inevitable discovery doctrine in District of Columbia

2025This court has previously held that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies in cases where police engaged in lawful and unlawful processes in parallel, and “[h]ad the unlawful process not occurred . . . the lawful one would inevitably have produced the same evidentiary result.” (Prince) Jones, 168 A.3d at 718 (citing Pinkney v. United States, 851 A.2d 479, 495 (D.C. 2004); McFerguson v. United States, 770 A.2d 66 , 74-75 (D.C. 2001); Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 662 (D.C. 1999)).

2017Inevitable-Discovery Doctrine The inevitable-discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’ ” Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1999)); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

2017Inevitable-Discovery Doctrine The inevitable-discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’ ” Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1999)); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

2017Inevitable-Discovery Doctrine The inevitable-discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’ ” Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1999)); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

2025The inevitable-discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from [exclusion] if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’” (Prince) Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 717 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016)).

2025“To avail itself of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, the government must prove (1) that the lawful process which would have ended in the inevitable discovery had commenced before the constitutionally invalid seizure, and (2) that there is ‘requisite actuality’ that the discovery would have ultimately been made by lawful means.” (Gregory) Smith v. United States, 283 A.3d 88 , 98 (D.C. 2022) (ellipsis omitted) (quoting (Prince) Jones, 168 A.3d at 717 ) (holding government failed to show a “requisite actuality” that police would have discovered drugs found in a hard plastic case inside of appel

2025The inevitable-discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from [exclusion] if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’” (Prince) Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 717 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016)).

2025Unlike in Jones, where the inevitable-discovery doctrine did not apply because a lawful process was available to the police but it “never occurred” and the police instead pursued only the unlawful option, (Prince) Jones, 168 A.3d at 718 , here, the police did in fact engage in the lawful process of detaining and questioning Mr. Sanders as part of their execution of the search warrant, see Gore, 145 A.3d at 549 (holding that inevitable-discovery doctrine did not apply because police had not yet, but “could” have, applied for a search warrant before entering the property and 30 seizing evidence)

2025This court has previously held that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies in cases where police engaged in lawful and unlawful processes in parallel, and “[h]ad the unlawful process not occurred . . . the lawful one would inevitably have produced the same evidentiary result.” (Prince) Jones, 168 A.3d at 718 (citing Pinkney v. United States, 851 A.2d 479, 495 (D.C. 2004); McFerguson v. United States, 770 A.2d 66 , 74-75 (D.C. 2001); Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 662 (D.C. 1999)).

2025This court has previously held that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies in cases where police engaged in lawful and unlawful processes in parallel, and “[h]ad the unlawful process not occurred . . . the lawful one would inevitably have produced the same evidentiary result.” (Prince) Jones, 168 A.3d at 718 (citing Pinkney v. United States, 851 A.2d 479, 495 (D.C. 2004); McFerguson v. United States, 770 A.2d 66 , 74-75 (D.C. 2001); Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 662 (D.C. 1999)).

2017To avail itself of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, the government must prove two distinct elements: (1) that “the lawful process which would have ended in the inevitable discovery ... ha[d] commenced before the constitutionally invalid seizure,” and (2) that there is a “ ‘requisite actuality’ that the discovery would have ultimately been made by lawful means.” Hicks, 730 A.2d at 659 (quoting Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137 , 1139 n.6 (D.C. 1985), and Hilliard v. United States, 638 A.2d 698, 707 (D.C. 1994)) (brackets and ellipsis removed).

2017To avail itself of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, the government must prove two distinct elements: (1) that ―the lawful process which would have ended in the inevitable discovery . . . ha[d] commenced before the constitutionally invalid seizure,‖ and (2) that there is a ―‗requisite actuality‘ that the discovery would have ultimately been made by lawful means.‖ Hicks, 730 A.2d at 659 (quoting Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137 , 1139 n.6 (D.C. 1985), and Hilliard v. United States, 638 A.2d 698, 707 (D.C. 1994)) (brackets and ellipsis removed).

2025This court has previously held that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies in cases where police engaged in lawful and unlawful processes in parallel, and “[h]ad the unlawful process not occurred . . . the lawful one would inevitably have produced the same evidentiary result.” (Prince) Jones, 168 A.3d at 718 (citing Pinkney v. United States, 851 A.2d 479, 495 (D.C. 2004); McFerguson v. United States, 770 A.2d 66 , 74-75 (D.C. 2001); Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 662 (D.C. 1999)).

2025This court has previously held that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies in cases where police engaged in lawful and unlawful processes in parallel, and “[h]ad the unlawful process not occurred . . . the lawful one would inevitably have produced the same evidentiary result.” (Prince) Jones, 168 A.3d at 718 (citing Pinkney v. United States, 851 A.2d 479, 495 (D.C. 2004); McFerguson v. United States, 770 A.2d 66 , 74-75 (D.C. 2001); Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 662 (D.C. 1999)).

2017The Supreme Court first recognized this exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), holding that ―evidence obtained [by the police] in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant‖ is not subject to the exclusionary rule.

2015See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984). 15 Appellant asserts that “[a]ny reasonable person who examined the statute in 2005 would have understood that [appellant] did not have a conviction for a qualifying offense and, thus, that the statute did not authorize taking his DNA.” 14 government cannot show that application of the exclusionary rule would have no deterrent effect.16 Nor, appellant urges, did the inevitable discovery doctrine apply.

2017The government also argues that much of the evidence that Mr. Jones wants excluded does not fall within the scope of the exclusionary rule— that it is not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

2017The government also argues that much of the evidence that Mr. Jones wants excluded does not fall within the scope of the exclusionary rule— that it is not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

2025See (Gregory) Smith v. United States, 283 A.3d 88 , 98 (D.C. 2022) (explaining that the government’s failure to preserve an inevitable-discovery argument in the trial court “would permit [this court] to bypass it” unless “exceptional circumstances” were present (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (“We are not persuaded that the government should have a second chance to elicit facts supporting an affirmance of the trial court’s ruling as the record indicates that it had a full and fair opportunity to present whatever facts it chose to mee

2025And when faced 7 See (Prince) Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 718 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies where “the police engaged in lawful and unlawful processes in parallel,” not where, as here, “the police had mutually exclusive options and . . . chose the option that turned out to be unlawful”); West v. United States, 100 A.3d 1076, 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (noting that the plain- view exception to the Fourth Amendment applies only where police can see an incriminating object from a lawful position). 24 with the government’s failure to preserve such argume

2024See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016) 10 As noted above, the trial court ruled that the government had demonstrated that discovery of the rifle was not related to the stop.

2017Although it does not explicitly say so, the government is invoking the (…continued) affirmance, ―the contours of the inevitable discovery doctrine, a carefully crafted exception to the exclusionary rule with strict requirements, would be subject to end-runs, because the possibility of an alternative means of discovery could often be repackaged as a reason to reject an expectation of privacy in the first place‖ (citation omitted). 32 ―good-faith exception.‖ Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 239 (2011).

2017See United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that to rely on the inevitable-discovery doctrine the government must prove a lawful means by which it would have obtained the evidence, and that it is insufficient to prove merely that "the evidence would have been discovered as a consequence of [an] illegal search of [a third party], to which [the defendant] could not object”). .The MPD owned another unit, but it was not working properly the day of the search. .

2017See United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that to rely on the inevitable-discovery doctrine the government must prove a lawful means by which it would have obtained the evidence, and that it is insufficient to prove merely that ―the evidence would have been discovered as a consequence of [an] illegal search of [a third party], to which [the defendant] could not object‖). 31 The MPD owned another unit, but it was not working properly the day of the search. 29 the constitutionally invalid seizure‖ of Mr. Jones.

2016United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1980) (“the police must show that when the illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing the evidence or leads that would have led to the discovery of the challenged witness”); see United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation”); Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004) (rape victim’s identification of defendant’s voice during an illegal stop admissible becaus

2016United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 2014) (We do not "limit the inevitable discovery exception to lines of investigation that were already underway”); and United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n alternate, independent line of investigation is not required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply”).

2016United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 2014) (We do not "limit the inevitable discovery exception to lines of investigation that were already underway”); and United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n alternate, independent line of investigation is not required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply”).

2016United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1980) (“the police must show that when the illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing the evidence or leads that would have led to the discovery of the challenged witness”); see United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation”); Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004) (rape victim’s identification of defendant’s voice during an illegal stop admissible becaus

2016United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1980) (“the police must show that when the illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing the evidence or leads that would have led to the discovery of the challenged witness”); see United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation”); Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004) (rape victim’s identification of defendant’s voice during an illegal stop admissible becaus

2016United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1980) (“the police must show that when the illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing the evidence or leads that would have led to the discovery of the challenged witness”); see United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation”); Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004) (rape victim’s identification of defendant’s voice during an illegal stop admissible becaus

2016United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1980) (“the police must show that when the illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing the evidence or leads that would have led to the discovery of the challenged witness”); see United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation”); Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004) (rape victim’s identification of defendant’s voice during an illegal stop admissible becaus

2016See also concurring opinion in Thomas, supra, 524 F.3d at 862 ("Even if the police were not actively pursuing an alternative line of investigation at the time of police error .., the government may well be able to establish [inevitable discovery].”).

2016The inevitable discovery doctrine should not be applied under the prior investigation requirement, however, when an ongoing investigation is unrelated to the evidence illegally obtained, see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendant being investigated in relation to homicide when illegal search uncovered unrelated shotgun).

2016United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1980) (“the police must show that when the illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing the evidence or leads that would have led to the discovery of the challenged witness”); see United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation”); Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004) (rape victim’s identification of defendant’s voice during an illegal stop admissible becaus

2016United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1980) (“the police must show that when the illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing the evidence or leads that would have led to the discovery of the challenged witness”); see United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation”); Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004) (rape victim’s identification of defendant’s voice during an illegal stop admissible becaus

2016United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 2014) (We do not "limit the inevitable discovery exception to lines of investigation that were already underway”); and United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n alternate, independent line of investigation is not required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply”).

2016United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 2014) (We do not "limit the inevitable discovery exception to lines of investigation that were already underway”); and United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n alternate, independent line of investigation is not required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply”).

2015Appellant emphasizes that application of the doctrine is confined “to cases in which discovery of the evidence is truly inevitable,” such that “the court is persuaded with certainty that the evidence would have been discovered lawfully.” United States v. Allen, 436 A.2d 1303, 1310 (D.C. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hilliard v. United States, 638 A.2d 698, 707 (D.C. 1994) (“The facts of this case fall within the parameters of the [inevitable discovery] rule” because “discovery of the weapon was certain[.]”). 16 Appellant notes that even though the Council amended the list

2014See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 661-62 (D.C.1999) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine); Al- Mahdi v. United States, 867 A.2d 1011, 1023-24 (D.C.2005) (applying the independent source rule).

1997See Speight v. United States, 671 A.2d 442, 454 (D.C.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 375 , 136 L.Ed.2d 264 (1996) (holding that suppression of illegally seized car keys was not required because following legally justified arrest police would have inevitably discovered the keys).

1997See Speight v. United States, 671 A.2d 442, 454 (D.C.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 375 , 136 L.Ed.2d 264 (1996) (holding that suppression of illegally seized car keys was not required because following legally justified arrest police would have inevitably discovered the keys).