Miller factors in Michigan

2024See Bennett, 335 Mich App at 420 (“While the Miller factors remain highly relevant, a judge resentencing an offender who has served many years in prison has the benefit of actual data regarding whether the offender’s life in prison is truly consistent with ‘irreparable corruption,’ the only ground Miller specifically identified for imposing a life-without-parole sentence.”), and 434 3 We recognized the limited holding of Miller more than a decade ago in People v Eliason, 300 Mich App 293, 309 ; 833 NW2d 357 (2013), remanded by People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 ; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), acknowledging th

2024See Bennett, 335 Mich App at 420 (“While the Miller factors remain highly relevant, a judge resentencing an offender who has served many years in prison has the benefit of actual data regarding whether the offender’s life in prison is truly consistent with ‘irreparable corruption,’ the only ground Miller specifically identified for imposing a life-without-parole sentence.”), and 434 3 We recognized the limited holding of Miller more than a decade ago in People v Eliason, 300 Mich App 293, 309 ; 833 NW2d 357 (2013), remanded by People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 ; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), acknowledging th

2024Despite Miller’s limited holding, what this Court in People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368 ; 891 NW2d 549 (2016), rev’d in part on other grounds by Skinner, 502 Mich 89 , People v Garay, 320 Mich App 29 ; 903 NW2d 883 (2017), rev’d in part on other grounds by 506 Mich 936 (2020), and Bennett, 335 Mich App at 426, emphasized from Miller was Miller’s dicta that LWOP sentences would likely be imposed (after application of the mitigating factors) only on those “uncommon” or “rare” juveniles who exhibit “irreparable corruption.”6 By focusing on that and similar terminology, rather than on the applicatio

2024Despite Miller’s limited holding, what this Court in People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368 ; 891 NW2d 549 (2016), rev’d in part on other grounds by Skinner, 502 Mich 89 , People v Garay, 320 Mich App 29 ; 903 NW2d 883 (2017), rev’d in part on other grounds by 506 Mich 936 (2020), and Bennett, 335 Mich App at 426, emphasized from Miller was Miller’s dicta that LWOP sentences would likely be imposed (after application of the mitigating factors) only on those “uncommon” or “rare” juveniles who exhibit “irreparable corruption.”6 By focusing on that and similar terminology, rather than on the applicatio

2022Particularly, it failed to explain whether “ ‘taking into account the attributes of youth’ [is] distinguishable in some way from considering the Miller factors and, if so, what is that distinction?” 44 The majority opinion adds to the confusion left by Wines’s holding by requiring sentencing courts to consider “the mitigating qualities of youth within Snow’s sentencing criteria” 45—which do not represent an exhaustive list of criteria to be considered in fashioning an appropriate sentence—but failing to explain how a court’s 41 See Jones, 593 US at ___; 141 S Ct 1307 (rejecting the argument th

2022Particularly, it failed to explain whether “ ‘taking into account the attributes of youth’ [is] distinguishable in some way from considering the Miller factors and, if so, what is that distinction?” 44 The majority opinion adds to the confusion left by Wines’s holding by requiring sentencing courts to consider “the mitigating qualities of youth within Snow’s sentencing criteria” 45—which do not represent an exhaustive list of criteria to be considered in fashioning an appropriate sentence—but failing to explain how a court’s 41 See Jones, 593 US at ___; 141 S Ct 1307 (rejecting the argument th

2024See Bennett, 335 Mich App at 420 (“While the Miller factors remain highly relevant, a judge resentencing an offender who has served many years in prison has the benefit of actual data regarding whether the offender’s life in prison is truly consistent with ‘irreparable corruption,’ the only ground Miller specifically identified for imposing a life-without-parole sentence.”), and 434 3 We recognized the limited holding of Miller more than a decade ago in People v Eliason, 300 Mich App 293, 309 ; 833 NW2d 357 (2013), remanded by People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 ; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), acknowledging th

2024See Bennett, 335 Mich App at 420 (“While the Miller factors remain highly relevant, a judge resentencing an offender who has served many years in prison has the benefit of actual data regarding whether the offender’s life in prison is truly consistent with ‘irreparable corruption,’ the only ground Miller specifically identified for imposing a life-without-parole sentence.”), and 434 3 We recognized the limited holding of Miller more than a decade ago in People v Eliason, 300 Mich App 293, 309 ; 833 NW2d 357 (2013), remanded by People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 ; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), acknowledging th

2022Though Killebrew deals with a defendant’s ability to contest his or her guilt if a trial court rejects a sentencing agreement contained in a plea bargain, see id. at 206-210 , the sentencing agreement herein was analogous to a Killebrew agreement in that both parties retained the right to proceed to a Miller hearing if the court rejected their agreement. 5 The parties’ sentencing agreement erroneously alluded to MCL 769.25, which governs sentencing juveniles who were convicted of homicide on or after March 4, 2014, and allows for the imposition of a maximum sentence not less than 60 years, ind

2022Though Killebrew deals with a defendant’s ability to contest his or her guilt if a trial court rejects a sentencing agreement contained in a plea bargain, see id. at 206-210 , the sentencing agreement herein was analogous to a Killebrew agreement in that both parties retained the right to proceed to a Miller hearing if the court rejected their agreement. 5 The parties’ sentencing agreement erroneously alluded to MCL 769.25, which governs sentencing juveniles who were convicted of homicide on or after March 4, 2014, and allows for the imposition of a maximum sentence not less than 60 years, ind

2024The Court easily dispensed with the defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge quoting from Montgomery: “ ‘A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.’ ” -10- to reject the Montgomery majority’s analysis that Miller applied retroactively, and to follow the reasoning of the Montgomery dissenters to conclude that Parks did not apply retroactively.8 During oral argument, this Court raised the question of the applicability, if any, of People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 ; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), cert gtd and opinio

2024The Court easily dispensed with the defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge quoting from Montgomery: “ ‘A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.’ ” -10- to reject the Montgomery majority’s analysis that Miller applied retroactively, and to follow the reasoning of the Montgomery dissenters to conclude that Parks did not apply retroactively.8 During oral argument, this Court raised the question of the applicability, if any, of People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 ; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), cert gtd and opinio

2024The Court easily dispensed with the defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge quoting from Montgomery: “ ‘A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.’ ” -10- to reject the Montgomery majority’s analysis that Miller applied retroactively, and to follow the reasoning of the Montgomery dissenters to conclude that Parks did not apply retroactively.8 During oral argument, this Court raised the question of the applicability, if any, of People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 ; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), cert gtd and opinio

2024The Court easily dispensed with the defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge quoting from Montgomery: “ ‘A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.’ ” -10- to reject the Montgomery majority’s analysis that Miller applied retroactively, and to follow the reasoning of the Montgomery dissenters to conclude that Parks did not apply retroactively.8 During oral argument, this Court raised the question of the applicability, if any, of People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 ; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), cert gtd and opinio

2022But that determination is within the discretion of the trial court, not a fact to be proven or disproven by the parties. 48 United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 233 ; 125 S Ct 738 ; 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005). 49 MCL 769.25(4). 50 Skinner, 502 Mich at 116 n 11. 15 The United States Supreme Court has come to a similar conclusion in the context of the death penalty. 51 At issue there was a state sentencing procedure that required the jury to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances such that the death

2022But that determination is within the discretion of the trial court, not a fact to be proven or disproven by the parties. 48 United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 233 ; 125 S Ct 738 ; 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005). 49 MCL 769.25(4). 50 Skinner, 502 Mich at 116 n 11. 15 The United States Supreme Court has come to a similar conclusion in the context of the death penalty. 51 At issue there was a state sentencing procedure that required the jury to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances such that the death

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022MCL 769.25(6) contains no language regarding a burden and instead imposes an unqualified requirement that the trial court must consider the Miller factors and exercise its discretion to impose either a 51 See Kansas v Carr, 577 US 108 ; 136 S Ct 633 ; 193 L Ed 2d 535 (2016). 52 State v Carr, 300 Kan 1, 308; 331 P3d 544 (2014). 53 Carr, 577 US at 119. 54 Id. 55 Id. 16 term-of-years sentence or an LWOP sentence.

2022MCL 769.25(6) contains no language regarding a burden and instead imposes an unqualified requirement that the trial court must consider the Miller factors and exercise its discretion to impose either a 51 See Kansas v Carr, 577 US 108 ; 136 S Ct 633 ; 193 L Ed 2d 535 (2016). 52 State v Carr, 300 Kan 1, 308; 331 P3d 544 (2014). 53 Carr, 577 US at 119. 54 Id. 55 Id. 16 term-of-years sentence or an LWOP sentence.

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022MCL 769.25(6) contains no language regarding a burden and instead imposes an unqualified requirement that the trial court must consider the Miller factors and exercise its discretion to impose either a 51 See Kansas v Carr, 577 US 108 ; 136 S Ct 633 ; 193 L Ed 2d 535 (2016). 52 State v Carr, 300 Kan 1, 308; 331 P3d 544 (2014). 53 Carr, 577 US at 119. 54 Id. 55 Id. 16 term-of-years sentence or an LWOP sentence.

2022MCL 769.25(6) contains no language regarding a burden and instead imposes an unqualified requirement that the trial court must consider the Miller factors and exercise its discretion to impose either a 51 See Kansas v Carr, 577 US 108 ; 136 S Ct 633 ; 193 L Ed 2d 535 (2016). 52 State v Carr, 300 Kan 1, 308; 331 P3d 544 (2014). 53 Carr, 577 US at 119. 54 Id. 55 Id. 16 term-of-years sentence or an LWOP sentence.

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022In any event, the statement in Skinner was dictum and involved an interpretation solely of the constitutional requirements under Montgomery; it did not involve procedural mechanisms attached to a legislative sentencing scheme. 14 The term “burden of proof” encompasses two separate burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 336, p 692. 12 398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n

2022Some common, nonhomicide felonies subject to parolable life include assault with intent to murder, armed robbery, and first-degree 38 Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515 . 39 “Malice” is an element of second-degree murder, People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 70 ; 731 NW2d 411 (2007), and is defined as “the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm,” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464 ; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). 40 Defendant contends, and the major

2022Some common, nonhomicide felonies subject to parolable life include assault with intent to murder, armed robbery, and first-degree 38 Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515 . 39 “Malice” is an element of second-degree murder, People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 70 ; 731 NW2d 411 (2007), and is defined as “the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm,” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464 ; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). 40 Defendant contends, and the major

2022Some common, nonhomicide felonies subject to parolable life include assault with intent to murder, armed robbery, and first-degree 38 Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515 . 39 “Malice” is an element of second-degree murder, People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 70 ; 731 NW2d 411 (2007), and is defined as “the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm,” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464 ; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). 40 Defendant contends, and the major

2022Some common, nonhomicide felonies subject to parolable life include assault with intent to murder, armed robbery, and first-degree 38 Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515 . 39 “Malice” is an element of second-degree murder, People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 70 ; 731 NW2d 411 (2007), and is defined as “the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm,” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464 ; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). 40 Defendant contends, and the major

2022Notably, the Court of Appeals concluded that the sentencing judge did not abuse her discretion even under the heightened scrutiny required by the now-overruled opinion in Hyatt, which held that imposition of an LWOP sentence on a juvenile offender required appellate courts to view such “sentence[s] as inherently suspect.” 61 Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard we announced in Skinner, I believe it was well within the range of principled outcomes for the trial court to sentence defendant to LWOP. 62 59 See Skinner, 502 Mich at 135-136 . 60 Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 27

2022Notably, the Court of Appeals concluded that the sentencing judge did not abuse her discretion even under the heightened scrutiny required by the now-overruled opinion in Hyatt, which held that imposition of an LWOP sentence on a juvenile offender required appellate courts to view such “sentence[s] as inherently suspect.” 61 Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard we announced in Skinner, I believe it was well within the range of principled outcomes for the trial court to sentence defendant to LWOP. 62 59 See Skinner, 502 Mich at 135-136 . 60 Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 27

2022That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.”) (emphasis omitted). 47 See People v Harris, 499 Mich 332, 356 ; 885 NW2d 832 (2016) (“It is not our role to rewrite the law or substitute our own policy judgment in the face of the text of the statute . . . .”); see also People v Parks, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (CLEMENT, J., dissenting); slip op at 14-19. 14 IV.

2022That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.”) (emphasis omitted). 47 See People v Harris, 499 Mich 332, 356 ; 885 NW2d 832 (2016) (“It is not our role to rewrite the law or substitute our own policy judgment in the face of the text of the statute . . . .”); see also People v Parks, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (CLEMENT, J., dissenting); slip op at 14-19. 14 IV.

2026If the prosecutor seeks a 6 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -12- sentence of life without parole, the trial court must conduct a hearing and consider the Miller factors, any other relevant criteria, and the defendant’s record while incarcerated.

2026If the prosecutor seeks a 6 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -12- sentence of life without parole, the trial court must conduct a hearing and consider the Miller factors, any other relevant criteria, and the defendant’s record while incarcerated.

2025Eads also held that the sentence “lack[ed] the requisite proportionally[]” under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), for this same reason, and because the trial court failed to consider the Miller factors.

2025Eads also held that the sentence “lack[ed] the requisite proportionally[]” under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), for this same reason, and because the trial court failed to consider the Miller factors.