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24 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Keene v. Rosasgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Keene v. Rosas, 215 AD 3d 938, 939 , 187 NYS 3d 752 (NY App Div 2023) (“It is well-settled that a video recording may be authenticated by the testimony of a witness to the recorded events * * * that the video[ ] accurately represents the subject matter depicted” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Mooney v. State, No 1561-2022, 2023 WL 6783388 (Md App Oct 13, 2023) (testimony by a witness present at the event captured by video that video was a true and accurate depiction of the events was sufficient to authenticate); Webb v. State, 339 So 3d 118, 128 (Miss 2022) (obser 2024See, e.g., Keene v. Rosas, 215 AD 3d 938, 939 , 187 NYS 3d 752 (NY App Div 2023) (“It is well-settled that a video recording may be authenticated by the testimony of a witness to the recorded events * * * that the video[ ] accurately represents the subject matter depicted” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Mooney v. State, No 1561-2022, 2023 WL 6783388 (Md App Oct 13, 2023) (testimony by a witness present at the event captured by video that video was a true and accurate depiction of the events was sufficient to authenticate); Webb v. State, 339 So 3d 118, 128 (Miss 2022) (obser | 2 | 2 |
State v. Linkgreen2 sentences2020See Hardegger v. Amsberry, 305 Or App 726, 728 , 473 P3d 576 (2020) (concluding that Link applies retroactively); Link, 297 Or App at 154-56 (concluding that the murder review hearing, in its current form, cannot cure a Miller violation). 292 Gillette v. Cain The Court determined that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479. 2020See Hardegger v. Amsberry, 305 Or App 726, 728 , 473 P3d 576 (2020) (concluding that Link applies retroactively); Link, 297 Or App at 154-56 (concluding that the murder review hearing, in its current form, cannot cure a Miller violation). 292 Gillette v. Cain The Court determined that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479. | 1 | 2 |
State of Arizona v. Ronnie Roy Veragreen2 sentences2021It requires an individualized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.”).22 22 See also State v. Vera, 235 Ariz 571, 578, 334 P3d 754, 761 (Ariz Ct App 2014), cert den, 577 US 854 (2015) (explaining that life with the possibility of parole after 25 years is “consistent with the ‘meaningful opportunity’ for release contemplated by Miller and Graham”); State v. Delgado, 323 Conn 801, 810-11 , 151 A3d 345, 351-52 (2016) (“The eighth amendment, as interpreted by Miller, does not prohibit a court from imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with the 2021It requires an individualized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.”).22 22 See also State v. Vera, 235 Ariz 571, 578, 334 P3d 754, 761 (Ariz Ct App 2014), cert den, 577 US 854 (2015) (explaining that life with the possibility of parole after 25 years is “consistent with the ‘meaningful opportunity’ for release contemplated by Miller and Graham”); State v. Delgado, 323 Conn 801, 810-11 , 151 A3d 345, 351-52 (2016) (“The eighth amendment, as interpreted by Miller, does not prohibit a court from imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Franklingreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem 2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Okorogreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem 2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem 2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem | 1 | 1 |
Nolley, Erron Keithgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem 2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem | 1 | 1 |
Franklin v. Californiagreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem 2021See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 63 Cal 4th 267, 276, 279-80, 370 P3d 1053, 1060, 1062 , cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 573 (2016) (explaining that “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of [life without parole] for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller,” but concluding that a Miller claim did not arise because the defendant was not serving the functional equivalent of life without parole); People v. Tate, 352 P3d 959, 970 (Colo 2015) (explaining that, if life without parole was determined to be unconstitutional under Miller for the defendant on rem | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2021The Court explained that a state can remedy a Miller violation “by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole.” Id. at 212 . 2021The Court explained that a state can remedy a Miller violation “by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole.” Id. at 212 . | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Denem Anthony Nullgreen2 sentences2020See White, 365 Or at 14 (citing Null, 836 NW2d at 71-72 (a sentence that releases the juvenile offender “in his or her late sixties after a half century of incarceration” is subject to the rationales of Graham and Miller); Casiano, 317 Conn at 79, 115 A3d at 1048 (“Miller must be followed when considering whether to sentence a juvenile offender to fifty years imprisonment without parole.”)). 2020See White, 365 Or at 14 (citing Null, 836 NW2d at 71-72 (a sentence that releases the juvenile offender “in his or her late sixties after a half century of incarceration” is subject to the rationales of Graham and Miller); Casiano, 317 Conn at 79, 115 A3d at 1048 (“Miller must be followed when considering whether to sentence a juvenile offender to fifty years imprisonment without parole.”)). | 1 | 1 |
Roper v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2020See White, 365 Or at 7-10 (discussing “the genesis of Miller” and “the state of the law before Miller was decided in 2012” (citing Roper, 543 US at 569-74 (observing that differences juvenile offender cannot do anything as a practical matter to demonstrate rehabilitation because of the acts he took as a juvenile,” and that “that * * * conclusion is [inconsistent] with the * * * United States Supreme Court directive that we have that juveniles can be rehabilitated.” 4 In defendant’s last appeal, we declined to address defendant’s argument that the same 600-month sentence was unconstitutional un 2020See White, 365 Or at 7-10 (discussing “the genesis of Miller” and “the state of the law before Miller was decided in 2012” (citing Roper, 543 US at 569-74 (observing that differences juvenile offender cannot do anything as a practical matter to demonstrate rehabilitation because of the acts he took as a juvenile,” and that “that * * * conclusion is [inconsistent] with the * * * United States Supreme Court directive that we have that juveniles can be rehabilitated.” 4 In defendant’s last appeal, we declined to address defendant’s argument that the same 600-month sentence was unconstitutional un | 1 | 1 |
White v. Premogreen2 sentences2020We do so now in light of the novel developments in constitutional law that limit the availability of sentences that do not provide juvenile offenders a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” to the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Miller, 567 US at 479-80 (internal quotation marks omitted); see White, 365 Or at 11 (concluding that the petitioner was not procedurally barred from raising his Miller claim in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the “rule that the Court articulated in Mil 2020See White, 365 Or at 7-10 (discussing “the genesis of Miller” and “the state of the law before Miller was decided in 2012” (citing Roper, 543 US at 569-74 (observing that differences juvenile offender cannot do anything as a practical matter to demonstrate rehabilitation because of the acts he took as a juvenile,” and that “that * * * conclusion is [inconsistent] with the * * * United States Supreme Court directive that we have that juveniles can be rehabilitated.” 4 In defendant’s last appeal, we declined to address defendant’s argument that the same 600-month sentence was unconstitutional un | 1 | 1 |
Hardegger v. Amsberrygreen2 sentences2020See Hardegger v. Amsberry, 305 Or App 726, 728 , 473 P3d 576 (2020) (concluding that Link applies retroactively); Link, 297 Or App at 154-56 (concluding that the murder review hearing, in its current form, cannot cure a Miller violation). 292 Gillette v. Cain The Court determined that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479. 2020See Hardegger v. Amsberry, 305 Or App 726, 728 , 473 P3d 576 (2020) (concluding that Link applies retroactively); Link, 297 Or App at 154-56 (concluding that the murder review hearing, in its current form, cannot cure a Miller violation). 292 Gillette v. Cain The Court determined that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2020We do so now in light of the novel developments in constitutional law that limit the availability of sentences that do not provide juvenile offenders a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” to the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Miller, 567 US at 479-80 (internal quotation marks omitted); see White, 365 Or at 11 (concluding that the petitioner was not procedurally barred from raising his Miller claim in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the “rule that the Court articulated in Mil | 1 | 1 |
| Semple v. Casianogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Contrerasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Berman v. Krogergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Warnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Warnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Tabrongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Manzogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gravesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2020We did that despite Montgomery’s clarification that the Miller requirement to consider a juvenile offender’s youth at the time of sentencing is limited to those cases in which a child could be “condemn[ed] * * * to die in prison.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ US ___, ___, 136 S Ct 718, 726 , 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016). 2020We did that despite Montgomery’s clarification that the Miller requirement to consider a juvenile offender’s youth at the time of sentencing is limited to those cases in which a child could be “condemn[ed] * * * to die in prison.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ US ___, ___, 136 S Ct 718, 726 , 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016). | 4 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Sassarini
green
2 sentences2024State v. Barden, 309 Or App 87, 92-93 , 481 P3d 359 (2021) (citing Sassarini, 300 Or App at 126 ). question whether—although the proponent of the evidence is not required to meet all of the Miller factors—Davis’s testimony satisfies them sufficiently to allow the jury to make the ultimate determination on the videos’ authenticity. 2024State v. Barden, 309 Or App 87, 92-93 , 481 P3d 359 (2021) (citing Sassarini, 300 Or App at 126 ). question whether—although the proponent of the evidence is not required to meet all of the Miller factors—Davis’s testimony satisfies them sufficiently to allow the jury to make the ultimate determination on the videos’ authenticity. | 3 | 2021–2024 |
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2021The record shows that the court set a hearing a few days out and explicitly noted ‘at that time we’ll bring you back before the Court if you want to ask for a preliminary [hearing] if you had time, you’d certainly be free to do that.’ Defendant has presented us no persuasive authority that—at this early stage—a trial court cannot temporarily defer its Miller inquiry and employ appointed counsel to both help clarify a defendant’s equivocal request and to ensure that any eventual unequivocal request is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Brooks, 301 Or App 419, 428-29 , 456 P3d 665 (2 2021The record shows that the court set a hearing a few days out and explicitly noted ‘at that time we’ll bring you back before the Court if you want to ask for a preliminary [hearing] if you had time, you’d certainly be free to do that.’ Defendant has presented us no persuasive authority that—at this early stage—a trial court cannot temporarily defer its Miller inquiry and employ appointed counsel to both help clarify a defendant’s equivocal request and to ensure that any eventual unequivocal request is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Brooks, 301 Or App 419, 428-29 , 456 P3d 665 (2 | 3 | 2020–2024 |
State v. Barden
green
2 sentences2024To meet the prima facie requirements of authentication, the Miller factors are not ‘irrelevant,’ but they are also not ‘rigid’ or ‘demanding.’ ” State v. Barden, 309 Or App 87, 93 , 481 P3d 359 , rev den, 368 Or 511 (2021). 2024To meet the prima facie requirements of authentication, the Miller factors are not ‘irrelevant,’ but they are also not ‘rigid’ or ‘demanding.’ ” State v. Barden, 309 Or App 87, 93 , 481 P3d 359 , rev den, 368 Or 511 (2021). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Music
neutral
2 sentences2023On appeal, defendant further asserts, citing State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514 , 295 P3d 158 (2013), and State v. Music, 305 Or App 13 , 467 P3d 812 (2020), that because he made requests to represent himself, he triggered the trial court’s “obligation” to “make the Miller inquiry,” in which the court must determine whether the defendant’s decision is made knowingly and intelligently. 2023On appeal, defendant further asserts, citing State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514 , 295 P3d 158 (2013), and State v. Music, 305 Or App 13 , 467 P3d 812 (2020), that because he made requests to represent himself, he triggered the trial court’s “obligation” to “make the Miller inquiry,” in which the court must determine whether the defendant’s decision is made knowingly and intelligently. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2023On appeal, defendant further asserts, citing State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514 , 295 P3d 158 (2013), and State v. Music, 305 Or App 13 , 467 P3d 812 (2020), that because he made requests to represent himself, he triggered the trial court’s “obligation” to “make the Miller inquiry,” in which the court must determine whether the defendant’s decision is made knowingly and intelligently. 2023On appeal, defendant further asserts, citing State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514 , 295 P3d 158 (2013), and State v. Music, 305 Or App 13 , 467 P3d 812 (2020), that because he made requests to represent himself, he triggered the trial court’s “obligation” to “make the Miller inquiry,” in which the court must determine whether the defendant’s decision is made knowingly and intelligently. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Page
neutral
2 sentences2006See State v. Warner, 200 Or App 65 , 112 P3d 464 (2005), rev allowed, 340 Or 157 (2006) (careless driving, driving uninsured, and failure to carry proof of insurance violations did not bar subsequent prosecutions for DUII and reckless driving); State v. Page, 200 Or App 55 , 113 P3d 447 , rev den, 339 Or 450 (2005) (driving while suspended violation did not bar subsequent prosecution for DUII). 5 In that regard, the citation for refusing to take a breath test stands in the same relationship to the DUII arrest as the exclusion order did to the prostitution arrest in Lhasawa . 2006Id. at 64 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Tidyman
green
2 sentences1987As Judge Tanzer aptly noted in State v. Tidyman, 30 Or App 537, 547 , 568 P2d 666 , rev den 280 Or 683 (1977), the problem with the United States Supreme Court’s approach to obscene expression is that it permits government to decide what constitutes socially acceptable expression, which is precisely what Madison decried: “The difficulty [with the United States Supreme Court’s approach] arises from the anomaly that the very purpose of the First Amendment is to protect expression which fails to conform to community standards.” We hold that characterizing expression as “obscenity” under any defin 1987As Judge Tanzer aptly noted in State v. Tidyman, 30 Or App 537, 547 , 568 P2d 666 , rev den 280 Or 683 (1977), the problem with the United States Supreme Court’s approach to obscene expression is that it permits government to decide what constitutes socially acceptable expression, which is precisely what Madison decried: “The difficulty [with the United States Supreme Court’s approach] arises from the anomaly that the very purpose of the First Amendment is to protect expression which fails to conform to community standards.” We hold that characterizing expression as “obscenity” under any defin | 2 | 1986–1987 |
State v. Glasby
green
2 sentences2024The trial court made no such inquiry, and the record does not reflect that it balanced “defendant’s right to self-representation against the court’s potential basis for denying the request.” State v. Glasby, 301 Or App 479, 484 , 456 P3d 305 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2024The trial court made no such inquiry, and the record does not reflect that it balanced “defendant’s right to self-representation against the court’s potential basis for denying the request.” State v. Glasby, 301 Or App 479, 484 , 456 P3d 305 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
New York v. Ferber
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 764-65 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Verna
green
2 sentences2021State v. Davis, 110 Or App 358, 360 , 822 P2d 736 (1991); Verna, 9 Or App at 627 . 2021State v. Davis, 110 Or App 358, 360 , 822 P2d 736 (1991); Verna, 9 Or App at 627 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2021State v. Davis, 110 Or App 358, 360 , 822 P2d 736 (1991); Verna, 9 Or App at 627 . 2021State v. Davis, 110 Or App 358, 360 , 822 P2d 736 (1991); Verna, 9 Or App at 627 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Delgado
green
2 sentences2021It requires an individualized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.”).22 22 See also State v. Vera, 235 Ariz 571, 578, 334 P3d 754, 761 (Ariz Ct App 2014), cert den, 577 US 854 (2015) (explaining that life with the possibility of parole after 25 years is “consistent with the ‘meaningful opportunity’ for release contemplated by Miller and Graham”); State v. Delgado, 323 Conn 801, 810-11 , 151 A3d 345, 351-52 (2016) (“The eighth amendment, as interpreted by Miller, does not prohibit a court from imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with the 2021It requires an individualized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.”).22 22 See also State v. Vera, 235 Ariz 571, 578, 334 P3d 754, 761 (Ariz Ct App 2014), cert den, 577 US 854 (2015) (explaining that life with the possibility of parole after 25 years is “consistent with the ‘meaningful opportunity’ for release contemplated by Miller and Graham”); State v. Delgado, 323 Conn 801, 810-11 , 151 A3d 345, 351-52 (2016) (“The eighth amendment, as interpreted by Miller, does not prohibit a court from imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with the | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ortega
green
2 sentences2021In State v. Ortega, 286 Or App 673, 674 , 399 P3d 470 (2017), we held: “Specifically, the record of the operative pretrial hearing discloses that, notwithstanding defendant’s initial, unambiguous request (‘I don’t want the services of the lawyer. 2021In State v. Ortega, 286 Or App 673, 674 , 399 P3d 470 (2017), we held: “Specifically, the record of the operative pretrial hearing discloses that, notwithstanding defendant’s initial, unambiguous request (‘I don’t want the services of the lawyer. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Pichardo
green
1 sentence2020Pichardo, 360 Or at 762 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Backstrand
green
2 sentences2020Accepting the trial court’s supported factual findings and otherwise reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, State v. Backstrand, 354 Or 392 , 405 n 12, 313 P3d 1084 (2013), we conclude that the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that the officer’s concerns and ensuing weapons inquiry were objectively reasonable under the “not * * * demanding” Jimenez/Miller standard. 2020Accepting the trial court’s supported factual findings and otherwise reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, State v. Backstrand, 354 Or 392 , 405 n 12, 313 P3d 1084 (2013), we conclude that the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that the officer’s concerns and ensuing weapons inquiry were objectively reasonable under the “not * * * demanding” Jimenez/Miller standard. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Warner green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Lhasawa green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Selness green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Dumont green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. New Horizons, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Commonwealth v. United Books, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People Ex Rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Wrestle, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Leech v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| City of Portland v. Jacobsky green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Hollins green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Commonwealth v. Stock green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Lesieure green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Hakim v. Commissioner neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Taylor v. Tennessee green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Taylor v. State Ex Rel. Kirkpatrick green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Burch v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Miller v. California green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.