inevitable discovery doctrine in Florida

2024However, under the inevitable discovery exception, “evidence obtained as the result of unconstitutional police procedure may still be admissible provided the 4 evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means.” Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298, 301 (Fla. 1993); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984) (“[I]f the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial pr

2019The inevitable discovery doctrine "balance[s] the need to deter police misconduct with the societal cost of allowing obviously guilty persons to go free." Rodriguez, 187 So. 3d at 845 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).

2024However, under the inevitable discovery exception, “evidence obtained as the result of unconstitutional police procedure may still be admissible provided the 4 evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means.” Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298, 301 (Fla. 1993); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984) (“[I]f the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial pr

2019The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule, which states that "evidence obtained as the result of unconstitutional police procedure may still be admissible provided the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means." Clayton v. State, 252 So. 3d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298, 301 (Fla. 1993)).

2019See Moody, 842 So. 2d at 759 (finding the inevitable discovery doctrine inapplicable where the police were not already in possession of facts that would have led to the evidence notwithstanding the police misconduct).

2015In other words, the case must be in such a posture that the facts already in the possession of the police would have led to this evidence notwithstanding the police misconduct, See Moody, 842 So.2d at 759 . federal law suggests that the inevitable discovery doctrine will not be.applied in every case where the police had probable cause for a search warrant, but failed to get one.

2018The inevitable discovery doctrine requires the State to establish that the police ultimately would have discovered the evidence independently of any improper police conduct by “means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure.” Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857, 863 (Fla. 1987) (citations omitted).

2015In applying the inevitable discovery rule, we have held that evidence discovered by the police based on a constitutional violation is not subject to suppression if the evidence “would have been found independently ... by means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure.” Craig v. State, 510 So.2d 857, 863 (Fla.1987).

2018This Court addressed the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine in McDonnell v. State, 981 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

2018While we held that “the inevitable discovery doctrine will not be applied in every case where the police had probable cause for a search warrant, but 4 failed to get one,” the focus is on “whether the police made an effort to get a warrant prior to the illegal search and whether strong probable cause existed for the search warrant.” Id. (emphasis added).

2015See Moody, 842 So.2d at 759 (refusing to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine where police, prior to unconstitutionally stopping a defendant for driving without a license, had neither initiated an investigation of the defendant nor obtained facts in their possession that would have led to the discovery of the evidence); Jeffries, 797 So.2d at 578 (refusing to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine where the police improperly detained the defendant, had not yet obtained a warrant for his arrest, and were merely speculating as to his whereabouts).

2015See Moody, 842 So. 2d at 759 (refusing to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine where police, prior to unconstitutionally stopping a defendant for driving without a license, had neither initiated an investigation of the defendant nor obtained facts in their possession that would have led to the discovery of the evidence); Jeffries, 797 So. 2d at 578 (refusing to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine where the police improperly detained the defendant, had not yet obtained a warrant for his arrest, and were merely speculating as to his whereabouts).

2017Cf. Young v. State, 207 So.3d 267, 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“The inevitable discovery doctrine allows evidence obtained as the result of unconstitutional police procedure to be admitted if the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means.” (quoting Hatcher v. State, 834 So.2d 314, 317-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003))).

2016“The inevitable discovery doctrine allows evidence obtained as the result of unconstitutional police procedure to be admitted if the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means.” Hatcher v. State, 834 So.2d 314, 317-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

2024The State contends that the inevitable discovery principle applies to blood alcohol evidence derived from warrantless blood draws, citing Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 514 (Fla. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Alahad v. State, 362 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 2023).

2018Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search "may still be admissible provided the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means." Rodriguez, 187 So. 3d at 845 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 514 (Fla. 2005)).

2024Otherwise, “application of the inevitable discovery rule would effectively nullify the requirement of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 850 . 6 violated a statute providing greater protection against searches or seizures than the minimum required by the Fourth Amendment.

2024The State points to language in Rodriguez, 187 So. 3d at 849 , where the Florida Supreme Court said it would apply the inevitable discovery doctrine if officers illegally entered a home but were in the process of obtaining a warrant when entry was made. 4 But Rodriguez, like Hudson, was a Fourth Amendment case.

2015Rowell v. State, 83 So.3d 990, 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, the evidence. will be admissible.” (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 434 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 )).

2015I would disapprove the decision in Rowell v. State, 83 So.3d 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), to the extent that it adopted a categorical rule,; also adopted by the majority here, that pursuit of a search.warrant is prerequisite to application of the inevitable discovery doctrine when the existence of probable cause justifying issuance of a search warrant is the basis asserted for the application of the doctrine.

2014See Cummings v. State, 956 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine, as that doctrine “requires the state to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the police ultimately would have discovered the evidence independently of the improper police conduct by ‘means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure’ ” (quoting Craig v. State, 510 So.2d 857, 863 (Fla.1987))); Carter v. State, 868 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (declining to a

2014See Cummings v. State, 956 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine, as that doctrine “requires the state to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the police ultimately would have discovered the evidence independently of the improper police conduct by ‘means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure’” (quoting Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857, 863 (Fla. 1987))); Carter v. State, 868 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (declining t

2015Likewise, the First District has reaffirmed that “the inevitable discovery doctrine may be' employed to deem a search lawful if probable cause to obtain a warrant existed and officers are ‘in the process of obtaining a warrant’ when the search occurs.” King v. State, 79 So.3d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

2015In King , the First District found that the trial court erred in relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine where “the officer testified that he did not attempt to get a warrant, and the State’ presented no evidence suggesting he did.” Id.

2019Weekly D2404 , D2406 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 26, 2018) (holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to support the admission of videos obtained from a laptop computer even though the police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant when the police were not actively pursuing a search warrant); Clayton v. State, 252 So. 3d 827, 829-31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to evidence of indoor marijuana cultivation found in a home despite the fact that the officers had probable cause to obtain a search warrant because the officers had no

2019The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule, which states that "evidence obtained as the result of unconstitutional police procedure may still be admissible provided the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means." Clayton v. State, 252 So. 3d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298, 301 (Fla. 1993)).

2015See United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.2008) (requiring the government “to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant, to prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.2009) (reaffirming the rejection of the Virden standard as explained in Tejada and applying a “harmless error” approach); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199 ; 1204 (10th Cir.2005) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine after a warrantless search of a home where “officers’ actions c

2015See United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008) (requiring the government “to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant, to prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the rejection of the Virden standard as explained in Tejada and applying a “harmless error” approach); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine after a warrantless search of a home where “officers’ actions

2014See Cummings v. State, 956 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine, as that doctrine “requires the state to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the police ultimately would have discovered the evidence independently of the improper police conduct by ‘means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure’ ” (quoting Craig v. State, 510 So.2d 857, 863 (Fla.1987))); Carter v. State, 868 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (declining to a

2014See Cummings v. State, 956 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine, as that doctrine “requires the state to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the police ultimately would have discovered the evidence independently of the improper police conduct by ‘means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure’” (quoting Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857, 863 (Fla. 1987))); Carter v. State, 868 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (declining t

2008Had Officer Brownfield immediately explained the reason for the stop when he made personal contact with Appellants, rather than first asking Appellants for their identification, he would have still smelled marijuana and thus developed probable cause to detain Appellants."); Jones v. State, 758 So.2d 722, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (citing Maulden, 617 So.2d at 298 , for the proposition that "under `inevitable discovery' doctrine, evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search is admissible if the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means"); A.J.M. v. State, 746 So.2d 122

2008Had Officer Brownfield immediately explained the reason for the stop when he made personal contact with Appellants, rather than first asking Appellants for their identification, he would have still smelled marijuana and thus developed probable cause to detain Appellants.”); Jones v. State, 758 So.2d 722, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (citing Maulden, 617 So.2d at 298 , for the proposition that “under ‘inevitable discovery’ doctrine, evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search is admissible if the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means”); A.J.M. v. State, 746 So.2d 122

2008See, e.g., State v. Duggins, 691 So.2d 566, 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“The inevitable discovery rule is an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

2003See State v. Duggins, 691 So.2d 566, 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Bowen v. State, 685 So.2d 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (holding that speculation may not play a part in the inevitable discovery rule and that the focus must be on demonstrated fact capable of verification).

2015See United States v. Quinney, 583 F.3d 891, 894 (6th Cir.2009) (rejecting “the government’s attempt to circumvent the [warrant] requirement via the [inevitable discovery] doctrine,” when probable cause, to obtain a. warrant existed but officers failed to. do so); Virden, 488 F.3d at 1322 (explaining that the .active pursuit requirement is especially important as to not eviscerate the exclusionary rule); United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that the court “has never applied the inevitable discovery exception so as to excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant wher

2015See United States v. Quinney, 583 F.3d 891, 894 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting “the government’s attempt to circumvent the [warrant] requirement via the [inevitable discovery] doctrine,” when probable cause to obtain a warrant existed but officers failed to do so); Virden, 488 F.3d at 1322 (explaining that the active pursuit requirement is especially important as to not eviscerate the exclusionary rule); United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the court “has never applied the inevitable discovery exception so as to excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant where

2015See United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.2008) (requiring the government “to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant, to prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.2009) (reaffirming the rejection of the Virden standard as explained in Tejada and applying a “harmless error” approach); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199 ; 1204 (10th Cir.2005) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine after a warrantless search of a home where “officers’ actions c

2015See United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008) (requiring the government “to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant, to prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the rejection of the Virden standard as explained in Tejada and applying a “harmless error” approach); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine after a warrantless search of a home where “officers’ actions

2013The majority opinion in McDonnell surveyed a number of federal cases, including United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.2007), and United States v. Reilly, 224 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.2000), before concluding: Thus, federal law suggests that the inevitable discovery doctrine will not be applied in every case where the police had probable cause for a warrant, but failed to get one.

2012In McDonnell v. State, 981 So.2d 585, 592-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), this court recognized that the inevitable discovery doctrine will not be applied in every case where the police had probable cause for a search warrant; the focus is on whether officers made an effort to get a warrant prior to searching and whether strong probable cause existed for the warrant. “ ‘[T]o excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.’ ” U.S. v. Reilly, 224 F.

2004See State v. LeCroy, 435 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

1987State v. LeCroy, 435 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 907 , 105 S.Ct. 3532 , 87 L.Ed.2d 656 (1985).

2024There, we stated, “We conclude that the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable in cases in which section 933.09 is violated, as the application of the doctrine to evidence seized in violation of the knock and announce rule would render section 933.09 and the policy behind the rule meaningless.” Kellom, 849 So. 2d at 396 ; see also State v. Robinson, 565 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (noting that if inevitable discovery applied whenever the knock-and-announce statute was violated, its application would undo the statutory requirement).

2003See State v. Robinson, 565 So.2d 730, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (noting that if the rule of inevitable discovery was applied to all cases in which primary evidence was seized in violation of the knock and announce requirement, the rule would emasculate the requirement); see also United States v. Shugart, 889 F.Supp. 963, 977 (E.D.Tex.1995) (noting that the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to the evidence seized after a clear violation of the knock and announce requirement would completely eviscerate the fundamental privacy and safety interests that the requirement seeks to secure)

2019Such a rule would eviscerate the warrant requirement. - 14 - 252 So. 3d at 831 ; see also Rodriguez, 187 So. 3d at 850 ; Young v. State, 207 So. 3d 267, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016); Rowell v. State, 83 So. 3d 990, 995 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine will not be applied in every case where the police had probable cause for a search warrant, but failed to get one." (quoting McDonnell v. State, 981 So. 2d 585, 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008))).

2017Cf. Young v. State, 207 So.3d 267, 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“The inevitable discovery doctrine allows evidence obtained as the result of unconstitutional police procedure to be admitted if the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means.” (quoting Hatcher v. State, 834 So.2d 314, 317-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003))).

2018"A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and the court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." Id. at 845 (quoting Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 958 (Fla. 1996)). "[A]ppellate courts defer to the trial court's factual findings so long as the findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and review de novo the legal question of whether there was probable cause given the totality of the fact

2018"A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and the court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." Id. at 845 (quoting Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 958 (Fla. 1996)). "[A]ppellate courts defer to the trial court's factual findings so long as the findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and review de novo the legal question of whether there was probable cause given the totality of the fact

2019The inevitable discovery rule requires that there is "a 'reasonable probability' that the evidence would have been discovered despite the improper police procedure." Rodriguez v. State, 187 So. 3d 841, 846 (Fla. 2015) (quoting United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980)).

2019The inevitable discovery rule requires that there is "a 'reasonable probability' that the evidence would have been discovered despite the improper police procedure." Rodriguez v. State, 187 So. 3d 841, 846 (Fla. 2015) (quoting United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980)).

2025See Jones, 279 So. 3d at 347; see also State v. Ojeda, 147 So. 3d 53, 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (explaining that “under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence otherwise subject to suppression can be admitted if the State shows that the officers ultimately would have discovered the evidence independently of the improper police conduct by means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure” (quotations omitted)).

2019Nix , 467 U.S. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 . "[T]he 'exclusionary rule' has no application where the government can show it has learned of the challenged evidence from an 'independent source.' The rule applies where the illegal search or seizure was not an actual cause of the discovery of the subject evidence." State v. Ojeda , 147 So.3d 53 , 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

2015See United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.2008) (requiring the government “to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant, to prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.2009) (reaffirming the rejection of the Virden standard as explained in Tejada and applying a “harmless error” approach); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199 ; 1204 (10th Cir.2005) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine after a warrantless search of a home where “officers’ actions c

2015See United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008) (requiring the government “to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant, to prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the rejection of the Virden standard as explained in Tejada and applying a “harmless error” approach); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine after a warrantless search of a home where “officers’ actions

2015See United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.2008) (requiring the government “to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant, to prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.2009) (reaffirming the rejection of the Virden standard as explained in Tejada and applying a “harmless error” approach); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199 ; 1204 (10th Cir.2005) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine after a warrantless search of a home where “officers’ actions c

2015See United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008) (requiring the government “to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant, to prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the rejection of the Virden standard as explained in Tejada and applying a “harmless error” approach); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine after a warrantless search of a home where “officers’ actions