Miller test in Maryland

2022Despite the procedural function of Miller’s rule, Montgomery held that the Miller rule was substantive for retroactivity purposes and therefore applied retroactively on collateral review. 577 U.S. at 206, 212 , 136 S. Ct. 718 .

2022Despite the procedural function of Miller’s rule, Montgomery held that the Miller rule was substantive for retroactivity purposes and therefore applied retroactively on collateral review. 577 U.S. at 206, 212 , 136 S. Ct. 718 .

2022Yet the Court said that even in that “highly unlikely scenario, the defendant may have a potential ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim, not a Miller claim[.]” Id., 141 S. Ct. at 1320 n.6 (emphasis added).

2022Yet the Court said that even in that “highly unlikely scenario, the defendant may have a potential ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim, not a Miller claim[.]” Id., 141 S. Ct. at 1320 n.6 (emphasis added).

2018"The Miller standard, like its predecessors, was an accommodation between the State's interests in protecting the 'sensibilities of unwilling recipients' from exposure to pornographic material and the dangers of censorship inherent in unabashedly content-based laws." Ferber , 458 U.S. at 756 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 (quoting Miller , 413 U.S. at 18 -19 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 ).

2018"The Miller standard, like its predecessors, was an accommodation between the State's interests in protecting the 'sensibilities of unwilling recipients' from exposure to pornographic material and the dangers of censorship inherent in unabashedly content-based laws." Ferber , 458 U.S. at 756 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 (quoting Miller , 413 U.S. at 18 -19 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 ).

2023In fact, the Ferber Court’s “adjustment” of the Miller standard for the child pornography context removes the requirement that Hillie and now Turenne argue for—that the image must be objectively sexual without regard to the mental state or preferences of the defendant. 17 We also highlight the last line of the Hillie court’s explanation, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Williams that the conduct defined in the federal statute must be more “hard-core” than that defined in New York’s statute, since the federal statute proscribes imagery of minors engaged in “sexually explicit conduc

2023In fact, the Ferber Court’s “adjustment” of the Miller standard for the child pornography context removes the requirement that Hillie and now Turenne argue for—that the image must be objectively sexual without regard to the mental state or preferences of the defendant. 17 We also highlight the last line of the Hillie court’s explanation, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Williams that the conduct defined in the federal statute must be more “hard-core” than that defined in New York’s statute, since the federal statute proscribes imagery of minors engaged in “sexually explicit conduc

2023In fact, the Ferber Court’s “adjustment” of the Miller standard for the child pornography context removes the requirement that Hillie and now Turenne argue for—that the image must be objectively sexual without regard to the mental state or preferences of the defendant. 17 We also highlight the last line of the Hillie court’s explanation, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Williams that the conduct defined in the federal statute must be more “hard-core” than that defined in New York’s statute, since the federal statute proscribes imagery of minors engaged in “sexually explicit conduc

2023In fact, the Ferber Court’s “adjustment” of the Miller standard for the child pornography context removes the requirement that Hillie and now Turenne argue for—that the image must be objectively sexual without regard to the mental state or preferences of the defendant. 17 We also highlight the last line of the Hillie court’s explanation, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Williams that the conduct defined in the federal statute must be more “hard-core” than that defined in New York’s statute, since the federal statute proscribes imagery of minors engaged in “sexually explicit conduc

2021We noted that Hartless did not rely on Miller for this argument, stating: “Indeed, if a Miller violation can be remedied simply by permitting a juvenile offender to be considered for parole, it is illogical to suggest that Montgomery and Miller somehow require an individualized sentencing process for all juveniles convicted of homicide, regardless of whether they are sentenced to life with or without parole.” Id. at 87 .

2021We noted that Hartless did not rely on Miller for this argument, stating: “Indeed, if a Miller violation can be remedied simply by permitting a juvenile offender to be considered for parole, it is illogical to suggest that Montgomery and Miller somehow require an individualized sentencing process for all juveniles convicted of homicide, regardless of whether they are sentenced to life with or without parole.” Id. at 87 .

2021All we decide today is that Mr. Miller’s violation does not constitute absconding. 10 On this point, we find State v. Ford, 134 P.3d 959 (Or.

2018Brown v. State , 10 N.E.3d 1 , 7-8 (Ind. 2014) (applying Miller and Graham to 150 year aggregate sentence pursuant to state constitutional authority to review and revise sentences); State v. Null , 836 N.W.2d 41 , 74-77 (Iowa 2013) ("[Constitution of Iowa] requires ... recogniz[ing] and apply[ing] the core teachings of Roper , Graham , and Miller in making sentencing decisions for long prison terms involving juveniles ... [and] consider[ing] whether the imposition of consecutive sentences would result in a prison term of such length that it [is] cruel and unusual punishment[.]"); Commonwealth

2018Brown v. State , 10 N.E.3d 1 , 7-8 (Ind. 2014) (applying Miller and Graham to 150 year aggregate sentence pursuant to state constitutional authority to review and revise sentences); State v. Null , 836 N.W.2d 41 , 74-77 (Iowa 2013) ("[Constitution of Iowa] requires ... recogniz[ing] and apply[ing] the core teachings of Roper , Graham , and Miller in making sentencing decisions for long prison terms involving juveniles ... [and] consider[ing] whether the imposition of consecutive sentences would result in a prison term of such length that it [is] cruel and unusual punishment[.]"); Commonwealth

2018Brown v. State , 10 N.E.3d 1 , 7-8 (Ind. 2014) (applying Miller and Graham to 150 year aggregate sentence pursuant to state constitutional authority to review and revise sentences); State v. Null , 836 N.W.2d 41 , 74-77 (Iowa 2013) ("[Constitution of Iowa] requires ... recogniz[ing] and apply[ing] the core teachings of Roper , Graham , and Miller in making sentencing decisions for long prison terms involving juveniles ... [and] consider[ing] whether the imposition of consecutive sentences would result in a prison term of such length that it [is] cruel and unusual punishment[.]"); Commonwealth

2018Mr. McCullough's parole eligibility is also beyond each potential retirement age discussed in Grant. 887 F.3d 131 , 151-52 (3d Cir. 2018).

2018Brown v. State , 10 N.E.3d 1 , 7-8 (Ind. 2014) (applying Miller and Graham to 150 year aggregate sentence pursuant to state constitutional authority to review and revise sentences); State v. Null , 836 N.W.2d 41 , 74-77 (Iowa 2013) ("[Constitution of Iowa] requires ... recogniz[ing] and apply[ing] the core teachings of Roper , Graham , and Miller in making sentencing decisions for long prison terms involving juveniles ... [and] consider[ing] whether the imposition of consecutive sentences would result in a prison term of such length that it [is] cruel and unusual punishment[.]"); Commonwealth

2017The life sentence for premeditated murder was a mandatory LWOP, The Supreme Court of Minnesota vacated that sentence, State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2014), and remanded for a "Miller hearing.” The trial court did not hold a Miller hearing because the State stipulated to all three life sentences being with parole, When the case returned to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, it held that Miller did not apply to multiple consecutive sentences that, in the aggregate, are the functional equivalent of a LWOP sentence. 32 , Hawkins involved a pre-Graham Eighth Amendment challenge to a juvenile offe

2017The life sentence for premeditated murder was a mandatory LWOP, The Supreme Court of Minnesota vacated that sentence, State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2014), and remanded for a "Miller hearing.” The trial court did not hold a Miller hearing because the State stipulated to all three life sentences being with parole, When the case returned to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, it held that Miller did not apply to multiple consecutive sentences that, in the aggregate, are the functional equivalent of a LWOP sentence. 32 , Hawkins involved a pre-Graham Eighth Amendment challenge to a juvenile offe

2015What was before the jury was “the damages, if any, arising from the tort action of Miller v. Sowell....” Id. at 185 , 553 A.2d 1268 .

2015What was before the jury was “the damages, if any, arising from the tort action of Miller v. Sowell....” Id. at 185 , 553 A.2d 1268 .

2003Cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 , 233 N.Y. 236 (1922); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 , 255 N.Y. 170 (1931). *690 In our view, imposing liability on Mr. Miller’s physicians for Mrs. Miller’s claim, despite the lack of a doctor-patient relationship between them, also falls well within traditional tort principles.

2003Cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 , 233 N.Y. 236 (1922); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 , 255 N.Y. 170 (1931). *690 In our view, imposing liability on Mr. Miller’s physicians for Mrs. Miller’s claim, despite the lack of a doctor-patient relationship between them, also falls well within traditional tort principles.

2003Cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 , 233 N.Y. 236 (1922); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 , 255 N.Y. 170 (1931). *690 In our view, imposing liability on Mr. Miller’s physicians for Mrs. Miller’s claim, despite the lack of a doctor-patient relationship between them, also falls well within traditional tort principles.

2003Cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 , 233 N.Y. 236 (1922); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 , 255 N.Y. 170 (1931). *690 In our view, imposing liability on Mr. Miller’s physicians for Mrs. Miller’s claim, despite the lack of a doctor-patient relationship between them, also falls well within traditional tort principles.

2001Id. at 657-58 .

1988In terms of Maryland law, we agree with Judge Miller’s analysis in Twenty Seven Trust, supra, 533 F.Supp. at 1036 , based on pronouncements in Homer v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 155 Md. 66 , 141 A. 425 (1928), and American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629 , 190 A. 225 (1937), that “Nothing in the present appraisal statute ... or the act from which it is derived ... indicates that statutory appraisal was intended to be a dissenting shareholder’s exclusive remedy in connection with mergers and consolidations under all circumstances.

1988In terms of Maryland law, we agree with Judge Miller’s analysis in Twenty Seven Trust, supra, 533 F.Supp. at 1036 , based on pronouncements in Homer v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 155 Md. 66 , 141 A. 425 (1928), and American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629 , 190 A. 225 (1937), that “Nothing in the present appraisal statute ... or the act from which it is derived ... indicates that statutory appraisal was intended to be a dissenting shareholder’s exclusive remedy in connection with mergers and consolidations under all circumstances.

1988In terms of Maryland law, we agree with Judge Miller’s analysis in Twenty Seven Trust, supra, 533 F.Supp. at 1036 , based on pronouncements in Homer v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 155 Md. 66 , 141 A. 425 (1928), and American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629 , 190 A. 225 (1937), that “Nothing in the present appraisal statute ... or the act from which it is derived ... indicates that statutory appraisal was intended to be a dissenting shareholder’s exclusive remedy in connection with mergers and consolidations under all circumstances.

1988In terms of Maryland law, we agree with Judge Miller’s analysis in Twenty Seven Trust, supra, 533 F.Supp. at 1036 , based on pronouncements in Homer v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 155 Md. 66 , 141 A. 425 (1928), and American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629 , 190 A. 225 (1937), that “Nothing in the present appraisal statute ... or the act from which it is derived ... indicates that statutory appraisal was intended to be a dissenting shareholder’s exclusive remedy in connection with mergers and consolidations under all circumstances.

1988In terms of Maryland law, we agree with Judge Miller’s analysis in Twenty Seven Trust, supra, 533 F.Supp. at 1036 , based on pronouncements in Homer v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 155 Md. 66 , 141 A. 425 (1928), and American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629 , 190 A. 225 (1937), that “Nothing in the present appraisal statute ... or the act from which it is derived ... indicates that statutory appraisal was intended to be a dissenting shareholder’s exclusive remedy in connection with mergers and consolidations under all circumstances.

1988Indeed, Homer and American General suggest to the contrary.” That conclusion was confirmed in Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771 , 511 A.2d 501 (1986), where the Court of Appeals upheld an interlocutory injunction restraining a majority stockholder from proceeding with a “freeze-out” of the minority shareholder through a reverse stock split.

1988Indeed, Homer and American General suggest to the contrary.” That conclusion was confirmed in Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771 , 511 A.2d 501 (1986), where the Court of Appeals upheld an interlocutory injunction restraining a majority stockholder from proceeding with a “freeze-out” of the minority shareholder through a reverse stock split.

1987At the trial of the matter now before us, the appellant, 5297 Pulaski Highway, produced evidence that magazines of substantially the same type as those the court found “sleazy,” “typically ‘black market’ ” and “obscene” were sold in stores within the ordinance proscribed bounds. 7 *604 Additionally, there was evidence that other stores within close proximity to Perryville were displaying and offering for sale similar type magazines. 8 The trial court in the instant case declared that it was in effect applying a “shortcut” we mentioned in Woodruff v. State, 11 Md.App. 202, 273 , A.2d 436 (1971)

1987At the trial of the matter now before us, the appellant, 5297 Pulaski Highway, produced evidence that magazines of substantially the same type as those the court found “sleazy,” “typically ‘black market’ ” and “obscene” were sold in stores within the ordinance proscribed bounds. 7 *604 Additionally, there was evidence that other stores within close proximity to Perryville were displaying and offering for sale similar type magazines. 8 The trial court in the instant case declared that it was in effect applying a “shortcut” we mentioned in Woodruff v. State, 11 Md.App. 202, 273 , A.2d 436 (1971)

1987Gov’t Employees Insur. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717 , 261 A.2d 747 (1970). *668 Giving the words in the exclusionary clause their customary and normal meaning, we have no difficulty in concluding that Miller’s claim against the Pedersens arose out of the use of a motor vehicle owned or operated by an insured.

1987Gov’t Employees Insur. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717 , 261 A.2d 747 (1970). *668 Giving the words in the exclusionary clause their customary and normal meaning, we have no difficulty in concluding that Miller’s claim against the Pedersens arose out of the use of a motor vehicle owned or operated by an insured.