inevitable discovery doctrine in New York

2024Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, the physical evidence recovered by and in the lake was not primary evidence, i.e., the very evidence obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the police's illegal conduct to which the inevitable discovery exception does not apply ( see People v Stith , 69 NY2d at 318 ; People v Fitzpatrick , 32 NY2d at 506-507 ; People v Watson , 188 AD2d at 501 ).

2024Under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, "courts have refused to suppress evidence if it can be shown by 'a very high degree of probability' that the evidence sought to be suppressed would inevitably have been discovered irrespective of the initial wrong" ( People v Stith , 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987] [internal citations omitted]).

2024In applying the inevitable discovery exception, the People must demonstrate a "very high degree of probability" that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence "independently of [a] tainted source" ( People v Turriago , 90 NY2d 77, 86 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Watson , 188 AD2d 501, 501 ).

2024However, "the inevitable discovery exception can validly apply to permit the use of secondary evidence, obtained as a result of information gleaned from or by other exploitation of, the tainted primary evidence" ( People v Turriago , 90 NY2d at 86 ).

2024Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, the physical evidence recovered by and in the lake was not primary evidence, i.e., the very evidence obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the police's illegal conduct to which the inevitable discovery exception does not apply ( see People v Stith , 69 NY2d at 318 ; People v Fitzpatrick , 32 NY2d at 506-507 ; People v Watson , 188 AD2d at 501 ).

2023In any event, we find that the record supports the court's alternative holding that [*2]the inevitable discovery doctrine applied, because there was a high degree of probability that the police would have eventually obtained a copy of defendant's DNA profile as the result of DNA he had provided in connection with an unrelated case, and matched it to the samples taken from the rape victims ( see People v Turriago , 90 NY2d 77, 85-86 [1997]; People v Fitzpatrick , 32 NY2d 499, 505-506 [1973]; People v Adams , 120 AD3d 1253, 1255 [2d Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1081 [2014]).

2012Moreover, despite the People’s contention to the contrary, the card was not admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, since the card constituted primary, rather than secondary, evidence (see People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318-319 [1987]; People v Mais, 71 AD3d 1163, 1164-1165 [2010]; People v Lindsey, 13 AD3d 651, 652 [2004]).

2012Moreover, despite the People’s contention to the contrary, the card was not admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, since the card constituted primary, rather than secondary, evidence (see People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318-319 [1987]; People v Mais, 71 AD3d 1163, 1164-1165 [2010]; People v Lindsey, 13 AD3d 651, 652 [2004]).

2017Indeed, the court properly determined that "[a] cursory search of [d]efendant's person would have resulted in finding the subject gun regardless of any admission by [d]efendant that a gun was on his person." Under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, evidence that would otherwise have been suppressed pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine will be deemed admissible " where the normal course of police investigation would, in any case, even absent the illicit conduct, have inevitably led to such evidence' " ( People v Garcia , 101 AD3d 1604, 1605-1606 , lv denied 20 NY3d 1098 , quo

2017Indeed, the court properly determined that “[a] cursory search of [d]efendant’s person would have resulted in finding the subject gun regardless of any admission by [defendant that a gun was on his person.” Under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, evidence that would otherwise have been suppressed pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine will be deemed admissible “ ‘where the normal course of police investigation would, in any case, even absent the illicit conduct, have inevitably led to such evidence’ ” (People v Garcia, 101 AD3d 1604 , 1605-1606 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1098

1999In applying the inevitable discovery exception, the Court of Appeals requires the People to demonstrate a “very high degree of probability” that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence “independently of the tainted source” (People v Payton, 45 NY2d 300, 313 , revd on other grounds 445 US 573 , on remand 51 NY2d 169 ).

1997In applying the inevitable discovery exception, we require the prosecution to demonstrate a "very high degree of probability” that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence "independently of [a] tainted source” (People v Payton, 45 NY2d 300, 313 , revd on other grounds 445 US 573 , on remand 51 NY2d 169 ).

2024Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, the physical evidence recovered by and in the lake was not primary evidence, i.e., the very evidence obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the police's illegal conduct to which the inevitable discovery exception does not apply ( see People v Stith , 69 NY2d at 318 ; People v Fitzpatrick , 32 NY2d at 506-507 ; People v Watson , 188 AD2d at 501 ).

2024In applying the inevitable discovery exception, the People must demonstrate a "very high degree of probability" that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence "independently of [a] tainted source" ( People v Turriago , 90 NY2d 77, 86 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Watson , 188 AD2d 501, 501 ).

2004The policy rationale behind the inevitable discovery exception is that precluding evidence which would have been discovered in any event through lawful means does not excuse the unlawful police conduct, but reduces the defendant's opportunity to receive an undeserved benefit, and prevents "the prosecution [from being] put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police error misconduct." Nix v Williams, 467 US 431, 443 (1984) (emphasis in original), see People v. Fitzpatrick , 32 NY2d at 507 .

1997Fitzpatrick recognized that " 'if properly administered [the test for application of the inevitable discovery rule] denie[s] * * * the government the use of evidence [obtained by exploitation of illegality] and at the same time minimizes the opportunity for the defendant to receive an undeserved and socially undesirable bonanza’ ” (id., at 507 [quoting Maguire, How To Unpoison the Fruit — The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J Crim L, Criminology & Police Sci 307, 317]) Similarly, the Supreme Court in Nix v Williams ( 467 US 431 ) noted, on the one hand, that the exclusionary rul

2013The People, however, did not raise the inevitable discovery doctrine as a ground for denying suppression of the gun, nor did they meet their burden of “demonstrating] a very high degree of probability that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence independently of [a] tainted source” (People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 86 [1997], rearg denied 90 NY2d 936 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499, 507 [1973], cert denied 414 US 1033 , 1050 [1973]; People v Walker, 198 AD2d 785, 787 [1993]; cf. People v Watson, 188 AD2d 501, 502 [199

2013The People, however, did not raise the inevitable discovery doctrine as a ground for denying suppression of the gun, nor did they meet their burden of “demonstrating] a very high degree of probability that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence independently of [a] tainted source” (People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 86 [1997], rearg denied 90 NY2d 936 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499, 507 [1973], cert denied 414 US 1033 , 1050 [1973]; People v Walker, 198 AD2d 785, 787 [1993]; cf. People v Watson, 188 AD2d 501, 502 [199

2015However, as the People now correctly concede, the court erred in its determination that the jewelry inevitably would have been discovered through normal police procedures, as the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to primary evidence, that is, “the very evidence obtained in the illegal search,” such as the jewelry at issue here (People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987]; see People v Julien, 100 AD3d 925, 927 [2012]; People v Mais, 71 AD3d 1163, 1165 [2010]).

2012Moreover, despite the People’s contention to the contrary, the card was not admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, since the card constituted primary, rather than secondary, evidence (see People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318-319 [1987]; People v Mais, 71 AD3d 1163, 1164-1165 [2010]; People v Lindsey, 13 AD3d 651, 652 [2004]).

2013Further, even if a founded suspicion of criminal activity supported the police officer’s inquiry (see Garcia, 20 NY3d at 322-323 ), we are precluded from affirming with respect to the court’s refusal to suppress the gun “on a theory not reached by the suppression court” (People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948, 949 [2012]; see People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195 [2011]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 473-474 [1998], rearg denied 94 NY2d 849 [1999]).

2013Further, even if a founded suspicion of criminal activity supported the police officer’s inquiry (see Garcia, 20 NY3d at 322-323 ), we are precluded from affirming with respect to the court’s refusal to suppress the gun “on a theory not reached by the suppression court” (People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948, 949 [2012]; see People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195 [2011]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 473-474 [1998], rearg denied 94 NY2d 849 [1999]).

2020Nevertheless, the court's error in refusing to suppress the contents of the diabetes bag is harmless inasmuch as the evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming, and there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to defendant's conviction ( see generally People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; Garcia , 101 AD3d at 1606).

2014Given that defendant preserved his specific constitutional arguments for suppressing the photos, the error in denying his motion requires reversal unless it was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]).

2012It thus follows that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply where “the evidence sought to be suppressed is the very evidence obtained in the illegal search [and seizure]” (People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987]; see Turriago, 90 NY2d at 86 ; People v James, 256 AD2d 1149, 1149 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 875 [1999]).

2012It thus follows that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply where “the evidence sought to be suppressed is the very evidence obtained in the illegal search [and seizure]” (People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987]; see Turriago, 90 NY2d at 86 ; People v James, 256 AD2d 1149, 1149 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 875 [1999]).

2013Further, even if a founded suspicion of criminal activity supported the police officer’s inquiry (see Garcia, 20 NY3d at 322-323 ), we are precluded from affirming with respect to the court’s refusal to suppress the gun “on a theory not reached by the suppression court” (People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948, 949 [2012]; see People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195 [2011]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 473-474 [1998], rearg denied 94 NY2d 849 [1999]).

2013Further, even if a founded suspicion of criminal activity supported the police officer’s inquiry (see Garcia, 20 NY3d at 322-323 ), we are precluded from affirming with respect to the court’s refusal to suppress the gun “on a theory not reached by the suppression court” (People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948, 949 [2012]; see People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195 [2011]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 473-474 [1998], rearg denied 94 NY2d 849 [1999]).

2013Further, even if a founded suspicion of criminal activity supported the police officer’s inquiry (see Garcia, 20 NY3d at 322-323 ), we are precluded from affirming with respect to the court’s refusal to suppress the gun “on a theory not reached by the suppression court” (People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948, 949 [2012]; see People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195 [2011]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 473-474 [1998], rearg denied 94 NY2d 849 [1999]).

2013Further, even if a founded suspicion of criminal activity supported the police officer’s inquiry (see Garcia, 20 NY3d at 322-323 ), we are precluded from affirming with respect to the court’s refusal to suppress the gun “on a theory not reached by the suppression court” (People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948, 949 [2012]; see People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195 [2011]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 473-474 [1998], rearg denied 94 NY2d 849 [1999]).

2012People v Doll, 98 AD3d 356, 362 [2012]).

2012People v Doll, 98 AD3d 356, 362 [2012]).

2017Here, defendant's statement admitting his possession of the handgun was the tainted primary evidence arising from the unlawful pre- Miranda custodial interrogation and must be suppressed ( see People v Stith , 69 NY2d 313, 320 ); however, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies to the handgun as secondary evidence arising therefrom ( see People v Turriago , 90 NY2d 77, 86 , rearg denied 90 NY2d 936 ; People v Dempsey , 177 AD2d 1018, 1019 , lv denied 79 NY2d 946 ).

2017Here, defendant’s statement admitting his possession of the handgun was the tainted primary evidence arising from the unlawful pre-Miranda custodial interrogation and must be suppressed (see People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 320 [1987]); however, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies to the handgun as secondary evidence arising therefrom (see People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 86 [1997], rearg denied 90 NY2d 936 [1997]; People v Dempsey, 177 AD2d 1018, 1019 [1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 946 [1992]).

2020The contents of the diabetes bag that defendant sought to suppress was the "very evidence" that was obtained as the "immediate consequence of the challenged police conduct" ( People v Stith , 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987]; see People v Garcia , 101 AD3d 1604 , 1606 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1098 [2013]), and thus the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable here ( see Garcia , 101 AD3d at 1606).

2020The contents of the diabetes bag that defendant sought to suppress was the "very evidence" that was obtained as the "immediate consequence of the challenged police conduct" ( People v Stith , 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987]; see People v Garcia , 101 AD3d 1604 , 1606 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1098 [2013]), and thus the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable here ( see Garcia , 101 AD3d at 1606).

2008Here, the People showed “by a ‘very high degree of probability that the evidence in question would have been obtained independently of the tainted source’ ” (People v Binns, 299 AD2d 651, 653 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 612 [2003], quoting People v Payton, 45 NY2d 300, 313 [1978], revd on other grounds 445 US 573 [1980]; see People v Turriago, 90 NY2d at 86 ). 1 We next address County Court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress computer evidence seized from his home.

2004Notwithstanding that the inculpatory cooperation of the defendant, directing the detectives to the dresser, was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, the guns recovered from the dresser were properly received in evidence pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule as the People established a very high degree of probability that the evidence in question would have been obtained independently of the tainted source (see People v Binns, 299 AD2d 651 [2002]; People v Brown, 259 AD2d 985 [1999]; People v Watson, 188 AD2d 501 [1992]).

2008While evidence that has been illegally obtained may not generally be used against a defendant in his or her trial (see People v Arnau, 58 NY2d 27, 32 [1982], cert denied 468 US 1217 [1984]), under the inevitable discovery rule, secondary evidence obtained as a result of information derived from an illegal search is admissible if normal police conduct would have inevitably led to the evidence (see People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 85 [1997]; People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499, 506 [1973], certs denied 414 US 1033 , 1050 [1973]).

1987We reach the same conclusions by applying the exclusionary rule established under our State law (see, People v Bethea, 67 NY2d 364 ; People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398 ; People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417 ; People v Gokey, 60 NY2d 309 ; People v Elwell, 50 NY2d 231 ; cf., People v Arnau, 58 NY2d 27 ), our New York cases enunciating the inevitable discovery doctrine (see, People v Payton, 45 NY2d 300; People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499 ; cf., People v Knapp, 52 NY2d 689 ), and non-Federal decisions and other authorities which we find persuasive (see, State v Crossen, 21 Ore App 835, 536 P2d 1263 ; see als

2004Moreover, the drugs seized were “primary evidence,” the very evidence obtained in the illegal search (People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318-319 [1987]; see People v Vega, 256 AD2d 730, 731-732 [1998]; People v Julio, 245 AD2d 158 [1997]).

2002It is well recognized that the doctrine of inevitable discovery “applies only to secondary evidence, not to the very items uncovered in an illegal search” (People v Vega, 256 AD2d 730, 732 , lv denied 93 NY2d 858 ; see People v Turriago, supra at 86). “[P]rimary evidence, i.e., the Very evidence * * * obtained during or as the immediate consequence’ of the illegal conduct, would still be subject to exclusion even if it would most likely have been discovered in the course of routine police procedures” (People v Turriago, supra at 86 , quoting People v Stith, supra at 318 ).

1997Moreover, even if Blum’s search were “poisoned” by an unjustified request to search the vehicle for more beer bottles (see, People v Hollman, supra; People v De Bour, supra), it is our view that the facts in this case clearly fall within the inevitable discovery exception to the rule which excludes evidence tainted by questionable police procedures (see, People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499 , cert denied 414 US 1033 ).

1996"We hold that applying the inevitable discovery rule in these circumstances, and effecting what would amount to a post hoc rationalization of the initial wrong (see, Nix v Williams [ 467 US 431 ], at 448), would be an unacceptable dilution of the exclusionary rule.” Logically, the subsequent discovery that none of the persons in the rental van was authorized to operate the vehicle cannot serve as a predicate to the request to search (People v Hollman, supra, at 191-192 ; People v De Bour, supra, at 222; People v Boyd, 188 AD2d 239, 243 ).