 783 . 20 {10} We next consider whether the inevitable discovery doctrine—the alternative 21 basis on which the district court relied to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress— 22

2018See 14 generally State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 17 , 144 N.M. 663 , 191 P.3d 521 15 (observing that the well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement for 16 searches incident to a custodial arrest permits “the search of an arrestee’s person 17 and any other area within the arrestee’s access” (emphasis added)), abrogated on 18 other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 357 , 210 19 P.3d 783 . 20 {10} We next consider whether the inevitable discovery doctrine—the alternative 21 basis on which the district court relied to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress— 22

2018See 14 generally State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 17 , 144 N.M. 663 , 191 P.3d 521 15 (observing that the well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement for 16 searches incident to a custodial arrest permits “the search of an arrestee’s person 17 and any other area within the arrestee’s access” (emphasis added)), abrogated on 18 other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 357 , 210 19 P.3d 783 . 20 {10} We next consider whether the inevitable discovery doctrine—the alternative 21 basis on which the district court relied to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress— 22

2018See 14 generally State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 17 , 144 N.M. 663 , 191 P.3d 521 15 (observing that the well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement for 16 searches incident to a custodial arrest permits “the search of an arrestee’s person 17 and any other area within the arrestee’s access” (emphasis added)), abrogated on 18 other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 357 , 210 19 P.3d 783 . 20 {10} We next consider whether the inevitable discovery doctrine—the alternative 21 basis on which the district court relied to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress— 22

2023See Ortiz, A-1-CA- 17 34703, mem. op. ¶ 14. 18 {28} Given our conclusion that the district court did not properly take judicial 19 notice of the jail’s inventory process, the State’s theory of inevitable discovery fails. 20 1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule that 2 permits the admission of unlawfully seized evidence if that evidence would have 3 been seized independently and lawfully in due course.” State v. Barragan, 2001- 4 NMCA-086, ¶ 18, 131 N.M. 281 , 34 P.3d 1157 , overruled on other grounds by State 5 v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 37 n.6, 275

2023See Ortiz, A-1-CA- 17 34703, mem. op. ¶ 14. 18 {28} Given our conclusion that the district court did not properly take judicial 19 notice of the jail’s inventory process, the State’s theory of inevitable discovery fails. 20 1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule that 2 permits the admission of unlawfully seized evidence if that evidence would have 3 been seized independently and lawfully in due course.” State v. Barragan, 2001- 4 NMCA-086, ¶ 18, 131 N.M. 281 , 34 P.3d 1157 , overruled on other grounds by State 5 v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 37 n.6, 275

2023See Ortiz, A-1-CA- 17 34703, mem. op. ¶ 14. 18 {28} Given our conclusion that the district court did not properly take judicial 19 notice of the jail’s inventory process, the State’s theory of inevitable discovery fails. 20 1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule that 2 permits the admission of unlawfully seized evidence if that evidence would have 3 been seized independently and lawfully in due course.” State v. Barragan, 2001- 4 NMCA-086, ¶ 18, 131 N.M. 281 , 34 P.3d 1157 , overruled on other grounds by State 5 v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 37 n.6, 275

2023See Ortiz, A-1-CA- 17 34703, mem. op. ¶ 14. 18 {28} Given our conclusion that the district court did not properly take judicial 19 notice of the jail’s inventory process, the State’s theory of inevitable discovery fails. 20 1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule that 2 permits the admission of unlawfully seized evidence if that evidence would have 3 been seized independently and lawfully in due course.” State v. Barragan, 2001- 4 NMCA-086, ¶ 18, 131 N.M. 281 , 34 P.3d 1157 , overruled on other grounds by State 5 v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 37 n.6, 275

2001See id. at 449 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 . {14} The inevitable discovery doctrine was most recently applied in New Mexico in State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-117 , 122 N.M. 713 , 930 P.2d 1165 .

2001See id. at 449 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 . {14} The inevitable discovery doctrine was most recently applied in New Mexico in State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-117 , 122 N.M. 713 , 930 P.2d 1165 .

2018Barragan, 2001-NMCA-086, ¶ 18 ; see Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081 , 19 ¶¶ 30, 32 (holding that the state “did not meet its burden of proving that the seizure 13 1 of cocaine [from a small hole in the dashboard of the defendant’s vehicle] was 2 justified as the inevitable result of an inventory search” where “the [s]tate pointed 3 to no evidence in the record to establish that an inventory search of [the 4 d]efendant’s vehicle was made pursuant to established police regulations”). 5 {14} Here, as in Barragan and Arredondo, there was no evidence adduced 6 whatsoever regarding inventory procedures at

2001See Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 30 , 123 N.M. 628 , 944 P.2d 276 .

2001See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.”).

2001See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.”).

2001See State v. Shaw, 115 N.M. 174, 176 , 848 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Ct.App.1993) (inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement); Corneau, 109 N.M. at 90 , 781 P.2d at 1168 (tainted evidence that would have been discovered through an independent source should be admissible if the State can prove that it would have inevitably been discovered anyway).

2001See State v. Shaw, 115 N.M. 174, 176 , 848 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Ct.App.1993) (inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement); Corneau, 109 N.M. at 90 , 781 P.2d at 1168 (tainted evidence that would have been discovered through an independent source should be admissible if the State can prove that it would have inevitably been discovered anyway).

2016We, therefore decline, to infer 4 that Defendant was not unfairly surprised by the district court’s unanticipated 5 invocation of, and reliance upon the inevitable discovery doctrine in this case. 6 {5} In its memorandum in opposition, the State further contends that insofar as the 7 search of the residence was ongoing at the time, the impermissible questioning took 8 place, “the discovery [of the drugs] which was pending but not yet realized[,]” such 9 that the inevitable discovery doctrine should be regarded as applicable. [MIO 8] 10 Although the pendency of the ongoing search provided an ap

2016We, therefore decline, to infer 4 that Defendant was not unfairly surprised by the district court’s unanticipated 5 invocation of, and reliance upon the inevitable discovery doctrine in this case. 6 {5} In its memorandum in opposition, the State further contends that insofar as the 7 search of the residence was ongoing at the time, the impermissible questioning took 8 place, “the discovery [of the drugs] which was pending but not yet realized[,]” such 9 that the inevitable discovery doctrine should be regarded as applicable. [MIO 8] 10 Although the pendency of the ongoing search provided an ap

2019See Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 28 , 267 P.3d 806 (observing that “courts exercise judicial restraint by deciding cases on the narrowest possible grounds and avoid reaching unnecessary constitutional issues”). {23} Lastly, Defendant contends that his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted at trial on the charge for failure to stop or yield at an intersection.

2018See 14 generally State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 17 , 144 N.M. 663 , 191 P.3d 521 15 (observing that the well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement for 16 searches incident to a custodial arrest permits “the search of an arrestee’s person 17 and any other area within the arrestee’s access” (emphasis added)), abrogated on 18 other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 357 , 210 19 P.3d 783 . 20 {10} We next consider whether the inevitable discovery doctrine—the alternative 21 basis on which the district court relied to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress— 22

2008See Excelsior Laundry Co. v. Diehl, 32 N.M. 169 , 252 P. 991 (1927) (holding that a list of customers on a laundry route is not a trade secret); Insure N.M., LLC v. McGonigle, 2000-NMCA-018 , 128 N.M. 611 , 995 P.2d 1053 (analyzing the definition of trade secrets and the inevitable discovery doctrine under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (1989)).

2008See Excelsior Laundry Co. v. Diehl, 32 N.M. 169 , 252 P. 991 (1927) (holding that a list of customers on a laundry route is not a trade secret); Insure N.M., LLC v. McGonigle, 2000-NMCA-018 , 128 N.M. 611 , 995 P.2d 1053 (analyzing the definition of trade secrets and the inevitable discovery doctrine under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (1989)).

2008See State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-117 , ¶ 22, 122 N.M. 713 , 930 P.2d 1165 . {21} Once the officer saw the receipt in the wallet reflecting Defendant’s presence in Belen at an ATM with a potential photographic record of a recent transaction between the time of Rustvold’s disappearance and Defendant’s surfacing without her, “swift action was necessary.” State v. Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶ 10 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 (quoted authority omitted).

2008See State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-117 , ¶ 22, 122 N.M. 713 , 930 P.2d 1165 . {21} Once the officer saw the receipt in the wallet reflecting Defendant’s presence in Belen at an ATM with a potential photographic record of a recent transaction between the time of Rustvold’s disappearance and Defendant’s surfacing without her, “swift action was necessary.” State v. Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶ 10 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 (quoted authority omitted).

2001See State v. Wagoner, 1998-NMCA-124 , 126 N.M. 9 , 966 P.2d 176 (Wagoner I).

2001See State v. Wagoner, 1998-NMCA-124 , 126 N.M. 9 , 966 P.2d 176 (Wagoner I).

2001See Franks, 119 N.M. at 177 , 889 P.2d at 212 (refusing to uphold trial court’s decision on fact-dependent ground not raised below). {19} Finally, the State argues that the admission of the coins, tokens, and watches, even if erroneous, was harmless insofar as the evidence was cumulative.

2001See Franks, 119 N.M. at 177 , 889 P.2d at 212 (refusing to uphold trial court’s decision on fact-dependent ground not raised below). {19} Finally, the State argues that the admission of the coins, tokens, and watches, even if erroneous, was harmless insofar as the evidence was cumulative.

2001We hold that the record is insufficient for us to evaluate the State’s claim that the evidence is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. {12} “In appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner a police officer may approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior, even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” State v. Watley, 109 N.M. 619, 624 , 788 P.2d 375, 380 (Ct.App.1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2001We hold that the record is insufficient for us to evaluate the State’s claim that the evidence is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. {12} “In appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner a police officer may approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior, even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” State v. Watley, 109 N.M. 619, 624 , 788 P.2d 375, 380 (Ct.App.1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).