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28 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nix v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, ¶46 , 369 Wis. 2d 673 , 882 N.W.2d 422 . ¶9 In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that the inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule. 2021In the State’s view, the existence of the search warrant authorizing police to confiscate the iPhone made the seizure of the device inevitable under the facts here. ¶9 Articulated in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the inevitable discovery doctrine provides as follows: “If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means … then the deterrence rationale [for police misconduct] has so little basis that the evidence should be received.” Id. at 444 . | 6 | 9 |
State v. Mastella L. Jacksongreen2 sentences2025“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, ‘evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means.’” State v. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, ¶47 , 369 Wis. 2d 673 , 882 N.W.2d 422 (quoted source omitted). “[T]he State has the burden of proof in satisfying this narrow exception to the exclusionary rule.” Id., ¶72. ¶35 Here, as noted above, the circuit court concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied either because Meloy would have voluntarily exited his garage or because the offic 2025“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, ‘evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means.’” State v. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, ¶47 , 369 Wis. 2d 673 , 882 N.W.2d 422 (quoted source omitted). “[T]he State has the burden of proof in satisfying this narrow exception to the exclusionary rule.” Id., ¶72. ¶35 Here, as noted above, the circuit court concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied either because Meloy would have voluntarily exited his garage or because the offic | 5 | 9 |
United States v. James Thomas Cherrygreen2 sentences2016To a degree, the Cherry court anticipated this critique by acknowledging a case in which, despite the fact that "the Brookins prerequisites were not met," the Fifth Circuit "held that the inevitable discovery exception applied since the alternate means for obtaining the evidence was an intervening and independent event occurring subsequent to the misconduct." Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1205 (citing United States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991, 997 (5th Cir. 1982)). 2009See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, where agents "could have obtained a warrant but had made no effort to do so," undercuts the warrant requirement). ¶ 50. | 3 | 4 |
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, which was not developed by the State, illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the state can show that it" 'inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.'" State v. Anker, 2014 WI App 107, ¶ 25 , 357 Wis. 2d 565 , 855 N.W.2d 483 (quoting State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added); see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988). 2014See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988) ("The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine."). | 3 | 3 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattier, 50 N.E.3d 157, 167 (Mass. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997)); State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 33 (N.D. 2013) (citing State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980)); Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997); see also United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (declaring that courts are not required to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine "without regard to the severity of the police misconduct"); but see State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (N.C. 1992) (rejecting this view). ¶ 140. 2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattier, 50 N.E.3d 157, 167 (Mass. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997)); State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 33 (N.D. 2013) (citing State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980)); Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997); see also United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (declaring that courts are not required to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine "without regard to the severity of the police misconduct"); but see State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (N.C. 1992) (rejecting this view). 43 Knapp, 2 | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Sbordonegreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattier, 50 N.E.3d 157, 167 (Mass. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997)); State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 33 (N.D. 2013) (citing State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980)); Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997); see also United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (declaring that courts are not required to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine "without regard to the severity of the police misconduct"); but see State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (N.C. 1992) (rejecting this view). ¶ 140. 2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattier, 50 N.E.3d 157, 167 (Mass. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997)); State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 33 (N.D. 2013) (citing State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980)); Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997); see also United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (declaring that courts are not required to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine "without regard to the severity of the police misconduct"); but see State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (N.C. 1992) (rejecting this view). 43 Knapp, 2 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Averygreen2 sentences2016See State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124 , 337 Wis. 2d 351 , 804 N.W.2d 216 ; State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413 , 559 N.W.2d 264 2 No. 2014AP2238-CR (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487 , 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992). ¶5 Jackson now urges us to reassess the inevitable discovery doctrine. 2016See State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124 , 337 Wis. 2d 351 , 804 N.W.2d 216 ; State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413 , 559 N.W.2d 264 2 No. 2014AP2238-CR (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487 , 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992). ¶5 Jackson now urges us to reassess the inevitable discovery doctrine. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hollygreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattier, 50 N.E.3d 157, 167 (Mass. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997)); State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 33 (N.D. 2013) (citing State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980)); Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997); see also United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (declaring that courts are not required to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine "without regard to the severity of the police misconduct"); but see State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (N.C. 1992) (rejecting this view). ¶ 140. 2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattier, 50 N.E.3d 157, 167 (Mass. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997)); State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 33 (N.D. 2013) (citing State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980)); Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997); see also United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (declaring that courts are not required to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine "without regard to the severity of the police misconduct"); but see State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (N.C. 1992) (rejecting this view). 43 Knapp, 2 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Schweglergreen2 sentences2016Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, which was not developed by the State, illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the state can show that it" 'inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.'" State v. Anker, 2014 WI App 107, ¶ 25 , 357 Wis. 2d 565 , 855 N.W.2d 483 (quoting State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added); see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988). 2016Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, which was not developed by the State, illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the state can show that it" 'inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.'" State v. Anker, 2014 WI App 107, ¶ 25 , 357 Wis. 2d 565 , 855 N.W.2d 483 (quoting State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added); see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988). | 1 | 6 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2016Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, "evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means." State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 427 , 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992)); see also 6 Wayne R. 2016Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, "evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means." State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 427 , 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992)); see also 6 Wayne R. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Knappgreen2 sentences2016When such transgressions are acknowledged yet forgiven by the courts, we endorse and invite their repetition." United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., joined by four judges, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶75, 79 . 18 See ¶134, infra (quoting Professor LaFave's criticism of a court's using the inevitable discovery doctrine under these circumstances). 6 No. 2014AP2238-CR.ssa Rather, the State challenges only the suppression of the physical evidence seized at Jackson's home. ¶113 The majority opinion agrees with t 2016In concluding that suppression of the physical evidence is necessary, I adhere to the reasoning in State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127 , 285 Wis. 2d 86 , 700 N.W.2d 899 , which held that physical evidence obtained as a direct result of an intentional violation of Miranda is inadmissible under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. ¶116 In refusing to suppress the physical evidence obtained at Jackson's home, the majority opinion applies the inevitable discovery doctrine, an exception to the exclusionary rule.20 I disagree with applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in the instant case | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Jason Guidrygreen1 sentence2024For example, in United States v. Guidry, 817 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2016), police lawfully stopped a driver, Guidry, for a traffic offense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quigleygreen1 sentence2022The independent source doctrine does not apply, but the inevitable discovery doctrine does apply and provides a basis for us to affirm. ¶23 To explain, “the independent source doctrine requires proof that the tainted evidence was actually discovered by independent and lawful means; that is, it was ‘obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.’” Quigley, 370 Wis. 2d 702, ¶51 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Utah v. Strieffgreen2 sentences2022See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016). 2022This leaves the attenuation doctrine. ¶35 The attenuation doctrine provides that “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021He now appeals the denial of his suppression motion.2 1 In response to a subsequent recusal motion, the circuit court provided further explanation of its thinking regarding the potential applicability of Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), including by remarking that it was relying on defense counsel’s representation of that case and opining that the search of Walentowski’s iPhone involved a “clearcut” application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 2 See WIS. 2021See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.”); see also Bailey, 568 U.S. at 196 (“If Bailey had rushed back to his apartment, the police could have apprehended and detained him under Summers.”). ¶13 Walentowski responds that the notion he would have returned home is speculative and cannot form the basis for application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Ybarra v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence2021See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.”); see also Bailey, 568 U.S. at 196 (“If Bailey had rushed back to his apartment, the police could have apprehended and detained him under Summers.”). ¶13 Walentowski responds that the notion he would have returned home is speculative and cannot form the basis for application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Timothy W. Marklinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Phelpsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Olmstead v. United Statesred | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Clifford Jerome Miller, United States of America v. Kathelyn Vandraiss Miller, United States of America v. Clifford Jerome Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. James Morrow Roper, Christian Matthew Newton, John Jackson Miller Truxellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Frederick Silvestri, Eldergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Rickie Lee Boatwrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Souza v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Larry Duane Conner, United States of America v. John Charles Tiltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Rene Madridgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Marroccogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kenneth Olsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Howardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Alexandergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Caingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cruzan Ex Rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Healthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Stronggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ker v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Romegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McNeil v. Wisconsingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michigan v. Harveygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Village of Hales Cornersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Knappgreen2 sentences2016When such transgressions are acknowledged yet forgiven by the courts, we endorse and invite their repetition." United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., joined by four judges, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶75, 79 . 18 See ¶134, infra (quoting Professor LaFave's criticism of a court's using the inevitable discovery doctrine under these circumstances). 6 No. 2014AP2238-CR.ssa Rather, the State challenges only the suppression of the physical evidence seized at Jackson's home. ¶113 The majority opinion agrees with t 2016In concluding that suppression of the physical evidence is necessary, I adhere to the reasoning in State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127 , 285 Wis. 2d 86 , 700 N.W.2d 899 , which held that physical evidence obtained as a direct result of an intentional violation of Miranda is inadmissible under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. ¶116 In refusing to suppress the physical evidence obtained at Jackson's home, the majority opinion applies the inevitable discovery doctrine, an exception to the exclusionary rule.20 I disagree with applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in the instant case | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Garnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Anker
green
2 sentences2022Johnson argues that the independent source doctrine does not apply, while the State argues that the inevitable discovery doctrine does apply.6 These two doctrines are “related but distinct.” State v. Anker, 2014 WI App 107, ¶25 , 357 Wis. 2d 565 , 855 N.W.2d 483 . 2022Johnson argues that the independent source doctrine does not apply, while the State argues that the inevitable discovery doctrine does apply.6 These two doctrines are “related but distinct.” State v. Anker, 2014 WI App 107, ¶25 , 357 Wis. 2d 565 , 855 N.W.2d 483 . | 2 | 2016–2022 |
State v. Pickens
green
2 sentences2011Avery relies on this court's holding in State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5 , 323 Wis. 2d 226 , 779 N.W.2d 1 , that the inevitable discovery rule requires "that the police be actively pursuing the legal alternative — here, a warrant — prior to the unlawful search." Id., ¶¶ 47-49. 2011Avery relies on this court's holding in State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5 , 323 Wis. 2d 226 , 779 N.W.2d 1 , that the inevitable discovery rule requires "that the police be actively pursuing the legal alternative — here, a warrant — prior to the unlawful search." Id., ¶¶ 47-49. | 2 | 2011–2021 |
United States v. Jacobsen
green
1 sentence2026Based on the facts as they existed at the time of the officer’s search of the flash drive, the officer’s conduct was reasonable, and the officer’s conduct “did not infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of private conduct.” See id. at 126 . ¶16 The State raises alternative arguments, including the argument that the doctrine of inevitable discovery applies, to any expansion in the scope of the private search. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Laverne Ware, Jr.
green
2 sentences2025For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the State has not shown that the facts of this case satisfy any of the justifications argued by the State for admitting the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry into Meloy’s garage.4 A. Exigent Circumstances ¶15 “Warrantless searches of homes are presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Ware, 2021 WI App 83, ¶19 , 400 Wis. 2d 118 , 968 N.W.2d 752 (internal 4 The State now concedes that there is no evidence that the officer was acting in a community caretaker capacity when he entered the garage. 2025For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the State has not shown that the facts of this case satisfy any of the justifications argued by the State for admitting the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry into Meloy’s garage.4 A. Exigent Circumstances ¶15 “Warrantless searches of homes are presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Ware, 2021 WI App 83, ¶19 , 400 Wis. 2d 118 , 968 N.W.2d 752 (internal 4 The State now concedes that there is no evidence that the officer was acting in a community caretaker capacity when he entered the garage. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences2024Jackson, 369 Wis. 2d 673, ¶¶65, 67 . ¶10 An inventory search of a vehicle being taken into police custody is “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 5 No. 2024AP617-CR U.S. 367, 371 (1987); State v. Clark, 2003 WI App 121, ¶11 , 265 Wis. 2d 557 , 666 N.W.2d 112 . 2024Jackson, 369 Wis. 2d 673, ¶¶65, 67 . ¶10 An inventory search of a vehicle being taken into police custody is “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 5 No. 2024AP617-CR U.S. 367, 371 (1987); State v. Clark, 2003 WI App 121, ¶11 , 265 Wis. 2d 557 , 666 N.W.2d 112 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2024Nor is there any question that the cocaine in Nelson’s cup holder would have been found in such a search; Goritz unequivocally testified that if he had not conducted the search of the vehicle before having it towed, the cocaine would have been found “regardless” in a later inventory search. ¶13 While conceding that our supreme court’s holding in Jackson makes clear that indicia of inevitability such as the active pursuit of an alternate line of investigation are not required elements for the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine, Nelson attempts to distinguish the case of State v. 2024Nor is there any question that the cocaine in Nelson’s cup holder would have been found in such a search; Goritz unequivocally testified that if he had not conducted the search of the vehicle before having it towed, the cocaine would have been found “regardless” in a later inventory search. ¶13 While conceding that our supreme court’s holding in Jackson makes clear that indicia of inevitability such as the active pursuit of an alternate line of investigation are not required elements for the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine, Nelson attempts to distinguish the case of State v. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Carroll
green
2 sentences2022“As applied to circumstances where an application for a warrant contains both tainted and untainted evidence, the issued warrant is valid if the untainted evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to issue the warrant.” See State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶44 , 322 Wis. 2d 299 , 778 N.W.2d 1 . 2022“As applied to circumstances where an application for a warrant contains both tainted and untainted evidence, the issued warrant is valid if the untainted evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to issue the warrant.” See State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶44 , 322 Wis. 2d 299 , 778 N.W.2d 1 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Arizona v. Gant
green
2 sentences2020Second, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), could not apply to support a suppression motion here, because, in the words of trial counsel, “the officer thought that there was a valid warrant [for Jackson] at the time that the search was conducted and [the 4 The State makes no argument that trial counsel could have provided deficient performance in failing to identify a potential winning suppression argument as to only one of the counts of conviction (felon in possession or threatening a law enforcement officer) and not the other. 6 No. 2018AP2450-CR officer] was operating on” the belief that 2020In fact, on the search incident to arrest topic, the State’s brief on appeal fails even to mention Gant or allude in any way to the holding of that case that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or the vehicle contains evidence of the offense resulting in the arrest.7 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 . ¶22 The State’s only developed argument is based on the protective search exception to the Fourth Amendment. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Daniel S. Iverson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Brett W. Dumstrey
green
2 sentences2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara 2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Charles v. Matalonis
green
2 sentences2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara 2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Andy J. Parisi
green
2 sentences2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara 2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Richard L. Weber
green
2 sentences2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara 2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Patrick K. Kozel
green
2 sentences2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara 2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. David W. Howes
green
2 sentences2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara 2017Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include: State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3 , 373 Wis. 2d 1 , 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96 , 372 Wis. 2d 202 , 887 N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's gara | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. West green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Doe green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re United States green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Washington green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. Matlock green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. Jerrell Heath green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Weber green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Thorstad green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Pallone green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Faust green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Cady v. Dombrowski green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Boggess green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Cherry v. United States green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| New York v. Quarles green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. James Thomas Cherry green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Donovan green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Friday green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.