inevitable discovery doctrine in Georgia

2020This “‘active pursuit rule’ . . . is a judicial effort to prevent application of the inevitable discovery doctrine from emasculating the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Teal, 282 Ga. at 325 (2).

2015Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 323 (2) ( 647 SE2d 15 ) (2007), quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 488 ( 83 SCt 407 , 9 LE2d 441) (1963).There are two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine; the independent source doctrine permits evidence that was discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation, while the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine allows the admission of evidence discovered as a result of police error or misconduct if the State can prove by a p

2012See Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 274 (3) ( 553 SE2d 598 ) (2001). (“[u]nder the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the [sítate can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence derived from police error or illegality would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means, then the evidence is not suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree” (citation omitted)).

2012See Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 274 (3) ( 553 SE2d 598 ) (2001). (“[u]nder the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the [sítate can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence derived from police error or illegality would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means, then the evidence is not suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree” (citation omitted)).

2013Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 830 (2) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (applying the inevitable discovery rule); Stringer v. State, 285 Ga. App. 599, 602-603 (1) ( 647 SE2d 310 ) (2007) (“protecting police against claims for stolen or lost property’ is a legitimate purpose for searching a properly impounded vehicle).

2013Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 830 (2) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (applying the inevitable discovery rule); Stringer v. State, 285 Ga. App. 599, 602-603 (1) ( 647 SE2d 310 ) (2007) (“protecting police against claims for stolen or lost property’ is a legitimate purpose for searching a properly impounded vehicle).

2024See Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 76-77 (4) (b) ( 834 SE2d 785 ) (2019) (holding that, even assuming that probable cause existed to obtain a warrant, the inevitable discovery rule did not apply because police were not actively in the process of obtaining a lawful warrant at the time of the search).

2024See Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 76-77 (4) (b) ( 834 SE2d 785 ) (2019) (holding that, even assuming that probable cause existed to obtain a warrant, the inevitable discovery rule did not apply because police were not actively in the process of obtaining a lawful warrant at the time of the search).

2025See Harvey, 266 Ga. at 672 . 6 The trial court also concluded that the phones in Ramirez’s possession “would have been inevitably discovered.” An exception to the general principle that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, the inevitable discovery doctrine “allows the admission of evidence discovered as a result of police error or misconduct if the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such information would have ultimately or inevitably been discovered by lawful means, without any connection to the police error or misconduct.” State v. Colvard, 296 Ga. 381, 384 (2) n

2025See Harvey, 266 Ga. at 672 . 6 The trial court also concluded that the phones in Ramirez’s possession “would have been inevitably discovered.” An exception to the general principle that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, the inevitable discovery doctrine “allows the admission of evidence discovered as a result of police error or misconduct if the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such information would have ultimately or inevitably been discovered by lawful means, without any connection to the police error or misconduct.” State v. Colvard, 296 Ga. 381, 384 (2) n

2024See also State v. Wood, 367 Ga. App. 10 , 14 (3) ( 884 SE2d 596 ) (2023) (“Absent proof that the officers were actively pursuing a warrant when they entered and searched [defendant’s] hotel room, the mere fact that drug task force agents 11 disclosure was necessarily based on the purported exigency of the circumstances, and based on the trial court’s factual findings, the police’s misrepresentations that exaggerated the exigency warranted the application of the exclusionary rule in this case. 2.

2023See State v. Wood, 367 Ga. App. 10 , 14 (3) ( 884 SE2d 596 ) (2023) (“Absent proof that the officers were actively pursuing a warrant [when they entered and searched appellee’s hotel room], the mere fact that drug task force agents actually obtained a warrant later that day is not 14 enough to bring this case within the inevitable discovery exception.”); Edwards, 357 Ga. App. at 400 (1) (affirming suppression of evidence because even assuming officers had probable cause to obtain a search warrant based on the odor of marijuana, “there [was] no evidence that [they] had applied for a warrant or

2018Compare Johnson , 777 F.3d at 1274-1277 (shotgun obtained in admittedly illegal search of *44 truck prior to motorist's arrest admissible under inevitable discovery doctrine, as evidence supported trial court's findings that officer eventually would have had to impound the truck and thereby would have had to perform an inventory search in which he would have discovered the gun), with Clay , 290 Ga. at 830 (2) (A), 725 S.E.2d 260 .

2018Compare Johnson, 777 F3d at 1274-1277 (shotgun obtained in admittedly illegal search of truck prior to motorist’s arrest admissible under inevitable discovery doctrine, as evidence supported trial court’s findings that officer eventually would have had to impound the truck and thereby would have had to perform an inventory search in which he would have discovered the gun), with Clay, 290 Ga. at 830 (2) (A).

2015Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 323 (2) ( 647 SE2d 15 ) (2007), quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 488 ( 83 SCt 407 , 9 LE2d 441) (1963).There are two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine; the independent source doctrine permits evidence that was discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation, while the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine allows the admission of evidence discovered as a result of police error or misconduct if the State can prove by a p

2015Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 323 (2) ( 647 SE2d 15 ) (2007), quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 488 ( 83 SCt 407 , 9 LE2d 441) (1963).There are two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine; the independent source doctrine permits evidence that was discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation, while the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine allows the admission of evidence discovered as a result of police error or misconduct if the State can prove by a p

2013The Supreme Court, quoting from Wilder, 304 Ga. App. at 892 (1), set forth the following pertinent facts established at the suppression hearing. [A]n investigating officer received information from the victim and another woman, April Quick, that Wilder had a briefcase containing videotapes of the victim and Wilder engaging in sex acts, and that the briefcase was at the home of Wilder’s friend, Judy Malin.

2013The Supreme Court, quoting from Wilder, 304 Ga. App. at 892 (1), set forth the following pertinent facts established at the suppression hearing. [A]n investigating officer received information from the victim and another woman, April Quick, that Wilder had a briefcase containing videotapes of the victim and Wilder engaging in sex acts, and that the briefcase was at the home of Wilder’s friend, Judy Malin.

2013Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 830 (2) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (applying the inevitable discovery rule); Stringer v. State, 285 Ga. App. 599, 602-603 (1) ( 647 SE2d 310 ) (2007) (“protecting police against claims for stolen or lost property’ is a legitimate purpose for searching a properly impounded vehicle).

2013Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 830 (2) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (applying the inevitable discovery rule); Stringer v. State, 285 Ga. App. 599, 602-603 (1) ( 647 SE2d 310 ) (2007) (“protecting police against claims for stolen or lost property’ is a legitimate purpose for searching a properly impounded vehicle).

2013See generally Fincher v. State, 276 Ga. 480, 481 (2) ( 578 SE2d 102 ) (2003) (trial court’s ruling on motion to suppress will be upheld if it is right for any reason).

2013See generally Fincher v. State, 276 Ga. 480, 481 (2) ( 578 SE2d 102 ) (2003) (trial court’s ruling on motion to suppress will be upheld if it is right for any reason).

2012Compare Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 326-327 (2) ( 647 SE2d 15 ) (2007) (where a search warrant issued after an investigator’s illegal entry was based on information gathered before that illegal entry, the evidentiary results of the warrant were admissible under the inevitable discovery exception); Lawson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 865, 869-870 (1), (2) ( 684 SE2d 1 ) (2009) (where defendant’s attack on police at his home dissipated any taint of illegality arising from officer’s arguably wrongful intrusion, a protective sweep as well as the seizure of evidence pursuant to a resulting search warrant

2012Compare Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 326-327 (2) ( 647 SE2d 15 ) (2007) (where a search warrant issued after an investigator’s illegal entry was based on information gathered before that illegal entry, the evidentiary results of the warrant were admissible under the inevitable discovery exception); Lawson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 865, 869-870 (1), (2) ( 684 SE2d 1 ) (2009) (where defendant’s attack on police at his home dissipated any taint of illegality arising from officer’s arguably wrongful intrusion, a protective sweep as well as the seizure of evidence pursuant to a resulting search warrant

2011See Mathis v. State, 279 Ga. 100, 102 (3) (a) ( 610 SE2d 62 ) (2005) (explaining that “(w)e will affirm a trial court’s ruling if it is right for any reason”).

2011See Mathis v. State, 279 Ga. 100, 102 (3) (a) ( 610 SE2d 62 ) (2005) (explaining that “(w)e will affirm a trial court’s ruling if it is right for any reason”).

2011See Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga. App. 739, 741 ( 644 SE2d 878 ) (2007) *580 (“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the [s]tate shows by a preponderance of the evidence that illegally obtained evidence would have been discovered inevitably by lawful means, the evidence is admissible.”)- But the state did not make this argument in the trial court, and the trial court made no ruling on an inevitable discovery theory.

2011See Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga. App. 739, 741 ( 644 SE2d 878 ) (2007) *580 (“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the [s]tate shows by a preponderance of the evidence that illegally obtained evidence would have been discovered inevitably by lawful means, the evidence is admissible.”)- But the state did not make this argument in the trial court, and the trial court made no ruling on an inevitable discovery theory.

2007Murray v. United States, supra, 487 U. S. at 542 . 4 Appellant’s reliance on the discussion of the doctrine of inevitable discovery in State v. Rocco, 255 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 566 SE2d 365 ) (2002), is misplaced since that discussion is dicta, the appellate court having determined that the search of a home after a warrant had issued hut prior to it being in the physical possession of the searching officers was not an illegal search.

2007Murray v. United States, supra, 487 U. S. at 542 . 4 Appellant’s reliance on the discussion of the doctrine of inevitable discovery in State v. Rocco, 255 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 566 SE2d 365 ) (2002), is misplaced since that discussion is dicta, the appellate court having determined that the search of a home after a warrant had issued hut prior to it being in the physical possession of the searching officers was not an illegal search.

2013Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 830 (2) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (applying the inevitable discovery rule); Stringer v. State, 285 Ga. App. 599, 602-603 (1) ( 647 SE2d 310 ) (2007) (“protecting police against claims for stolen or lost property” is a legitimate purpose for searching a properly impounded vehicle). 8 This rationale is not based on a vehicle search incident to arrest as analyzed in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332 (129 SC 1710, 173 LE2d 485) (2009), so Schweitzer’s reliance on that case on appeal is misplaced. 7

2010See Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga.App. 739, 741 , 644 S.E.2d 878 (2007) ("Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the State shows by a preponderance of the evidence that illegally obtained evidence would have been discovered inevitably by lawful means, the evidence is admissible."). [10] See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (III)(A) (5th Cir.2007) (cell phone user had reasonable expectation of privacy in call records and text messages on phone). [11] Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___(II), 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted); see Teal v. State, 28

2007Murray v. United States, supra, 487 U. S. at 542 . 4 Appellant’s reliance on the discussion of the doctrine of inevitable discovery in State v. Rocco, 255 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 566 SE2d 365 ) (2002), is misplaced since that discussion is dicta, the appellate court having determined that the search of a home after a warrant had issued hut prior to it being in the physical possession of the searching officers was not an illegal search.

2002Smith, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 195 Ga. App. 37, 39 (2) ( 392 SE2d 534 ) (1990). 2 Id. 3 See Murray v. United States, 487 U. S. 533, 535-536 (108 SC 2529, 101 LE2d 472) (1988); Price v. State, 270 Ga. 619, 622-623 ( 513 SE2d 483 ) (1999). 4 In such concession, Rocco urges that the laws relating to the inevitable discovery doctrine should not be applied here because, although applicable, the officers’ failure to wait for the physical presence of the warrant was deliberate and thus the State should be penalized.

2025See Harvey, 266 Ga. at 672 . 6 The trial court also concluded that the phones in Ramirez’s possession “would have been inevitably discovered.” An exception to the general principle that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, the inevitable discovery doctrine “allows the admission of evidence discovered as a result of police error or misconduct if the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such information would have ultimately or inevitably been discovered by lawful means, without any connection to the police error or misconduct.” State v. Colvard, 296 Ga. 381, 384 (2) n

2019Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 274-275 (3) ( 553 SE2d 598 ) (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted), disapproved in part on other 21 Whether stare decisis compels the retention of the particular holding in Gary that OCGA § 17-5-30 forecloses application of the Leon exception, notwithstanding the unsound reasoning from which that holding followed, is a question that will have to await a case involving the reliance of an officer in good faith on the validity of a search warrant. 36 grounds in State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 783 (3) (b) ( 770 SE2d 808 ) (2015).22 See also Teal v. State, 282 Ga.

2019Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 274-275 (3) ( 553 SE2d 598 ) (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted), disapproved in part on other 21 Whether stare decisis compels the retention of the particular holding in Gary that OCGA § 17-5-30 forecloses application of the Leon exception, notwithstanding the unsound reasoning from which that holding followed, is a question that will have to await a case involving the reliance of an officer in good faith on the validity of a search warrant. 36 grounds in State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 783 (3) (b) ( 770 SE2d 808 ) (2015).22 See also Teal v. State, 282 Ga.

2015In sum, the State has not established that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies by demonstrating “‘a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means, . . . [or] that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.’” Id. at 274-275 (citation omitted). 22 Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 ( 102 SCt 2664 , 73 LE2d 314) (1982) (“[A] confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless i

2015In sum, the State has not established that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies by demonstrating “‘a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means, . . . [or] that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.’” Id. at 274-275 (citation omitted). 22 Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 ( 102 SCt 2664 , 73 LE2d 314) (1982) (“[A] confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless i

2015In sum, the State has not established that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies by demonstrating “‘a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means, . . . [or] that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.’” Id. at 274-275 (citation omitted). 22 Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 ( 102 SCt 2664 , 73 LE2d 314) (1982) (“[A] confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless i

2015In sum, the State has not established that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies by demonstrating “‘a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means, . . . [or] that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.’” Id. at 274-275 (citation omitted). 22 Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 ( 102 SCt 2664 , 73 LE2d 314) (1982) (“[A] confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless i

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,

2014Using this rationale, two functionally similar exceptions to the exclusionary rule — the independent source doctrine and the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine — have developed because the interest of society in deterring unlawful police *492 conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 See Davis v. United States,_U. S._(IV) (B) (2) ( 131 SCt 2419 ,