inevitable discovery doctrine in Alaska

1997Imposition of the higher burden of proof is intended to “ensure that this hypothetical finding [contemplated by the inevitable discovery doctrine] is narrowly confined to circumstances that are functionally equivalent to an independent source, and to protect fully the fundamental rights served by the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 459, 104 S.Ct. at 2517 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

1997Imposition of the higher burden of proof is intended to “ensure that this hypothetical finding [contemplated by the inevitable discovery doctrine] is narrowly confined to circumstances that are functionally equivalent to an independent source, and to protect fully the fundamental rights served by the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 459, 104 S.Ct. at 2517 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

1997Although we referred to the inevitable discovery exception in Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1973), and applied it in a federal law context in State v. Hazelwood, 866 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1993), we have not previously adopted it as a matter of state law.

1997The inevitable discovery exception was described in Hazelwood, 866 P.2d at 831 , 832 as follows: The doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where evidence has been obtained in violation of constitutional protections such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

1996The court’s reliance on Justice Marshall's dissent in Kastigar, [v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)], see Hazelwood, 836 P.2d at 952 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 470-71 , 92 S.Ct. at 1669-70 (Marshall, J„ dissenting)), would be appropriate had the court of appeals been deciding Alaska law.

1996The court’s reliance on Justice Marshall's dissent in Kastigar, [v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)], see Hazelwood, 836 P.2d at 952 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 470-71 , 92 S.Ct. at 1669-70 (Marshall, J„ dissenting)), would be appropriate had the court of appeals been deciding Alaska law.

1996As we said in our initial opinion, the inevitable discovery doctrine, as approved in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), works “to avoid suppressing illegally obtained evidence when the prosecution has demonstrated that, although its evidence actually derived from a source tainted by illegality, the same evidence would inevitably have been discovered through lawful, untainted means had the illegality not occurred.” Hazelwood v. State, 836 P.2d at 950 (citing Wayne R.

1996See Hazelwood, 836 P.2d at 951 (“For present purposes, we may assume that the inevitable discovery doctrine would be adopted in Alaska in appropriate cases_”).

2008See also United States v. Pelullo, 173 F.3d 131 , 137 n. 4 (3rd Cir.1999) ("[determining] what Pelullo would or would not have testified to [under different cireumstances] clearly would require speculation" inconsistent with the inevitable discovery doctrine); United States v. Rodríguez, unpublished, 2006 WL 2860633 , at *11 (D.Conn.2006) ("as De Reyes makes clear, it is not so easy to conclude, let alone with a 'high level of confi-denee,' that Delossantos would have said the same thing to the police [in the absence of the prior unlawful arrest and search]"); United States v. Castillo, unpubl

1997See Zsupnik v. State, 789 P.2d 357, 361-63 (Alaska 1990). [4] Smith questions this court's decision to address the inevitable discovery rule, since it was not raised by the State in the proceeding below.

1997See Zsupnik v. State, 789 P.2d 357, 361-63 (Alaska 1990). .Smith questions this court’s decision to address the inevitable discovery rule, since it was not raised by the State in the proceeding below.

1997See State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459 , 724 P.2d 545, 551-52 (1986).

1997See State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459 , 724 P.2d 545, 551-52 (1986).

1997Va. 473 , 280 S.E.2d 222 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 925 , 102 S.Ct. 1287 , 71 L.Ed.2d 468 (1982); State v. Kennedy, 134 Wis.2d 308 , 396 N.W.2d 765 (Wisc.App. 1986); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 225 (Wyo. 1994). [6] Smith argues that the explicit right to privacy granted by article I, section 22 of Alaska's Constitution should prohibit the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, especially where the illegal search is of the defendant's home.

1996Courts in this category, however, have required the government to prove the existence of “an invariable, routine procedure,” United States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1988), or to demonstrate that “policy dictated” the action that would have inevitably resulted in discovery, United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 504 (1st Cir.1994). 7 The government must show not only that the procedure would inevitably have disclosed the evidence but also that the procedure was in place and would have been followed. 8 Absent proof that discovery of evidence was inevitable in light of either even

1996This line of cases, exemplified by United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir.1984) (emphasis in original), holds that “the prosecution must demonstrate that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.” 5 Other federal courts, including those of the Ninth Circuit, have enlarged the doctrine by accepting proof that “pursuant to some standardized procedures or established routine a certain evidence-revealing event would definitely have occurred later.” 5 Wayne R.

1996See United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1399-1400 ; State v. McKendall, 36 Or.App. 187 , 584 P.2d 816 , 320 (1978); cf. United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854 , 860-61 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir.1988).

1996Courts in this category, however, have required the government to prove the existence of “an invariable, routine procedure,” United States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1988), or to demonstrate that “policy dictated” the action that would have inevitably resulted in discovery, United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 504 (1st Cir.1994). 7 The government must show not only that the procedure would inevitably have disclosed the evidence but also that the procedure was in place and would have been followed. 8 Absent proof that discovery of evidence was inevitable in light of either even

1996See United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1399-1400 ; State v. McKendall, 36 Or.App. 187 , 584 P.2d 816 , 320 (1978); cf. United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854 , 860-61 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir.1988).

1993Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule, such as the independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine. [9] See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 , 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1609 , 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) ("[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating ... unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by ... officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him."). [10] Specifically, the Supreme Court explained: The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for

1993Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule, such as the independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine. [9] See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 , 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1609 , 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) ("[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating ... unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by ... officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him."). [10] Specifically, the Supreme Court explained: The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for

1993Rather, we hold that when the evidence at issue inevitably would have been discovered without reference to immunized statements, "there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible." Id. at 448 , 104 S.Ct. at 2511 ; see also United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 422-23 (8th Cir.1991). [12] The court of appeals also concluded that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine would defeat the congressional purpose in granting immunity for the immediate report of a spill.

1993Rather, we hold that when the evidence at issue inevitably would have been discovered without reference to immunized statements, “there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.” Id. at 448 , 104 S.Ct. at 2511 ; see also United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 422-23 (8th Cir. 1991). 12 The court of appeals also concluded that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine would defeat the congressional purpose in granting immumty for the immediate report of a spill.

1991See Ricks v. State, 771 P.2d 1364 , 1369 n. 3 (Alaska App.1989) (state failed to meet its burden of proof under the inevitable discovery doctrine).

1991See Ricks v. State, 771 P.2d 1364 , 1369 n. 3 (Alaska App. 1989) (state failed to meet its burden of proof under the inevitable discovery doctrine).